Gina Russomanno v. Sunovion Pharmaceuticals ( 2022 )

ALD-045 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 22-2822
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GINA RUSSOMANNO,
Appellant
v.
SUNOVION PHARMACEUTICALS; IQVIA INC
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-19-cv-05945)
District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary
Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
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No. 22-2823
___________
GINA RUSSOMANNO,
Appellant
v.
DAN DUGAN; JENNA YACKISH;
TREVOR VOLTZ; ERIC WEEDON;
SUNOVION PHARMACEUTICALS INC
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-20-cv-12336)
District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary
Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 8, 2022
Before: HARDIMAN, RESTREPO, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 29, 2022)
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OPINION *
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PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Gina Russomanno appeals from an order of the District Court
denying her motions to reopen two cases pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b). For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d
Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
In 2019, Russomanno filed a lawsuit against her former employers, Sunovion
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Sunovion), and IQVIA, Inc., for wrongful termination. The
District Court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint with prejudice in
May 2020. Russomanno did not appeal from that decision. Shortly thereafter,
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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Russomanno filed another lawsuit against Sunovion and four of its employees. Based on
res judicata, the District Court again dismissed the complaint with prejudice in May
2021. This Court affirmed the District Court’s ruling on appeal. See Russomanno v.
Dugan, No. 21-2004, 2021 WL 4075790 (3d Cir. 2021) (per curiam). Russomanno
subsequently petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the District Court to
reopen her first case; we denied the petition on August 30, 2022.
Russomanno then filed motions in the District Court to reopen each of her cases.
She argued that the District Court erred in dismissing her complaints without affording
her leave to amend. The District Court denied both motions, and Russomanno filed two
appeals, which have been consolidated.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a District Court’s denial
of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir.
2014) (citing Brown v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 350 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2003)). “A district
court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision upon a clearly erroneous finding of
fact, an erroneous conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to fact.” Id. at
118 (citing Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Here, Russomanno alleged in both of her motions to reopen that new evidence of
the defendants’ discrimination discovered during the course of her first action warranted
vacatur of the judgments. First, with respect to her second case, Russomanno has already
presented her argument regarding newly discovered evidence to this Court on appeal, and
this Court nevertheless affirmed the District Court’s judgment. Thus, because
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Russomanno essentially sought to alter our mandate, the District Court correctly
determined that it was without jurisdiction to grant her Rule 60(b) motion as to that case.
See Seese v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 679 F.2d 336, 337 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1982) (per
curiam). Regarding her first case, to the extent that her motion to reopen was brought
under Rule 60(b)(1)-(3), the District Court correctly denied it, as it was filed in
September 2022, more than one year after the entry of the respective judgment. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). We further agree with the District Court’s determination that
Russomanno failed to allege the existence of any “extraordinary circumstances”
warranting relief from either judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6). Cox, 757 F.3d at 115
(quotation marks omitted). Though she contends that the District Court should have
allowed her to amend her complaints, Russomanno’s disagreement with the outcome of
her cases does not warrant relief under Rule 60(b). See Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155,
158 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[A] Rule 60(b) motion may not be used as a substitute for appeal,
and . . . legal error, without more, cannot justify granting a Rule 60(b) motion.”),
overruled on other grounds by Lizardo v. United States, 619 F.3d 273, 276-77 (3d Cir.
2010).
Accordingly, because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will
affirm the judgments of the District Court. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
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