Ziegler v. Eby ( 2003 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2003 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    10-7-2003
    Ziegler v. Eby
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 03-1126
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003
    Recommended Citation
    "Ziegler v. Eby" (2003). 2003 Decisions. Paper 217.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003/217
    This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2003 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    __________
    No. 03-1126
    __________
    AARON ZIEGLER, by the Estate of
    Aaron Ziegler by Rosalie M. Ziegler, Administratrix,
    Appellant
    v.
    WILLIAM EBY; LARRY RAMPOLO;
    RICHARD F. BEIERSCHMITT, Superintendent;
    MARY E. JOHN; MT. CARMEL AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT;
    DONALD P. GEARY; BOROUGH OF MT. CARMEL
    __________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    Civil Action No. 02-cv-00618
    District Judge: Honorable Malcolm Muir
    __________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    October 3, 2003
    ___________
    Before: RENDELL, WEIS, and GARTH, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion Filed: October 7, 2003)
    __________
    OPINION
    __________
    Garth, Circuit Judge:
    While a senior in high school, Aaron Ziegler received a ten-day suspension for
    appearing to be under the influence of marijuana while on school grounds. He was
    arrested one month later at school and charged with several misdemeanors arising out of
    the alleged drug use. Two police officers transported Aaron to a local magistrate to be
    arraigned. Following his graduation from high school, Aaron pled no contest to a single
    misdemeanor charge of drug possession pursuant to a plea agreement with the district
    attorney. While awaiting sentencing, however, he took his own life.
    Aaron’s mother, Rosalie Ziegler, subsequently filed a Section 1983 1 lawsuit in her
    son’s name against the arresting police officers (Larry Rompallo,2 William Eby, and
    Donald Geary), the school district superintendent (Richard Beierschmitt), the high school
    principal (Mary John), the school district, and the local borough.3 The complaint alleges
    that the defendants violated, and conspired to violate, Aaron’s First, Fourth, and Sixth
    Amendment rights by planning and carrying out a “vindictive conspiracy intending to
    humiliate, demean, and harass” Aaron, and that “his suicide was a reasonably foreseeable
    result of their intentional misconduct.” (Complaint ¶¶ 1, 28.) In four separate orders
    issued over a five-month period, the District Court granted summary judgment to certain
    1
    See 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    .
    2
    Rompallo’s name is misspelled as “Rampolo” in the caption.
    3
    We will refer to Rosalie Ziegler as “Ziegler” and to Aaron Ziegler as “Aaron.”
    -2-
    of the defendants (Beierschmitt, John, Eby, and Geary) and dismissed the complaint as to
    the remaining defendants (the school district and Rompallo).
    I.
    Although Ziegler filed an amended notice of appeal on January 16, 2003, which
    specifically appealed from the District Court’s August 9, 2002 order (granting summary
    judgment in favor of Beierschmitt and John), Ziegler had previously filed a notice of
    appeal reading, “[n]otice is hereby given that the . . . plaintiffs hereby appeals [sic] . . .
    from the decision . . . for the U.S. District Court . . . entered on December 30, 2003 [sic].”
    (Appellant’s Appendix at 11.) The December 30, 2002 order, which granted Eby and
    Geary’s motion for summary judgment, was the final order entered by the District Court.
    While we would normally be guided, and have jurisdiction over, those orders designated
    in the notice of appeal, see Elfman Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 
    567 F.2d 1252
    , 1254
    (3d Cir. 1977), here the original notice of appeal and the amended notice of appeal, both
    of which included and specified the December 30, 2002 final order, would appear to
    bring up the District Court’s earlier orders for our review. We note, however, that
    motions panels of our court previously granted motions to dismiss as parties to the appeal
    the following two defendants: Rompallo and Mt. Carmel Area School District. We agree
    with that result in part, first: because the brief on appeal submitted by Ziegler addresses
    primarily the judgment entered in favor of Beierschmitt (the superintendent) and John
    (the school principal), and argues that they were liable because Aaron’s arrest on school
    -3-
    grounds was “contrary to the stated customary policy of the defendants Beierschmitt,
    Johns’ [sic] and the School District.” (Appellant’s Brief at 8.) Second: the brief does not
    specifically identify the other defendants against whom relief is sought, but only alleges
    that the defendants sought to make Aaron an object of ridicule in order to retaliate against
    him; that when he arrived at the magistrate’s office to be arraigned he was “held so the
    press could arrive;” that he was a news item on the six o’clock news; that the defendants
    were not entitled to qualified immunity; that they knew Aaron suffered from depression
    and was subject to mental and emotional pressures; and that he was intimidated and
    harassed by the police.
    The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 and we
    have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1291. Our review is plenary.
    II.
    Ziegler’s brief does not refer to any evidence submitted on behalf of Ziegler and in
    opposition to the summary judgment motions or motions to dismiss which were filed in
