Joseph v. West Manheim Police Dept. , 131 F. App'x 833 ( 2005 )

Opinions of the United
2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
5-18-2005
Joseph v. W Manheim Pol Dept
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 04-3828
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"Joseph v. W Manheim Pol Dept" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 1161.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 04-3828
________________
ARTHUR D. JOSEPH,
Appellant
v.
WEST MANHEIM POLICE DEPT.;
FRANEK; WILDASIN
_________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 01-00531)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
MAY 6, 2005
Before: SLOVITER, BARRY AND FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed May 18, 2005)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Arthur D. Joseph, proceeding pro se, filed suit against the West Manheim Police
Department, West Manheim Chief of Police Walter Franek, and West Manheim Police
Officer Toby Wildasin, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law.1 Joseph’s
claims arose from two separate police stops, which are described in greater detail in the
District Court’s opinion. On May 14, 1999, Joseph was stopped by Wildasin on the
suspicion that he was driving under the influence of alcohol, and was charged with
driving under the influence of alcohol, possession of a small amount of marijuana for
personal use, traffic violations, and driving with an expired license. On August 10, 2000,
Franek issued Joseph a speeding citation after a traffic stop. The District Court granted
summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims but the Fourth Amendment and
malicious prosecution claims asserted against Franek. Joseph moved for reconsideration,
which the District Court denied. The District Court later dismissed the two remaining
claims against Franek upon notice that Joseph and Franek had entered into a settlement
agreement. Joseph appeals.
Judgment was properly entered in favor of the Township of West Manheim (“the
Township”). 2 Joseph’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 failed because they were
1
He listed his claims against all Defendants as follows: (1) negligence; (2) entrapment;
(3) bribery; (4) harassment; (5) wrongful arrest; (6) wrongful search and seizure; (7)
wrongful imprisonment; (8) conspiracy; and (9) corruption. He also sued Wildasin for
falsifying a legal document and Franek for falsifying legal documents, “using his position
to intimidate or for personal gain,” and “knowingly and willlingly accusing the innocent.”
2
Joseph named as Defendant the West Manheim Police Department (“the
Department”), rather than the Township. Joseph could bring state law claims against the
Department, under the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 8541 (“the Tort Claims Act”). See Pahle v. Colebrookdale Twp., 227 F. Supp. 2d
361, 367-68 (E.D. Pa. 2002). However, as the District Court determined, the Department
is not a proper defendant in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Johnson v.
2
based on a theory of respondeat superior liability, see Rode v. Dellaciprete, 845 F.2d
1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988), and an unsubstantiated allegation of a defective traffic stop
policy, see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Joseph’s state law claims
were barred by the immunity granted by the Tort Claims Act, to which no exceptions
applied, despite Joseph’s argument to the contrary. See 42 P A. C ONS. S TAT. §§ 8541,
8542(b), 8550 (2004).
Judgment was also properly entered in favor of Wildasin, who was sued in his
official and individual capacities. Essentially, Joseph sued Wildasin for unreasonable
search and seizure and malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment and
malicious prosecution under state law. All of these claims turn on whether Wildasin had
probable cause to stop Joseph on May 14, 1999.
Wildasin had probable cause to stop and arrest Joseph. Probable cause exists when
the information known to the officer warrants a reasonable law enforcement officer to
believe an offense has been or is being committed by the person accused. See Paff v.
Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425, 436 (3d Cir. 2000). As the District Court explains in more
detail, before Wildasin stopped Joseph, he observed Joseph’s behavior and demeanor in a
convenience store and behind the wheel. Joseph does not dispute that he told a
City of Erie, 834 F. Supp. 873, 878-79 (W.D. Pa. 1993). The District Court’s decision to
consider Joseph’s federal claims as having been brought against the Township comported
with rules of liberal construction of pro se pleadings; considering Joseph’s state law
claims as against the Township rather than the Department made no difference to the
outcome.
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convenience store clerk in Wildasin’s presence that he had had too much to drink. He
also admits that he swerved over road lines after having four drinks. It is also undisputed
that, after Wildasin stopped Joseph, whose breath smelled of alcohol, Joseph admitted
that he had been drinking and then failed a field sobriety test. The search of Joseph’s
vehicle, which led to a drug charge, was constitutional because it followed a valid arrest
supported by probable cause. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 & n.4 (1981).
To the extent that Joseph’s additional claims against Wildasin were cognizable and
not subsumed into his Fourth Amendment and malicious prosecution claims, they were
unsubstantiated. In fact, Joseph admitted that he was just venting his frustration when he
included a conspiracy claim in his complaint. Joseph’s reconsideration motion properly
was denied.
Joseph presents no grounds for our consideration of his claims against Franek,
because he voluntarily entered into a settlement agreement with Franek. A settlement
agreement, voluntarily entered into, is binding on the parties. See Green v. John H. Lewis
& Co., 436 F.2d 389, 390 (3d Cir. 1970). Joseph states that he wrote to the District Court,
claiming that he made a mistake in entering into the settlement agreement because the
costs of his lawsuit exceeded the settlement amount. However, he gave the District Court
no reason to vacate the settlement, and he gives none to us. The settlement agreement
resolved the claims against Franek.
For the reasons stated, the District Court’s orders will be affirmed.
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