Collins v. Philadelphia Housing Authority ( 2005 )

Opinions of the United
2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
3-30-2005
Collins v. Phila Housing Auth
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 04-2344
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Recommended Citation
"Collins v. Phila Housing Auth" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 1410.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 04-2344
TERESA COLLINS,
Appellant
v.
THE PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY; CARL GREEN;
MICHAEL LEITHEAD; LINDA STALEY; JAMES JONES,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CORPORATE OFFICIALS FOR
THE PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 03-02500)
District Judge: Honorable John P. Fullam
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 7, 2005
BEFORE: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, ROTH and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Filed: March 30, 2005)
OPINION OF THE COURT
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
This matter comes on before this court on appeal from an order entered May 4,
2004, granting summary judgment to the defendant Philadelphia Housing Authority and
certain of its officers in this action in which plaintiff-appellant, Teresa Collins, the former
director of the Authority’s Head Start Program, sought relief under federal and
Pennsylvania law on the theory that the defendants retaliated against her by terminating
her employment because she registered her opposition to and protested defendants’
misuse of public funds and illegal activities. The district court in a memorandum opinion
dated April 26, 2004, granted defendants summary judgment because it determined that
even though Collins had complained about defendants’ activities to the Authority’s Office
of the Inspector General, the persons who made the decision to terminate her had been
unaware of her complaints before they made the termination decision.
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 and 1367, and
we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review on this appeal,
see Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995), and thus may affirm
only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). After
our review of this matter, we are in full accord with the district court as the evidence
cannot support a conclusion that the defendants’ denial that they lacked knowledge of
Collins’ complaint before her termination is not true. Thus, this case must fail on the
causation issue.
2
The order of May 4, 2004, will be affirmed.
3