United States v. Holmes ( 2003 )

Opinions of the United
2003 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
5-30-2003
USA v. Holmes
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket 02-3241
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 02-3241
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MARQUIS HOLM ES,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 01-cr-00041E)
District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
Argued May 13, 2003
Before: RENDELL, SMITH and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
(Filed May 30, 2003)
Karen S. Gerlach, Esq. [ARGUED]
Office of Federal Public Defender
1001 Liberty Avenue
1450 Liberty Center
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Counsel for Appellant
Bonnie R. Schlueter, Esq.
Michael L. Ivory, Esq.
Christine A. Sanner, Esq. [ARGUED]
Office of U.S. Attorney
633 U.S. Post Office & Courthouse
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Counsel for Appellee
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Following his conditional guilty plea on a charge of possession with the intent to
deliver crack cocaine, Marquis Holmes appeals from the District Court’s denial of his
Motion to Suppress. The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We will affirm.
As we write solely for the parties, we need not detail the factual background of this
appeal. Holmes argues that the police were without probable cause to arrest him, and
thus that the evidence obtained pursuant to that arrest should have been suppressed. In
response, the government primarily contends that the actions of the police did not rise to
the level of an arrest, but instead merely constituted a stop valid under cases such as Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Alternatively, the government maintains that even if Holmes
was immediately arrested, there was plenty of evidence to establish probable cause.
In reviewing a suppression order, we review the district court’s findings of fact for
clear error and conclusions of law de novo. See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d
251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002). We construe the record in the light most favorable to the
government, but “refrain from drawing inferences that are either not supported by the
record, or contrary to it, in an effort to uphold an arrest.” Id.We agree that the police officers’ actions here were clearly supported by probable
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cause. Probable cause is not a rigid or fixed standard. Instead, it is a “fluid concept,” a
common sense determination evaluated carefully on each unique set of facts. Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983); United States v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 98 (3d Cir. 2002).
It requires “only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual
showing of such activity.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 243 n.13. For cases, like the one here,
involving warrantless arrests, we have recently stated the standard as follows:
Probable cause exists whenever reasonably trustworthy information or
circumstances within a police officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a
person of reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has been committed by
the person being arrested. . . . “[T]he determination that probable cause exists for
a warrantless arrest is fundamentally a factual analysis that must be performed by
the officers at the scene. It is the function of the court to determine whether the
objective facts available to the officers at the time of arrest were sufficient to
justify a reasonable belief that an offense was being committed.”
Myers, 308 F.3d at 255 (quoting United States v. Glasser, 750 F.2d 1197, 1206 (3d Cir.
1984)); see also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964). Although “probable cause must
ultimately be decided by the courts, not the police,” Myers, 308 F.3d at 255, we must take
care to “remember that police officers may well ‘draw inferences and make deductions . .
. that might well elude an untrained person.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).
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Contrary to Holmes’s attempted characterization, this was not simply a case of the
police unjustifiably relying on an untrustworthy informant; indeed, the record is replete
with evidence from which the police could have reasonably concluded that Holmes was
likely engaged in criminal activity. First, the police had the statements of the confidential
informant, whose tips had proven reliable in the past. She stated that a large black man,
who was being driven around by a car salesman named Russ, had sold her crack in the
apartment of a man named Gino. Second, the police had the statements of McDeavitt
(also known as Russell Lawrence), which independently corroborated everything the
confidential informant had stated: He was a car dealer named Russ who was driving
around Holmes – a large black man – and was assisting Holmes in selling crack in the
apartment of a man named Gino. This story was echoed by the concerned citizen in the
neighborhood, who stated that a large black man had been going to Gino’s apartment and
that traffic increased in the area when he was there. He also stated that a Brenda Baker
was at Gino’s frequently, confirming a similar statement of McDeavitt’s.
In addition, the police confirmed McDeavitt’s statement that Holmes had previous
drug and firearms convictions and was presently under supervision. The police also had
the benefit of the recorded phone conversation between M cDeavitt and Holmes.
Although the discussion was not particularly specific or enlightening, it did suggest that
the two were indeed participating in some illicit behavior, likely involving drugs. Finally,
on the day of the failed buy/bust, McDeavitt showed up with the crack he was supposed
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to deliver – presumably from Holmes – in addition to a quantity of crack supposedly to be
delivered to another of Holmes’s customers, an individual who was known by the police
to be involved in the Oil City crack traffic. And, when the police arrived at Marini’s
apartment, McDeavitt, Marini, and Holmes were there, just as McDeavitt had said.
In light of all this evidence, Holmes’s challenge to the officers’ reliance on
McDeavitt’s statements is unconvincing. In evaluating the worth of an informant’s
report, we employ a “totality of the circumstances” approach, considering, among other
factors, the informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge. Gates, 462 U.S. at
230; see also United States v. Roberson, 90 F.3d 75, 77 (3d Cir. 1996). Here, despite the
fact that both the guns-for-drugs exchange and buy/bust ultimately failed to occur, the
“totality of the circumstances” clearly supports McDeavitt’s reliability. His statements
were made against his penal interest and from his direct involvement, and many of them
were independently corroborated or otherwise turned out to be true. Further, McDeavitt
worked with the police extensively and in person, giving the officers ample opportunity to
evaluate his trustworthiness, and there is no evidence that any of the officers involved
ever doubted his credibility. Little more is necessary under our case law. See, e.g.,
United States v. Nelson, 284 F.3d 472, 482-84 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Valentine,
232 F.3d 350, 353-56 (3d Cir. 2000).
The “reasonably trustworthy information or circumstances within” the officers’
knowledge here was certainly “sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to
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conclude that an offense ha[d] been committed by” Holmes. Accordingly, we will
AFFIRM.
_________________________
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TO THE CLERK OF COURT:
Please file the foregoing not precedential opinion.
/s/ Marjorie O. Rendell
Circuit Judge
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