    the District Court. Nor does the brief distinguish among the status or liability of the
    particular defendants.
    Among other issues discussed in Ziegler’s brief, Ziegler argues on appeal that,
    under the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Wilson v. Layne, 
    526 U.S. 603
    (1999) and Hanlon v. Berger, 
    526 U.S. 808
     (1999), the defendants are not entitled to
    qualified immunity. The Supreme Court held in those two companion cases that the
    -4-
    Fourth Amendment does not permit the police to bring the news media into a person’s
    home (or onto residential property) during the execution of a warrant. See Wilson, 
    526 U.S. at 614
    ; Hanlon, 
    526 U.S. at 809-10
    . Here, the complaint alleges that the school
    officials conspired with local police to make an example of, and retaliate against, Aaron
    because of his refusal to submit to a drug test on the day that he appeared to be under the
    influence of marijuana. (Complaint ¶¶ 13-28.) As we have stated, they allegedly carried
    out this conspiracy by first arresting Aaron at the high school in handcuffs and leg
    shackles and then by alerting the media and waiting for local reporters to arrive at the
    magistrate’s office before removing Aaron from a police cruiser and escorting him into
    the building. (Id.)
    Following a careful and independent review of the record, we have determined that
    it is not necessary for us to decide whether the police violated the Fourth Amendment by
    allegedly alerting the news media to Aaron’s arrest and waiting for them to arrive at the
    magistrate’s office before removing Aaron from the police vehicle.4 See Christopher v.
    Harbury, 
    536 U.S. 403
    , 417 (2002) (explaining that federal judiciary has an obligation “to
    avoid deciding constitutional issues needlessly”).
    The District Court determined, and we agree, that the uncontroverted evidence
    does not support the factual allegations in the complaint. The Chief of Police, who
    4
    Caldarola v. County of Westchester, -- F.3d --, 
    2003 WL 22080012
     (2d Cir.
    Sept. 9, 2003), a recent case from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussing
    allegations similar to those raised by Ziegler, held them not actionable.
    -5-
    accompanied Aaron to the local magistrate’s office, submitted an affidavit stating that he
    and Rompallo “did not delay taking Ziegler before District Justice Mychak for
    arraignment.” (Appellant’s Appendix at 95, ¶ 8.) The other police officer who remains a
    party to this appeal submitted an affidavit swearing that he did not even accompany
    Aaron to the magistrate’s office. (Appellant’s Appendix at 98, ¶ 9.) Ziegler did not
    submit any evidence to refute these or any other affidavits produced by any of the
    defendants. And the complaint was not verified, thereby precluding the District Court
    from treating it as the equivalent of an affidavit for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 56(e). See, e.g., Reese v. Sparks, 
    760 F.2d 64
    , 67 (3d Cir. 1985) (treating
    verified complaint as an affidavit on summary judgment motion). Nor is there any
    evidence in the record which suggests that the police or school officials conspired to
    involve the media in a plan to retaliate against Aaron. Indeed, the District Court in its
    August 9, 2002 order pertaining to Beierschmitt and John, made findings of fact based on
    this uncontroverted evidence and concluded that:
    With respect to Plaintiff’s remaining claims it is difficult to
    understand how Defendants Beierschmitt and John violated Aaron Ziegler’s
    constitutional rights. Aaron Ziegler committed suicide 69 days after he
    graduated from high school and 145 days after the conclusion of his
    suspension. We are unaware of any case where a court has imposed a
    constitutional duty on a school official to prevent a student’s suicide after
    the student has graduated from the school and is no longer within the
    school’s control when the suicide occurred. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not
    presented any evidence suggesting that Aaron Ziegler was suicidal when he
    attended school, that Defendants Beierschmitt or John were aware of his
    suicidal tendencies or that they failed to take appropriate action.*
    -6-
    * Again, Plaintiff has failed to explain by way of affidavit why she
    could not “present by affidavit facts essential to justify” her
    opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
    (Appellant’s Appendix at 26-27.)
    III.
    Ziegler also argues on appeal that there are no facts controverting the
    remaining allegations in the complaint, such as the claim that Aaron’s arrest on school
    grounds was a planned event or that he was arrested in retaliation for his refusal to submit
    to a drug test. We are satisfied, however, that even if those allegations may be deemed
    true, (and as noted there is no evidence supporting them), the defendants did not violate
    any “clearly established” right under the First, Fourth, or Sixth Amendments and
    therefore are entitled to qualified immunity. See Wilson, 
    526 U.S. at 609
    . We also note
    that the connection between the defendants’ alleged conduct in March and April of 2001
    and Aaron’s suicide on August 13, 2001 is too legally attenuated, both because of the
    passage of time and Aaron’s interceding high school graduation.
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court will be
    AFFIRMED.
    TO THE CLERK:
    Please file the foregoing opinion.
    /s/ Leonard I. Garth
    Circuit Judge
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-1126

Judges: Rendell, Weis, Garth

Filed Date: 10/7/2003

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024