Sanchez v. Attorney General, United States ( 2005 )

Opinions of the United
2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
7-13-2005
Sanchez v. Atty Gen USA
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 04-2740
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"Sanchez v. Atty Gen USA" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 856.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 04-2740
________________
IVAN SANCHEZ,
Appellant,
v.
*ATTORNEY GENERAL, UNITED STATES;
JAMES W. ZIGLAR, IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE
COMMISSIONER; A.J. QUARANTILLO,
INS DISTRICT DIRECTOR; JOSE C. SIMAO
*(Amended per Clerk's Order of 4/26/05)
__________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 03-cv-01848)
District Judge: Honorable Jose L. Linares
__________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 7, 2005
Before: SLOVITER, BARRY AND FISHER, CIRCUIT JUDGES.
(Filed : July 13, 2005)
_________________
OPINION
_________________
PER CURIAM
Appellant Ivan Sanchez, a native and citizen of Cuba, came to the United States as
part of the Mariel Boatlift, and was paroled into the United States in May 1980. In 1995,
Sanchez pleaded guilty to aggravated manslaughter in New Jersey state court. He was
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 17 years, and his immigration parole was revoked.
In August 2002, Sanchez was served with a Notice To Appear, which charged him with
removal under Immigration & Nationality Act § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (alien convicted of
crime of moral turpitude), and § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (failure to possess valid entry
document at time of application for admission). In October 2002, New Jersey released
Sanchez on parole, and he then was taken into immigration custody. In November 2002,
an Immigration Judge sustained the charges and ordered Sanchez removed to Cuba. The
Immigration & Naturalization Service, now the Department of Homeland Security,
subsequently considered but declined to release him on parole pursuant to the Cuban
Review Plan, 8 C.F.R. § 212.12.
In April 2003, Sanchez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 in United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, in which he
claimed that his ongoing detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) violated due process
because there was no likelihood that he would be removed to Cuba in the foreseeable
future. Relying upon Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), Sanchez requested release
from detention. In an order entered on May 25, 2004, the District Court denied the
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petition, concluding that Sanchez’ continued detention was authorized by our decision in
Sierra v. Romaine, 347 F.3d 559, 576 (3d Cir. 2003) (“the Attorney General has the
authority under [8 U.S.C. §] 1231(a)(6) to detain [an inadmissible alien] indefinitely and
Zadvydas’s six-month presumption of reasonableness is not applicable to him.”).
Sanchez appealed, and the appellees, which include the Attorney General, moved
for summary affirmance. A motions panel of this Court referred the motion to a merits
panel, and our Clerk stayed briefing pending the United States Supreme Court’s decision
in Benitez v. Wallis, 124 S. Ct. 1143 (U.S. 2004). That case has been decided, briefs
have been filed, and the appeal is ripe for decision.
We will dismiss the appeal as moot. In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 689, the
Supreme Court interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) to authorize the continued detention of
legal permanent resident aliens beyond the mandated 90-day removal period, but only for
as long as “reasonably necessary” to effectuate their removal from the country. The
Supreme Court explained that “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable,
continued detention is no longer authorized.” Id. at 699. The Court construed section
1231(a)(6) to limit post-removal order detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring
about the alien's removal, generally no more than six months. After six months, the alien
is eligible for conditional release if he can demonstrate that there is “no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 701.
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In Clark v. Martinez, 125 S. Ct. 716 (U.S. 2005), a companion case to Benitez, the
Supreme Court extended its interpretation of section 1231(a)(6) to inadmissible aliens,
such as Sanchez. The Court also vacated and remanded for reconsideration our decision
in Sierra, 125 S. Ct. 962 (U.S. 2005). Under Clark, an inadmissible alien can no longer
be detained beyond the statutory 90-day removal period of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1), where
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Clark
effectively ends this case. The Supreme Court itself observed that conditions in Cuba
have not changed such that removal of the Mariel Cubans is reasonably foreseeable;
therefore, Clark dictates that Sanchez is entitled to be released and paroled into the
country. 125 S. Ct. at 727 (because government brought forward nothing to indicate that
substantial likelihood of removal exists despite passage of six months, and conceded that
“it is no longer even involved in repatriation negotiations with Cuba,” petitions for habeas
corpus should have been granted).
In his brief on appeal, the Attorney General asserted that, on March 25, 2005, he
requested that a repatriation review, 8 C.F.R. § 241.13, be completed in Sanchez’ case as
soon as possible. He stated: “Upon completion of the review, ... [i]f the [Department of
Homeland Security] determines there is no likelihood of removal and that petitioner is not
a special category alien, the petitioner will be released on an order of supervision.”
(Appellees’ Brief, at 7.) Three weeks later, Sanchez was released from immigration
custody pending his removal from the United States, according to a letter submitted to
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this Court by the U.S. Attorney after the appellees’ brief was filed. The Release
Notification states that Sanchez’ release does not affect the removal order and does not
constitute an admission to the United States, and that Sanchez is subject to certain
conditions of supervision. See Clark, 125 S. Ct. at 727-28 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(any alien released under Clark is subject to conditions of supervised release, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(3), and if he fails to comply with conditions of release, he is subject to criminal
penalties, including further detention, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(b)).
In view of this development we conclude that the appeal is moot. In his habeas
petition, Sanchez sought release from detention. He has achieved that result. There is no
need for a remand to the District Court insofar as Sanchez has already been released. The
action of the Department of Homeland Security has forestalled any occasion for this
Court to provide meaningful relief. See Artway v. Attorney General of New Jersey, 81
F.3d 1235, 1246 (3d Cir. 1996).
We will dismiss the appeal as moot. The Attorney General’s motion for summary
affirmance is denied.
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