United States v. Forrest ( 2003 )

Opinions of the United
2003 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
4-23-2003
USA v. Forrest
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket 02-2860
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"USA v. Forrest" (2003). 2003 Decisions. Paper 631.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No: 02-2860
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
BRUCE FORREST,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
District Court Judge: The Honorable Jay C. Waldman
(D.C. Civil No. 00-cr-00066-5)
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
April 11, 2003
Before: ALITO, FUENTES, and PISANO* Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: April 23, 2003)
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________________
*Honorable Joel A. Pisano, United States District Judge for the District of New
Jersey, sitting by designation.
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Bruce Forrest (“Forrest”) appeals his mandatory sentence of 240 months
imprisonment imposed by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Forrest claims that the District Court
should have departed downward from the statutory minimum sentence based on the age of
the prior conviction that triggered the enhanced penalty provision of § 841(b)(1)(A).
Because we conclude that the District Court lacked the authority to do so, we affirm the
Judgment of July 1, 2002, sentencing Forrest to 240 months imprisonment.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Because we write solely for the parties, our review of the factual background is
limited to that which is necessary to inform our opinion today. Between October 19, 1999
and January 14, 2000, Forrest and four co-defendants met with an undercover police
officer on approximately four occasions and sold him “crack” cocaine. Two of those sales
took place at 4804 Tackawanna Street in Philadelphia, which is located within 1,000 feet of
the Whitehall Public Housing Development.
On May 3, 2000, Forrest appeared before the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania and, pursuant to the terms of a written plea agreement,
pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute “crack” cocaine, one count of
distribution of “crack” cocaine and aiding and abetting, and two counts of distribution of
“crack” cocaine within 1,000 feet of a public housing project. Forrest stipulated that he
distributed, or aided and abetted the distribution of, between 150 and 500 grams of “crack”
cocaine.
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At the time of sentencing, on June 27, 2002, the Government filed a Superseding
Information Charging Prior Offense based on a felony drug conviction entered by the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas on or about March 30, 1977. Because Forrest’s
offense involved more than 50 grams of “crack” cocaine and occurred after a separate
felony drug conviction, the District Court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of
twenty years imprisonment under § 841(b)(1)(A).
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We
exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over a final decision of a district court. As
Forrest neglected to raise this challenge at sentencing, we review the District Court’s
refusal to depart below the mandatory minimum sentence for plain error. United States v.
Couch, 291 F.3d 251, 252-53 (3d Cir. 2002).
III. Discussion
Forrest argues that just as a sentencing court may depart downward under the
sentencing guidelines if a defendant’s career offender status “overrepresents” his criminal
history, a sentencing court should also be permitted to depart from “other sentencing
mandates” that cause an “overrepresentation” of criminal history. Basically, Forrest claims
that, because his prior conviction from 1977 occurred so long ago, the District Court
should not have considered it in determining whether the mandatory minimum provision of
§ 841(b)(1)(A) applied to his case.
Unlike the sentencing guidelines, § 841(b)(1)(A) provides no general authority for a
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departure, nor any authority to depart based on the age of a prior conviction. Sentencing
courts may depart below the statutory mandatory minimum only if particular requirements
are met, including the condition that “the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal
history point, as determined under the sentencing guidelines.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).
Unfortunately, Forrest fails to meet this requirement.
Even if we were to agree that the resulting sentence imposed under § 841(b)(1)(A)
is harsh, “[w]e have no constitutional authority to adopt a new exception to the mandatory
minimum penalty requirements of 21 U.S.C. § 841, 844, and 846.” United States v.
Valencia-Andrade, 72 F.3d 770, 774 (9th Cir. 1995). “The Supreme Court [has] instructed
federal courts to resist the temptation to extend the reach of a statute beyond the express
intention of Congress, to avoid a harsh result.” Id. In sum, this Court lacks any basis on
which to reduce Forrest’s sentence.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the District
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Court.
/s/ Julio M. Fuentes
Circuit Judge
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