Schomer v. Commissioner of Social Security , 80 F. App'x 242 ( 2003 )

Opinions of the United
2003 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
11-5-2003
Schomer v. Comm Social Security
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 03-1643
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 03-1643
____________
MARY M. SCHOMER,
Appellant
v.
THE COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY
____________
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
D.C. No.: 02-cv-00776
District Judge: Honorable Alan N. Bloch
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) October 22, 2003
Before: ALITO, FUENTES, and ROSENN, Circuit Judges
(Filed : November 5, 2003)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
ROSENN, Circuit Judge.
Having exhausted all of her administrative remedies in her claim for
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, including two hearings before two separate
Administrative Law Judges (ALJ), Mary M. Schomer, appellant, brought this civil action
against the Commissioner of Social Security in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania pursuant to § 205(g) of the Social Security Act (the
Act), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to obtain judicial review of the final decision of the
Commissioner denying her claim for SSI benefits. The District Court entered summary
judgment for the Commissioner affirming the final decision of the Commissioner. The
claimant timely appealed. We affirm.
I.
The appellant raises two major issues in her appeal. The first issue is whether the
findings by the ALJ in his decision were supported by substantial evidence, especially the
findings with regard to the claimant’s disability and residual functional capacity (RFC).
The second is whether the Appeals Council denied appellant her constitutionally
protected due process by taking thirty-six months to render a decision on her request for a
review.
Turning to the primary issue, whether the District Court erred in entering
judgment for the Commissioner on the findings of the ALJ that Schomer’s disabilities and
RFC were supported by substantial evidence, the facts are well known to the parties and
we will not review the evidence of Schomer’s many illnesses and disabilities. Suffice it
to say that SSI benefits are not only dependent upon the claimant’s disabilities but of
equal importance, on the claimant’s functional limitations arising out of those disabilities.
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Under the Act, to be eligible for SSI, a claimant must not only have a medically
determinable physical or mental impairment that is severe, but the impairment must also
be of sufficient severity to prevent her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity
that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3); Petition of Sullivan, 904
F.2d 826, 845 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that claimant must show not only a diagnosed
impairment but also functional limitations that preclude working). The impairment must
be expected to result in death or to have lasted or to be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than twelve months to qualify as an impairment under the Act.
In addition, to be disabling, the impairment must have resulted in an inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity that has lasted or is expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Act
specifically requires that for an impairment to be disabling, it must be of such severity
that a claimant is not only unable to do her previous work but cannot, considering her age,
education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the
immediate area in which she lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for her, or
whether she would be hired if she applied for work. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
Objective medical evidence which supports a claim of disabling pain or disabling
limitations is central to disability determinations.
The record shows that the ALJ carefully considered the existence of Schomer’s
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medical treatment and disabling conditions and the limitations resulting therefrom. The
ALJ found that she had severe impairments of anxiety disorder and depression, low back
pain, leg pain, shortness of breath, shoulder pain, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, and
status-post four-way coronary bypass surgery, and that she accommodated those
impairments by imposing several work-related limitations and numerous restrictions.
The troublesome problem, which appellant seems to overlook, is the effect her
impairments have had in precluding her from performing a limited range of light work
that accommodated all of her limitations. The vocational expert, in response to the ALJ’s
hypothetical questions which embraced the description of the disabilities, identified
several jobs that Schomer could perform with all of the limitations and restrictions
imposed on her. The ALJ’s finding that appellant was capable of, but limited to, the work
specified by the vocational expert is well supported by the evidence of Dr. Jabbour, the
claimant’s family physician. Dr. Jabbour found that Schomer had satisfactory range of
motion in all of her joints, no motor deficits, normal sensation and deep tendon reflexes,
and intact cranial nerves. Dr. Tran and Dr. Kumar both opined that claimant was capable
of at least the range of work specified by the ALJ. There is no medical evidence that the
appellant required significant treatment for her cardiac condition after the period
adjudicated. She was never referred to a chronic pain specialist or a chronic pain program
or submitted to a work hardening program. Pain can also be constant and uncomfortable
without being disabling.
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The ALJ also provided for any mental limitations Schomer may have had by
limiting her to simple, routine work with limited interaction and stress, limitations quite
consistent with the reports and opinions of Drs. Link, Golin, and Detore, not one of whom
opined that claimant was disabled. Appellant was never hospitalized because of her
complaints of mental impairment and she did not regularly use antidepressant medication.
Moreover, she was independent and able to take care of her personal needs and, for much
of the time involved in the period in dispute, was the caretaker of her young
granddaughter. The ALJ found that she was able to carry on her personal life without
very much discomfort, including cooking, housecleaning, laundry, and making beds. She
acknowledged that she could lift a gallon of milk without difficulty and that she could sit
for a couple of hours at a time. Her principal problem is in bending, stooping, crouching,
or crawling to get back up once she got down. She testified that her principal difficulty
with her arms was in pulling and lifting them over her head without feeling some strain
on her shoulders.
Recognizing all of the appellant’s disabilities, the ALJ therefore limited her ability
to work with those impairments to light work that could be performed by an individual
who acquired a sit or stand option; who could not climb; who could do no more than
occasionally perform other postural movements; who had to avoid temperature extremes;
who could only perform simple, routine work; which involved limited contact with the
public.
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We see no error in the ALJ’s evaluation of the record or in the District Court’s
affirmation of the Commissioner’s decision. Substantial evidence supports their findings
and decision.
II.
As for the appellant’s complaint that she was denied due process because of the
lengthy delay of the Appeals Council in disposing of her request for review, we are
constrained to reject it. We are distressed by the undue length of time that the
Commissioner took to dispose of this appeal, but we also recognize the overwhelming
task that confronts her because of the numerosity of appeals. The Commissioner
represents to this court that as of March 1997, “there were 110,152 requests for review
pending at the Appeals Council.” That is an enormous number of cases to resolve with
reasonable promptness. We decry the lamentable delay in the disposition of this case, but
in light of the result we have reached, the appellant has not suffered any prejudice by the
Appeals Council’s delay. Moreover, if there is to be any improvement in the prompt
disposition of cases by the Appeals Council, such matter is for Congressional
consideration and not judicial determination.
For the reasons set forth above, the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.
Each side to bear its own costs.
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TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
/s/ Max Rosenn
Circuit Judge
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