Perkins v. Comm Social Security ( 2003 )

Opinions of the United
2003 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
10-28-2003
Perkins v. Comm Social Security
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 03-1612
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 03-1612
ALVIN L. PERKINS,
Appellant
v.
JOANNE B. BARNHART,
Commissioner of Social
Security
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 02-cv-00329)
District Judge: Honorable Alan N. Bloch
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 11, 2003
Before: ALITO, BARRY and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed : October 28, 2003)
OPINION
AMBRO, Circuit Judge:
Alvin L. Perkins appeals the January 6, 2003 order of the United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner
of Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner”) who had denied Perkins’s application
for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401-434.
Because we conclude that decision is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.
I.
Perkins originally applied for Disability Insurance Benefits on March 29, 2000. At the
time of his application, Perkins was twenty-nine years old. Perkins has received vocational
training and holds a high school diploma. He served in the military and has worked as a laborer,
line worker, machine operator, warehouse worker and warehouse manager. He claims that his
depression and asthma prohibit his participation in the workforce. The Commissioner denied
Perkins’s application.
Perkins timely filed a request for a hearing. After that, a hearing was held before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), who issued an opinion denying Perkins’s application for
Disability Insurance Benefits, based upon his finding that Perkins was not under a disability as
defined in the Social Security Act. Perkins then filed a request for review of the hearing
decision/order. The Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration subsequently denied
Perkins’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision. Perkins next filed a complaint with the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. That District Court denied
Perkins’s motion for summary judgment and granted the Commissioner’s summary judgment
motion. Perkins timely appealed.
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II.
We have jurisdiction of this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We must determine whether
the District Court correctly found the Commissioner’s decision to be supported by substantial
evidence; if so, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed. 42 U.S.C. 405(g); Hartranft v.
Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999); Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000).
Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather ‘such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197, 229 (1938)); see also Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d at 360; Stunkard v. Sec’y of Health and
Human Servs., 841 F.2d 57, 59 (3d Cir. 1988).
III.
Eligible disabled individuals are entitled to Disability Insurance Benefits. 42 U.S.C. §§
401-434. To qualify as disabled, a claimant must be unable “to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A person is unable to engage in
substantial gainful activity when “his physical or mental impairments are of such severity that he
is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
To determine whether a claimant is disabled and thus entitled to Disability Insurance
Benefits, the Commissioner undertakes a five-step evaluation process. This process requires the
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Commissioner to consider, in sequence: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in
substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if so,
whether the claimant’s severe impairment meets or equals the criteria of an impairment listed in
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1; (4) if not, whether the claimant’s impairment prevents him
from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if so, whether the claimant can perform any
other work which exists in the national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience,
and residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i) - (v); Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d
259, 262-263 (3d Cir. 2000). If other work exists for the claimant, he will not qualify as
disabled. Id.IV.
The ALJ fully and precisely applied the five-step process to reach his decision to deny
Perkins’s application for Disability Insurance Benefits. He relied on the record before him,
including, inter alia, Perkins’s medical history, psychiatric evaluation, numerous medical records
spanning a four-year period, and Perkins’s own statements. Because the ALJ’s decision is so
clearly supported by substantial evidence, we will not here recite his written opinion. See
Appellant’s App. at 013-022.
A.
Perkins’s arguments on appeal are unpersuasive. Perkins first argues that the ALJ “erred
in finding that Claimant’s depression was not a severe impairment, when substantial evidence
established that the depression resulted in moderate symptoms and/or moderate impairment in
social or occupational functioning.” (Appellant’s Br. at 12). As stated in Perkins’s own words,
substantial evidence established that his depression resulted in “moderate symptoms and/or
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moderate impairment in social or occupational functioning.” Id. (emphasis added). The ALJ
exhaustively considered Perkins’s depression.1 Perkins’s argument here amounts to no more
than a disagreement with the ALJ’s decision, which is soundly supported by substantial evidence.
B.
Perkins next argues that “the ALJ erred in failing to make a finding as to what effect
[Perkins’s] depression would have in combination with [his] asthma on [his] ability to perform
substantial gainful employment.” (Appellant’s Br. at 15). The ALJ’s failure to consider
expressly the combined effect of Perkins’s asthma and depression on his ability to engage in
gainful employment is potentially troubling. “[W]e will consider the combined effect of all your
impairments without regard to whether any such impairment, if considered separately, would be
of sufficient severity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523; see also Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 435 (3d
Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B)) (ordering the Commissioner on remand to “consider
the combined effect of all of [claimaint’s] impairments, physical and mental, in determining
whether the claimant is entitled to disability benefits”). Yet the failure here is, at worst, harmless
error.
Clearly, the ALJ found Perkins’s depression so non-severe as not to merit any further
consideration. The ALJ found that Perkins’s depression causes him “no limitations in the area of
performing his daily activities, in the area of social functioning, or in the area of concentration,
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“While the claimant testified that he sleeps during the day and has angry outbursts, this
testimony is not supported by the weight of evidence in record.” (Appellant’s App. at
015). Among other things, the ALJ found that Perkins declined counseling for
depression; cares for and plays with his five children, ages 8, 7, 4 and 9 month-old twins;
cares for his personal needs; does laundry; mows the lawn; takes out the trash; vacuums;
drives; watches TV; pays his own bills; exhibits an ability to think and concentrate; goes
grocery shopping; and takes public transportation. Id.5
persistence or pace. There is no evidence in record that [Perkins] has ever experienced episodes
of decompensation.” (Appellant’s App. at 016). The ALJ relied, in part, on Perkins’s own
statements to reach his finding. Therefore, even if Perkins’s depression had been expressly
considered in combination with his asthma, it would have had no effect on the ALJ’s decision.
C.
Perkins’s final argument in this appeal is that the ALJ “did not properly consider
Claimant’s complaints concerning the exertional limitations he suffers as a result of his asthma,
as he equated the ability to perform activities of daily living with the ability to work at all
exertional levels.” (Appellant’s Br. at 16). We find this argument to be unpersuasive.
In evaluating Perkins’s ability to perform past relevant work, the ALJ found “the claimant
has no exertional limitations. Due to his asthma, he must work in an environment controlled for
heat, cold, dust, fumes, and odors.” (Appellant’s App. at 019). Then, in a later stage of his
evaluation of Perkins’s ability to perform past relevant work, the ALJ found that Perkins’s
“ability to work is compromised at all exertional levels due to his non-exertional limitations.”
(Appellant’s App. at 020).
The ALJ then considered an impartial vocational expert’s evaluation of the ability of a
hypothetical individual with Perkins’s limitations and abilities to engage in gainful work. The
vocational expert found that jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy at all
exertional levels for a hypothetical individual with all of Perkins’s limitations and abilities.
Moreover, at the behest of Perkins’s counsel, the vocational expert identified a great number of
jobs requiring only a sedentary level of exertion.2 In this context, at the least, Perkins fails step 5.
2
Such sedentary exertional jobs included that of document preparer (120,000 jobs),
bench assembly jobs (160,000 available), and hand packer (20,000 positions).
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V.
For these reasons, we find that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence
in the record. We therefore affirm the January 6, 2003 judgment of the District Court upholding
the Commissioner’s denial of disability benefits.
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing Opinion.
By the Court,
/s/ Thomas L. Ambro
Circuit Judge
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