Spencer v. Verizon Connected Solutions, Inc. ( 2005 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2005 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    7-7-2005
    Spencer v. Verizon Connected
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 04-4074
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005
    Recommended Citation
    "Spencer v. Verizon Connected" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 884.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/884
    This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2005 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ________________
    No. 04-4074
    ________________
    WILBERT J. SPENCER, JR.
    Appellant
    v.
    VERIZON CONNECTED SOLUTIONS, INC.
    ________________
    On Appeal From the United States District Court
    For the District of Delaware
    (D.C. Civ. No. 03-cv-00031)
    District Judge: Honorable Gregory M. Sleet
    ________________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    June 6, 2005
    Before: RENDELL, AMBRO and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
    (Filed: July 7, 2005)
    ________________
    OPINION
    ________________
    PER CURIAM
    Wilbert J. Spencer, Jr. Appeals pro se from the entry of summary judgment in
    favor of the appellee on his claim of employment discrimination. After carefully
    reviewing the record, we agree with the District Court that summary judgment for
    Verizon was appropriate.
    We assume that the parties are familiar with the background, which is fully
    described in the District Court’s Memorandum Opinion. We merely summarize the
    pertinent facts here. Spencer was employed by appellee Verizon Connected Solutions,
    Inc. (Verizon) from 1998 until 2001 as a Multi-Media Services Technician (“MMST”).
    As an MMST, Spencer’s duties included installing, maintaining and repairing multi-
    media equipment for Verizon’s customers. The physical requirements of the position
    included crawling into tight spaces, climbing telephone poles, and moving and lifting
    equipment. According to Verizon, an essential function of the position also required the
    ability to lift up to 100 pounds. In December 1999, Spencer injured his back in a slip-
    and-fall accident at work. He was diagnosed with a herniated disc and was temporarily
    restricted by his doctor from bending repetitively or lifting more than 25 pounds. Spencer
    was subsequently examined by another physician who concluded that a person with a
    herniated disc would be permanently restricted from repetitively lifting over 50 pounds.
    Spencer was administratively discharged by Verizon on January 12, 2001.
    After receiving a “right to sue” letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity
    Commission (“EEOC”), Spencer filed this suit pro se in 2003. Spencer’s complaint
    asserted that Verizon violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) both when it
    terminated him due to his disability and when it failed to provide him with reasonable
    accommodation. After completion of discovery, the District Court granted Verizon’s
    motion for summary judgment on all claims, dismissed Spencer’s complaint, and denied
    2
    four of Spencer’s pending discovery motions as moot. Spencer timely filed this appeal.
    The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1331
    . We have
    jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We exercise plenary review over a grant of
    summary judgment and apply the same test as did the District Court. See Deane v.
    Pocono Med. Ctr., 
    142 F.3d 138
    , 142 n.3 (3d Cir. 1998). We must determine whether the
    record shows that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that Verizon was
    entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
    In order to state a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff
    must establish that he or she (1) is “disabled” as defined by the ADA; (2) is otherwise
    qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable
    accommodations by the employer; and (3) has suffered an otherwise adverse employment
    decision as a result of discrimination. Gaul v. Lucent Technologies, Inc. 
    134 F.3d 576
    ,
    580 (3d Cir. 1998). To qualify as “disabled,” a plaintiff must demonstrate that: 1) he has
    a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life
    activities; or 2) he has a record of such an impairment; or 3) he was regarded as having
    such an impairment. See 
    42 U.S.C. § 12102
    (2). On appeal, the parties do not contest that
    Spencer’s back injury constitutes a physical impairment. We thus consider whether this
    impairment substantially limited Spencer in a major life activity.
    “Major life activities” are those activities that are of central importance to daily
    life. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 
    534 U.S. 184
    , 197 (2002). EEOC
    regulations list “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
    3
    speaking, breathing, learning, and working” as examples of major life activities. See 
    29 C.F.R. § 1630.2
    (i). Spencer fails to allege that his back injury substantially limits any
    major life activity. Even if Spencer had argued that his back injury affected his work as
    an MMST, his inability to perform this particular job would not constitute a substantial
    limitation in the major life activity of “working,” and he has not alleged that he is unable
    to work in a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs. See Deane, 
    142 F.3d at
    144 n.7; Tice
    v. Ctr. Area Transp. Auth., 
    247 F.3d 506
    , 512-13 (3d Cir. 2001). Indeed, Spencer
    asserted several times that he could work despite his back injury, and the record indicates
    that Spencer was employed elsewhere at various times throughout this litigation. Spencer
    thus could not show that he was disabled within the meaning of 
    42 U.S.C. § 12102
    (2)(A).
    Alternatively, Spencer asserts that he was able to return to his MMST position in
    full capacity but was prevented from doing so by Verizon. Spencer appears to allege that,
    although he was not actually disabled, he was regarded as being disabled by Verizon. See
    
    42 U.S.C. § 12102
    (2)(C). We agree with the District Court that Spencer cannot make a
    prima facie showing that Verizon regarded him as being disabled. See Deane at 
    142 F.3d at 143
    .
    Because Spencer was unable to make a prima facie showing that he was disabled,
    Verizon was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We find no abuse of discretion in
    the District Court’s denial of Spencer’s discovery motions, as any information crucial to
    establishing a prima facie case would have been within Spencer’s knowledge. See In re
    Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 
    685 F.2d 810
    , 817-18 (3d Cir. 1982). Similarly, the
    4
    accessibility of this information rendered the appointment of counsel unwarranted. See
    Tabron v. Grace, 
    6 F.3d 147
    , 158 (3d Cir. 1993).
    For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
    5