H.W. v. Highland Park Board of Education ( 2004 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2004 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    9-2-2004
    H.W. v. Highland Park Bd Ed
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 03-3309
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    Recommended Citation
    "H.W. v. Highland Park Bd Ed" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 343.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/343
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 03-3309
    H.W. and J.W. O/B/O A.W., a Minor Child,
    Appellees
    vs.
    HIGHLAND PARK BOARD OF EDUCATION,
    Appellant
    ____________
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
    (D.C. Civ. No. 01-cv-05166)
    District Judge: Mary Little Cooper
    ____________
    Argued July 15, 2004
    Before: SLOVITER, BARRY and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: September 2, 2004)
    ____________
    James L. Plosia, Jr., Esquire (ARGUED)
    Apruzzese, McDermott, Mastro & Murphy, P.C.
    25 Independence Boulevard, P.O. Box 112
    Liberty Corner, New Jersey 07938
    Attorney for Appellant
    Nathan Lewin, Esquire (ARGUED)
    1
    Alyza D. Lewin, Esquire
    Lewin & Lewin, LLP
    1828 L Street, N.W., Suite 1000
    Washington, D.C. 20036
    Michael I. Inzelbuch, Esquire
    S.I. Bank & Trust Building
    555 Madison Avenue
    Lakewood, New Jersey 08701
    Attorneys for Appellees
    Abba Cohen, Esquire
    Agudath Israel of America
    1730 Rhode Island Avenue, Suite 504
    Washington, D. C. 20036
    David Zwiebel, Esquire
    Mordechai Biser, Esquire
    Agudath Israel of America
    42 Broadway, 14th Floor
    New York, New York 10004
    Yehuda L. Neuberger, Esquire
    59 Maiden Lane, Plaza Level
    New York, New York 10038
    Amicus Curiae Agudath Israel of America In Support of Appellees
    ____________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    WEIS, Circuit Judge.
    This appeal is from the entry of judgment in favor of H.W. and his wife on
    a claim for reimbursement of expenses incurred in a unilateral placement of their
    2
    daughter, A.W., at a private school for the disabled. Because the facts are well known to
    the parties and were exhaustingly developed in lengthy administrative proceedings, as
    well as thoroughly explored in the District Court’s opinion, we will refer to them only as
    necessary to the understanding of the legal issues.
    A.W., born on April 28, 1989, had learning difficulties in pre-school and
    the primary grades. She was classified as perceptually impaired and diagnosed as
    suffering from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Mixed Adjustment Disorder,
    Motor Coordination Disorder, and Asperger’s Syndrome (a form of autism).
    In August 2000, the Highland Park School District proposed a placement
    for A.W. in the Bartle School. The parents rejected this plan and enrolled their daughter
    in Sinai Special Needs Institute at the Kushner Hebrew Academy, a private school for the
    disabled. The Bartle plan called for A.W. to be in a co-ed class of eight students. In
    addition to Ms. Lois Brown, a teacher who was familiar with Asperger’s Syndrome, two
    para-professionals would be present with the likelihood that a third would be added if
    A.W. were enrolled.
    A.W. would receive one-on-one instruction in language arts, reading and
    mathematics. She would also receive occupational therapy, speech therapy, and physical
    therapy. Moreover, the District also expected to develop and implement a behavior
    modification plan. A.W. would attend mainstream classes with other children in her age
    group in art, music, physical education, health, as well as lunch and recess.
    3
    At the Sinai School, A.W. received instruction in mathematics and social
    studies with five other girls, one of whom had Asperger’s Syndrome and the other four of
    whom had learning disabilities. She also attended a science class with one other girl. The
    Sinai School had an excellent social skills development department and employed a full-
    time school psychologist. A.W. attended mainstream lunch and it was planned that she
    would also attend mainstream physical education and synagogue.
    A.W . remained in the Sinai School until the family moved to Israel in 2003.
    The parents’ claim is for their expenditures at the Sinai School for the school years
    beginning in September 2000, 2001 and 2002.
    A very patient ALJ presided over extensive presentation of evidence by two
    committed and loquacious advocates in the due process administrative proceeding. At the
    conclusion of the hearings, the ALJ stated, “I find Highland Park’s proposed placement of
    A.W. did not violate IDEA . . . I find all of Highland Park’s actions after A.W. enrolled in
    the Highland Park School District lead to the conclusion that Highland Park would meet
    its responsibilities to A.W. . . . petitioner did not give Highland Park the opportunity to
    provide FAPE [free appropriate public education] to A.W.”
    The plaintiffs appealed to the District Court for the District of New Jersey.
    After presenting oral arguments on legal issues, the parties stipulated to submit the case
    on the administrative record with no further evidence.
