Wright v. Montgomery Cty , 85 F. App'x 312 ( 2004 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2004 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    1-15-2004
    Wright v. Montgomery Cty
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 03-1536
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    Recommended Citation
    "Wright v. Montgomery Cty" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 1085.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/1085
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 03-1536
    ROBERT E. WRIGHT, SR.,
    Appellant
    v.
    MONTGOM ERY COUNTY; MONTGOMERY COUNTY COMMISSIONERS;
    MARIO MELE; RICHARD BUCKM AN; JOSEPH HOEFFEL;
    MAILLIE FALCONIERO; GEORGE FALCONERO
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civ. No. 96-04597)
    Honorable Herbert J. Hutton, District Judge
    Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    January 12, 2004
    BEFORE: BARRY, SMITH, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
    (Filed: January 14, 2004)
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
    This matter comes on before the court on the appeal of plaintiff Robert E.
    Wright, Sr. from an order entered in the district court on January 24, 2003, denying his
    motion for a new trial following a jury verdict for the appellees in this employment
    discrimination case. Wright characterizes this action as one “seeking declaratory and
    damage relief based upon discrimination in terms and conditions of employment [he]
    suffered . . . due to his race, for being outspoken at the workplace about his mistreatment
    due to his race and for his retaliatory discipline and termination by the Appellees on the
    basis of his race and retaliation.” Appellant’s br. at 2. In particular Wright was
    terminated as director of the Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, Department of Housing
    Services.
    In his notice of appeal Wright indicates that he is appealing from numerous
    orders culminating in the order denying his motion for a new trial. In his brief, however,
    he summarizes the issues as follows:
    I. Whether, in an action for retaliatory termination for
    speaking out against the County’s racially discriminatory employment
    practices, the District Court abused its discretion by effectively
    precluding and denying [him] an opportunity to present critical evidence
    at trial by handing out 28 orders on the day of trial during the voir dire
    of the jury which prohibited 27 of [his] witnesses from testifying and
    prohibited the introduction of important testimony which supported and
    corroborated [his] case that race was a determinative factor in his
    termination.
    II. Whether, in an employment discrimination action against
    a county and its elected county commissioners, it was clear error for the
    District Court to dismiss [his] 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action for failure to
    state a cause of action.
    III. Whether the District Court abused its discretion, during
    pretrial discovery, by permitting discovery abuses by Appellees and
    sanctioning [him] for requesting a discovery conference.
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    IV. Whether the District Court abused its discretion by
    sustaining the jury’s verdict and not granting [him] a new trial.
    Appellant’s br. at 1-2.
    He then summarizes his argument as follows:
    In an otherwise routine employment discrimination case, the
    abuse of discretion by the District Court on the morning of trial, by
    handing down 28 orders on matters which had been outstanding for
    more than three years, requires that [he] be granted a new trial. The
    blanket exclusion of 27 of [his] witnesses without explanation or
    reasoning by the District Court deprived [him of] a fair trial. The
    excluded witnesses and issues rightfully should have been presented to
    the jury for them to weigh their credibility and probative value in
    assessing whether [his] termination . . . was racially based or business
    justified.
    The District Court improperly dismissed the [42 U.S.C.] §
    1983 claim by limiting it to a property right claim under [42 U.S.C.] §
    1982.
    The District Court erred when [it] sanctioned [him] for
    requesting a discovery conference with the District Court to cap the
    discovery abuse and wasteful discovery efforts of Montgomery County.
    The District Court had full authority to set aside the jury
    verdict and grant [him] a new trial.
    Appellant’s br. at 6.
    The district court had jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1331
    , 1343(a), and 1367
    and we have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . Wright concedes that we review the
    various orders from which he appeals on an abuse of discretion basis except that we
    exercise plenary review over the district court’s order granting summary judgment and
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    dismissing his claim under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . We agree. See Evans v. Port Auth. of N.Y.
    and N.J., 
    273 F.3d 346
    , 351 (3d Cir. 2001) (reviewing order denying new trial on an
    abuse of discretion basis); Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 
    227 F.3d 78
    ,
    87 (3d Cir. 2000) (exercising plenary review of order granting judgment); Walden v.
    Georgia-Pacific Corp., 
    126 F.3d 506
    , 516-17 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that an abuse of
    discretion standard of review applies to admission of evidence); Newman v. GHS
    Osteopathic, Inc., 
    60 F.3d 153
    , 156 (3d Cir. 1995) (abuse of discretion standard in
    reviewing order with respect to sanction).
    We have reviewed this matter and have examined the district court’s
    comprehensive series of orders and dispositions from which W right appeals. It is clear to
    us that the district court was very diligent in its management of this case and, exercising
    the appropriate standards of review, we find no error in its numerous dispositions.
    Accordingly, the order of January 24, 2003, and the earlier orders from which Wright
    appeals will be affirmed.
    TO THE CLERK:
    Please file the foregoing not precedential opinion.
    /s/ Morton I. Greenberg
    Circuit Judge
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