United States v. Benjamin Easley , 703 F. App'x 135 ( 2017 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 16-2731
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
BENJAMIN EASLEY,
Appellant
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Nos. 2:13-cr-000061-003, 2:14-cr-00140-001)
District Judge: Hon. Cynthia M. Rufe
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 16, 2017
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Before: GREENAWAY, Jr., SHWARTZ, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: July 26, 2017)
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OPINION*
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*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
In 2016, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
sentenced Benjamin Easley (“Easley”) to 144 months of prison and 5 years of supervised
release for crimes related to a bank-fraud and identity-theft conspiracy. During
sentencing, Easley argued that he should receive a shorter sentence for several reasons:
(a) police illegally arrested him as a younger man; (b) someone murdered his brother in
the late 1990s; (c) he played an active role in his community; (d) he suffers from a mental
illness; (e) he has a physical illness; and (f) social scientists have concluded that longer
sentences do not deter crime.
The District Court Judge responded to these arguments in a long and personal
colloquy that implored Easley to take responsibility for his actions and to consider the
moral weight of his crime. After delivering this speech and hearing from the prosecution,
the Judge sentenced Easley. Approximately a month later, Easley filed a Motion for
Relief Pending Appeal and the District Court denied this Motion because it lacked
jurisdiction to modify Easley’s sentence. Easley filed a timely appeal.
Easley raises several issues on appeal. First, he argues that his sentence was
procedurally unreasonable because the Judge did not meaningfully consider his
arguments for leniency (a) that he possessed a mental illness; (b) that he suffered from a
physical illness; and (c) that lengthy sentences do not deter crime. Second, he asserts that
his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the Judge based Easley’s sentence
on the unfounded assumptions (a) that Easley had received a lighter sentence in an earlier
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case because of his illegal arrest in the 1990s and (b) that Easley had recruited children
whom he had mentored to further his criminal enterprises. Third, he contends that the
District Court incorrectly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over his Motion for Relief
Pending Appeal.
I. DISCUSSION
Easley challenges his sentence as procedurally unreasonable. If a defendant
objects to a District Court’s sentence as procedurally unreasonable for the first time in his
or her appeal, we review the sentence for plain error. United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759
F.3d 253, 258 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc). “For reversible plain error to exist, there must be
(1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) which seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States
v. Tai, 750 F.3d 309, 313–14 (3d Cir. 2014). In other words, even if there is plain error,
we may still affirm the sentence if the error is harmless. See United States v. Knight, 266
F.3d 203, 206 n.6 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Michael O’Shaughnessy, Appellate Review of
Sentences, 88 Geo. L.J. 1637, 1643 (2000)). The error is harmless if it is “clear that the
error did not affect the district court’s selection of the sentence imposed.” United States
v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2008).
Easley challenges his sentence as procedurally unreasonable because the District
Court Judge, he claims, did not meaningfully consider his arguments for leniency and
because the Judge based her decision on unfounded assumptions about Easley. Easley
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raised these objections for the first time on appeal. As a result, we review them under our
plain error standard.
Under this standard, Easley’s two procedural claims fail. With regards to
Easley’s first procedural claim, we apply a generous standard because “[a] sentencing
court need not analyze explicitly every argument that a defendant puts forward.” United
States v. Quiles, 618 F.3d 383, 397 (3d Cir. 2010). Under this standard, we reject
Easley’s first procedural claim because the record shows that the Judge considered
Easley’s arguments for leniency. The Judge ordered Easley to participate in a mental
health program because of his mental illness; allowed him to receive medical treatment
because of his physical illness; and acknowledged his deterrence argument when the
Judge said “I’m still a judge that believes in the general deterrence philosophy.” App.
229.
Easley’s second procedural claim that the sentencing Judge based the sentence on
unsubstantiated assumptions is also unpersuasive. The Judge did assume that Easley had
invoked his unwarranted arrest to reduce an earlier sentence, App. at 219 (“I’m sure you
told my colleague, who sentenced you the last time about [the wrongful arrest]”), but the
Judge did not base her sentence on that fact. Instead, the Judge referenced Easley’s
previous sentence to suggest that if his false arrest had driven him to criminality, Easley
should have learned, after this previous sentence, to take responsibility for his actions and
not to blame his error on a previous wrong, App. at 219 (“And I’m sure that’s a
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motivating factor to depreciate someone’s sentence hoping that they’ve learned from this
mistake but you didn’t. You didn’t in a big way.”).
Similarly, Easley has failed to prove that the trial Judge based the sentence on the
assumption that Easley preyed on the people that he mentored to further criminal
enterprises. This argument lacks merit because the Judge did not assume this, let alone
base her decision on it. Instead, the Judge referenced Easley’s criminal enterprise to find
that he lacked the general capacity to serve as a role model to the people he mentored.
Finally, the District Court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over his
Motion for Relief Pending Appeal. Other than through habeas corpus, a district court
may only modify a sentence if the judge (a) receives a motion from the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), (b) discovers that the Sentencing
Commission had lowered the sentencing range, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), or (c) finds that it
may modify a sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B). The Director of the Bureau of Prisons has not submitted a
motion to the District Court. The Sentencing Commission has not lowered the sentencing
range. Thus, the District Court may only modify Easley’s sentence pursuant to Rule 35.
Pursuant to Rule 35, the District Court denied the Motion for Relief Pending
Appeal. Rule 35 allows District Courts to reduce a sentence within 14 days after a
sentence is rendered, Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a), or upon motion from the government, Fed.
R. Crim. P. 35(b). Easley submitted his motion more than 14 days after sentencing and
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the government has not submitted a motion. As a result, the District Court correctly
found that it lacked jurisdiction.
Easley attempts to skirt this law by framing his request as seeking a
recommendation, as opposed to a request for a reduction in sentence. At least one other
circuit court, however, has denied a litigant’s attempt to draw upon a district court’s
inherent power to circumvent 35(a). United States v. Ortiz, 741 F.3d 288, 292 n. 2 (1st
Cir. 2014) (rejecting a motion to reconsider because “for motions—like this one—that
fall squarely within the purview of Rule 35(a), a district court’s authority to grant relief
stems solely from that rule’s positive law, not from any inherent power”). We agree.
II. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the orders of the District Court.
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