Carroll v. Rochford , 71 F. App'x 124 ( 2003 )

Opinions of the United
2003 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
7-30-2003
Carroll v. Rochford
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 02-3771
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Recommended Citation
"Carroll v. Rochford" (2003). 2003 Decisions. Paper 333.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 02-3771
WILLIAM AND ANNE MARIE CARROLL
v.
EDWARD ROCHFORD, individually and in his official capacity as Morris County
Sheriff; JACK DEMPSEY, individually and in his capacity as Morris County
Undersheriff; MORRIS COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; JOHN B. DANGLER,
in his official capacity as Morris County Prosecutor; MICHAEL LOWE, individually and
in his capacity as Internal Affairs Officer with the Morris County Sheriff’s Office;
RICHARD ROSE, individually and in his capacity as Detective of the Morris County
Prosecutor’s Office; ANTHONY CALAMITO, individually and in his capacity as
Detective of the Morris County Prosecutor’s Office; MORRIS COUNTY
PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE; COUNTY OF M ORRIS; JOHN DOES 1-6; fictitious names
for individuals as yet unknown,
Edward V. Rochford and Jack Dempsey,
Appellants
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(Dist. Court No. 99-CV-05669)
District Court Judge: William H. Walls
Argued on June 16, 2003
Before: ALITO, ROTH, HALL,* Circuit Judges
*
The Honorable Cynthia Holcomb Hall, Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting
by designation.
Opinion Filed: July 30, 2003
Dennis A. Durkin, Esquire
John A. Testa, Esquire
Durkin & Durkin
1120 Bloomfield Avenue
Suite 204
West Caldwell, NJ 07007
Counsel for Appellees
Frederic M. Knapp
Stephen E. Trimboli
Courter, Kobert, Laufer & Cohen
23 Cattano Avenue
Morristown, NJ 07960
Counsel for Appellants
OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM:
Edward V. Rochford, the Sheriff of Morris County, and Undersheriff Jack
Dempsey contend that the District Court erred in denying their qualified-immunity
summary judgment motion as to William Carroll’s 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim alleging a
violation of his constitutional right to freedom of association. As a pure question of law
is at issue, we exercise plenary review over a District Court’s decision. McLaughlin v.
Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 570 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. den., 535 U.S. 989 (2002).
Government officials performing discretionary functions are afforded qualified
-2-
immunity from civil damages in suits brought pursuant to Section 1983. Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982). A two-part standard is used to determine whether
public officials are entitled to qualified immunity. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.194, 200-02
(2001). First, a court must determine (based on the view of the facts that is pertinent to
the procedural stage at which the motion is made) whether the official’s conduct violated
a constitutional right. Id. at 201. Second, if the facts show that a right has indeed been
violated, a court must determine, as a matter of law, whether the constitutional right was
“clearly established” at the time of the official’s action. Id.1 This second step of the
analysis requires a court to both define the right at issue with a sufficient degree of
specificity, Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987), and to analyze the facts of
the case in light of relevant case law extant at the time of the alleged conduct.
McLaughlin v. Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 572 (2001). If a motion for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity is denied, the defendant may under some circumstances take
an immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S.
304, 312 (1995).
1
A government official may be held personally liable for an official action only
where the contours of the particular right allegedly violated are “sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1982). The clarity of the right at issue is evaluated at the
time the official’s allegedly unlawful action was taken, Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, and an
official may be entitled to immunity if “based on the information available to them they
could have believed that their conduct would be consistent with” contemporaneous
governing legal principles. Good v. Dauphin County Social Services for Children and
Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1092 (3d Cir. 1989).
-3-
In Forbes v. Township of Lower Merion, 313 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 2002), we
announced a supervisory rule that applies when a District Court denies a qualified
immunity summary judgment motion. This rule requires District Courts to “specify those
material facts that are and are not subject to genuine dispute and explain their
materiality.” Id. As we discussed in Forbes, this rule is designed to assist us in
determining whether we have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Under Jones, “a
defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not appeal a district
court’s summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the
pretrial record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial.” Id. at 319-20. Rather, a
defendant may appeal the District Court’s collateral order only as to the purely legal
question of whether the Court made an error of law, in which case “the court of appeals
can simply take, as given, the facts that the district court assumed when it denied
summary judgment for that (purely legal) reason.” Id. at 319.
The rule announced in Forbes is applicable in the matter now before us as the
District Court rejected the defendant’s summary judgment motion, which was based on
qualified immunity, upon a determination that “there was a genuine issue of material fact
regarding the issue of political retaliation by Defendants.” App. at 9 (Dist. Ct. Letter
Order, September 25, 2002, at 3). Our review of the record reveals that the District Court
did not identify the particular facts that are in dispute or explain the materiality of those
-4-
facts in relation to the qualified immunity issue.2
The District Court’s order was entered prior to our opinion in Forbes, and we do
not fault the District Court for failing to comply with a rule that had not yet been
announced, but in order to ensure that we do not exceed our jurisdiction, we vacate the
order of the District Court and remand for compliance with the Forbes rule. Upon
complying with that rule, the District Court should enter a new order granting or denying
the motion. If aggrieved, the current appellants can take a new appeal at that time and
raise any issues that are properly within our jurisdiction.
2
In denying the appellant’s motion, the District Court simply stated that “[t]aken in
the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Rochford and Dempsey’s conduct could show that
they violated Carroll’s First Amendment Right to not be harassed for his political
beliefs.” App. at 10 (Dist. Ct. Letter Order, September 25, 2002, at 4). The court went on
to note that
[b]oth Rochford and Dempsey were direct superiors to Carroll and were
allegedly the political rivals of John Fox. According to Plaintiff, they
caused him to be demoted, harassed at work, wrongfully charged and
terminated. It is reasonable to conclude that a reasonable officer would
comprehend the unlawfulness of basing any hiring decision of a public
employee on party affiliation and support when party affiliation is not a
requirement for the position.
Id.