    4
    The District Court reviewed the record and wrote a comprehensive opinion,
    concluding that Sinai was an appropriate placement and that A.W. had shown
    improvement there. The Court also held that the School District’s proposal did not
    provide an appropriate placement and entered judgment against it.
    The District Court’s determination rested on three factors:
    1.     Plaintiffs’ experts Trigani and Handleman had “a
    deeper knowledge of Asperger’s Syndrome” than the
    defendant’s expert;
    2.     The Highland Park Child Study Team of Bartle
    School had not met with A.W. before deciding on her
    placement; and
    3.     Defendant’s expert findings based on a 1996 test were
    inconsistent with those of other examiners.
    The District Court held that, even though Sinai was a private parochial
    school, nevertheless reimbursement to the parents was permissible. We do not reach that
    issue and intimate no views on it. On appeal, the defendant contends that the District
    Court erred in considering A.W.’s placement in 1996 and 1997, and failed to give due
    weight to the ALJ’s decision.
    Our standard of review is plenary. S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of the
    City of Newark, 
    336 F.3d 260
     (3d Cir. 2003). See also D.R. v. E. Brunswick Bd. of
    Educ., 
    109 F.3d 896
     (3d Cir. 1997); Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P., 
    62 F.3d 520
     (3d Cir.
    1995). The District Court’s standard of review is described as modified de novo. See
    S.H., 
    336 F.3d at 269-70
    .
    5
    District Courts are to give due weight to the factual findings of an ALJ in
    IDEA cases. See Board of Education v. Rowley, 
    458 U.S. 176
    , 206 (1982); S.H., 
    336 F.3d at 269-70
    . W e recently had occasion to discuss the appropriate standard.
    [I]f a state administrative agency has heard live testimony and has found
    the testimony of one witness to be more worthy of belief than the
    contradictory testimony of another witness, that determination is due special
    weight. Id.; Carlisle Area School v. Scott P., 
    62 F.3d 520
    , 527-29 (3d Cir.
    1995). Specifically, this means that a District Court must accept the state
    agency’s credibility determinations “unless the non-testimonial, extrinsic
    evidence in the record would justify a contrary conclusion.” Carlisle, 
    62 F.3d at 529
     (emphasis added). In this context the word “justify” demands
    essentially the same standard of review given to a trial court’s findings of
    fact by a federal appellate court. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,
    N.C., 
    470 U.S. 564
    , 574 (1985).
    When a District Court decision in a case such as this is
    appealed to us, we of course exercise plenary review with respect to the
    question of whether the District Court applied the correct legal standard, see
    Polk, 853 F.2d at 181, but we review the District Court’s factual findings
    for clear error. T.R. v. Kingwood Tp. Bd. of Educ., 
    205 F.3d 572
    , 576 (3d
    Cir. 2000). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, after reviewing
    the evidence, the court of appeals is left with a definite and firm conviction
    that a mistake has been committed.” Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1204 (internal
    quotation marks omitted). Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., ___
    F.3d ___, at ___ - ___ (3d Cir. 2004).
    6
    Where the court does not hear additional evidence, factual support for
    findings contrary to those of the ALJ must be found in the record. “Moreover, the court
    must explain why it does not accept the ALJ’s findings of fact to avoid the impression
    that it is substituting its own notions of sound educational policy for those of the agency it
    reviews.” S.H., 
    336 F.3d at 270
    .
    The issue in the case before us is not determined by comparison between
    the programs at Highland and Sinai. As we explained in Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of
    Educ., ___ F.3d at ___ - ___, where “parents seek reimbursement for a unilateral
    placement, the District Court must first determine whether the IEP afforded the student a
    FAPE.” A comparison between the two programs is irrelevant to the adequacy of the
    proposed placement under IDEA.
    Moreover, the propriety of an IEP must be judged prospectively. See
    Carlisle Area Sch., 
    62 F.3d at 530
    . The IDEA does not require a school district to
    provide the best possible education, but it must be more than de minimus. IDEA demands
    an Individualized Education Program that will result in some measurable benefit. The
    benefit must be gauged in relation to the child’s potential. Polk v. Central Susquehanna
    Intermediate Unit 16, 
    853 F.2d 171
     (3d Cir. 1988); see also Carlisle Area Sch., 
    62 F.3d 520
    .
    The education must be delivered in the least restrictive appropriate
    environment. See 
    20 U.S.C. § 1412
    (a)(5)(A). See also Carlisle Area Sch., 
    62 F.3d at
                                7
    533. The School District has the burden to prove that its proposed program was
    appropriate. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 
    995 F.2d 1204
     (3d Cir. 1993).
    We have pored through the extensive record in this case and it is clear that
    the District Court diligently reviewed the matter. Nonetheless, despite the competence
    displayed by the District Court, we have differing views on several significant factors
    underlying the grant of judgment for the parents.
    Although the Court faulted the School Board for preparing a proposal
    without meeting with A.W., the transcript demonstrates that such a meeting was indeed
    held in early August 2000. It was part of the process leading to a recommendation for
    placement of A.W. in September 2000. See J.A. at 730, 746, 1499 & 1500.
    The court concluded that the plaintiff’s experts, Drs. Trigani and
    Handleman, had a deeper knowledge of Asperger’s Syndrome than Ellyn Atherton, the
    School District expert. However, Dr. Handleman’s testimony did not support A.W.’s
    position that Highland Park would not provide an appropriate program. In his view, A.W.
    should not have been moved because she was thriving at Sinai as of October 2000. When
    questioned directly about whether the Highland Park proposal was appropriate, he said
    “the issue of assessing whether any program is appropriate is really a non-issue for me.”
    J.A. at 1232.
    When asked whether any other consideration made Highland Park
    inappropriate, Dr. Handleman responded: “[Regression] is the major factor.” J.A. at
    8
    1233. “Movement would not be appropriate for her . . . regardless of . . . what program.”
    J.A. at 1233-34. “. . . the issue of whether or not Highland Park could provide an
    appropriate program becomes a non-issue at that point, because my strong feeling was
    that A. should not be moved from her current placement.” J.A. at 1240-41.
    Dr. Handleman did concede that when he visited the Bartle School Special
    Education Class in October 2000, he “didn’t see anything at that point that would indicate
    any particular concern.” J.A. at 1240. He added that “[i]f it was judged that she was
    ready for a move, that the Highland Park program or some other program could be
    appropriate for her.” J.A. at 1264. Furthermore, he stated that “[t]here was nothing at
    that point to suggest that the component [at Bartle] couldn’t be enhanced or developed.”
    J.A. at 1265. In sum, Dr. Handleman did not opine that Highland Park’s program was
    inappropriate.
    Dr. Trigani’s testimony was lengthy, often repetitious, and frequently
    devoted to conditions at Sinai, an issue not relevant in appraising the program at Highland
    Park. His objections to the Highland Park program centered on the fact that the class size
    would be nine, and that he believed that none of the children in that class would be
    potential friends for A.W. He conceded, however, that the Bartle class would not be
    above the legal maximum number of students He noted that “Highland Park is in
    compliance with the law, but acceptable practice goes far in excess of maximum limits
    and goes down to one-on-one pretty much.” J.A. at 822.
    9
    Dr. Trigani also was critical of Highland Park’s lack of experience in
    dealing with Asperger’s Syndrome children in a self-contained program, lack of success
    and failure to have a behavioral plan. All of these factors were contradicted by the
    District’s expert.
    Defendant’s expert Ellyn Atherton has a Masters Degree in speech and
    language pathology and audiology. She has taught at Highland Park for 24 years,
    including students who had Asperger’s Syndrome. She described the proposed placement
    in her testimony before the ALJ. At the Bartle school, A.W. would be placed in Lois
    Brown’s special education classroom.
    The credibility of the expert witnesses was a matter for determination by the
    ALJ, who had the opportunity to hear and evaluate their demeanor and persuasiveness.
    Our study of the transcript and giving due weight to the findings of the ALJ does not lead
    us to disagree with his determination of the facts and credibility of the witnesses.
    Moreover, we are impressed with the qualifications of Ms. Lois Brown, who was the
    teacher assigned by Highland Park to conduct the special education class. She had more
    than 14 years experience in the field of special education, including Asperger’s
    Syndrome.
    Dr. Handleman’s fear of regression in the event of transfer, while an
    obvious concern to the parents, is irrelevant to the legal issue in this case - whether the
    Highland Park proposal was appropriate under IDEA. Just as comparison with Sinai’s
    10
    program is not a proper subject for evaluation, the possibility of regression caused by
    transfer from that school, where the parents unilaterally placed their daughter, has no
    bearing on the Highland Park program’s compliance with IDEA. Although Dr. Trigani
    favored an all-girl class for A.W., he failed to provide any professional research to
    support that view as a critical element in the Highland Park plan. In short, the record is
    devoid of any non-testimonial, extrinsic evidence that would justify a conclusion contrary
    to the ALJ decision.
    It is important to emphasize once again that the ALJ found that, based upon
    its actions, it was reasonable to presume that Highland Park would meets its obligations
    to provide an appropriate education to A.W. However, by preemptively placing and
    continuing the child in classes at Sinai, the parents did not give the school district the
    opportunity to provide a free and appropriate education.
    We conclude, therefore, that the District Court’s decision was not supported
    by the record and, accordingly, the judgment in favor of the parents will be reversed.
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