Government of the Virgin Islands v. Joyce , 210 F. App'x 208 ( 2006 )

Opinions of the United
2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
12-28-2006
Govt of VI v. Joyce
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-4937
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-4937
GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
v.
ELWIN JOYCE,
Appellant
On Appeal From the District Court
of the Virgin Islands, Division of St. Thomas and St. John
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 03-cr-00057-1)
Trial Judge: Hon. Raymond L. Finch, Chief District Judge
Trial Judge: Hon. Thomas K. Moore, District Judge
Trial Judge: Darryl D. Donohue, Territorial Judge
Argued: December 5, 2006
BEFORE: McKEE, BARRY and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: December 28, 2006)
Andrew L. Capdeville (Argued)
Nisky Center - Suite 201
P.O. Box 6576
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas
USVI 00804
Attorney for Appellant
Kerry E. Drue
Attorney General
Elliott M. Davis
Solicitor General
Matthew Phelan (Argued)
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General of Virgin Islands
Department of Justice
34-38 Kronprindsens Gade, GERS Building, 2nd Floor
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas
USVI 00802
Attorneys for Appellee
OPINION OF THE COURT
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
Elwin Joyce appeals his conviction for first-degree rape under V.I. Code tit. 14, §
1701(2). We have jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c) and we will affirm.
I
Joyce is a family friend of Carlene Ritter Thomas. Thomas is the mother of
Rhatonda Saddler, the victim in this case. Saddler was 17 years old at the time of the
alleged rape. At trial, Saddler testified that, on April 30, 1998, she went with Joyce and
his family to a show at a stadium in St. Thomas. During the show, Joyce told Saddler that
he wanted to talk to her. Joyce and Saddler went to Joyce's jeep and both got into the
back seat. At that point, Joyce physically forced Saddler to lie down and to have sexual
intercourse with him, although Saddler did not consent and tried to push Joyce off of her.
2
Joyce also touched Saddler's breast and vagina without her consent. Joyce said to Saddler
at one point that she belonged to him, and that he was a jealous man and would kill her.
After she put her clothes on, Joyce gave Saddler $20 and she returned to the stadium
alone. Although Saddler told Joyce's wife immediately that she had been raped, she did
not tell her mother until May 4, 1998. Ms Saddler was examined by a doctor the
following day, and by a second physician a day after that.
Joyce was subsequently charged with one count of first degree rape under V.I.
Code tit. 14, § 1701(2), and two counts of unlawful sexual contact under V.I. Code tit. 14,
§ 1708(1). Section 1701(2) provides that “[w]hoever perpetrates an act of sexual
intercourse or sodomy with a person . . . (2) when the person's resistance is forcibly
overcome . . . is guilty of rape in the first degree and shall be imprisoned not less than 10
years nor more than 30 years.” Section 1708(1) provides that “[a] person who engages in
sexual contact with a person not the perpetrator's spouse— . . . (1) when force or coercion
is used to accomplish the sexual contact; . . . is guilty of unlawful sexual contact and shall
be imprisoned not more than 15 years.”
Joyce had a trial in the Territorial Court from January 25 to January 28, 1999, at
which he testified. During his testimony, Joyce admitted that he had sexual intercourse
with Saddler, but testified that he did not use force and that Saddler consented.
After the closing arguments, the Territorial Court instructed the jury as follows on
the first-degree rape charge.
“[T]he government charges, in Count I of the Information that, on or about
3
April 30th, 1998, in St. Thomas United States Virgin Islands, Elwin Joyce
did perpetrate an act of sexual intercourse with a person, to wit . . .
Rhatonda Saddler, when her resistance was forcibly overcome by pushing
her down onto the back seat of his automobile and putting his penis into her
vagina, in violation of 14 Virgin Islands Code 1701(2).
“The elements which the Government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt on the charge of rape in the first degree as charged in
Count I are as follows. One, on or about April 30th, 1998; two, in St.
Thomas United States Virgin Islands; three, the defendant, Elwin Joyce,
four, at a time when Rhatonda Saddler’s resistance was forcibly overcome;
five, did perpetrate an act of sexual intercourse with Rhatonda Saddler; six,
without Rhatonda Saddler’s consent, by defendant pushing Rhatonda
Saddler onto the back seat of his automobile and putting his penis into her
vagina, in violation of 14 VI Code 1701(2).
...
“Now, in determining the defendant’s intention, the law assumes that
every person intends the natural consequences of his voluntary acts.
Therefore, the general intent required to be proved as an element of rape in
the first degree is inferred from the defendant’s voluntary commission of
the act forbidden by law and it is not necessary to establish that defendant
knew that his act was a violation of law.”
(emphasis added).
After charging the jury on the remaining counts, the court went on to discuss
Joyce’s assertion that Saddler consented. It stated as follows:
“The defendant has invoked a defense of consent. Consent is an
absolute defense to the crimes of rape in the first degree and unlawful
sexual contact in the first degree. If after considering all of the evidence
you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the alleged victim consented to
having sexual intercourse with the defendant, you must find the defendant
not guilty of rape in the first degree in Count I.”
After deliberating, the jury found Joyce guilty as charged on all three counts.
Joyce appealed to the Appellate Division of the Virgin Islands, arguing that the Territorial
Court had given the jury improper instructions regarding intent. The Appellate Division
4
affirmed, and Joyce appeals to this court.1
II
On appeal, Joyce challenges the following part of the Territorial Court’s
instruction on first degree rape:
“[I]n determining the defendant’s intention, the law assumes that every
person intends the natural consequences of his voluntary acts. Therefore,
the general intent required to be proved as an element of rape in the first
degree is inferred from the defendant’s voluntary commission of the act
forbidden by law and it is not necessary to establish that defendant knew
that his act was a violation of law.”
Joyce argues that the offense with which he is charged is such that “if [he]
reasonably believed that he had been involved in an act of consensual sexual
intercourse—as he testified—he would not have had the mens rea necessary to constitute
the crime of rape as charged,” and that the instruction given effectively shifted the burden
of proof on this mens rea element to him, in violation of the principles set forth in
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) and United States v. Garrett, 574 F.2d 778(3d Cir.1978).
A
1
This court reviews the determination of the Territorial Court using the same standard
of review applied by the Appellate Division. Tyler v. Armstrong, 365 F.3d 204, 208 (3d
Cir. 2004); Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Albert, 241 F.3d 344, 347 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001);
Semper v. Santos, 845 F.2d 1233, 1235-36 (3d Cir. 1988). In the absence of a timely
objection, this court reviews challenged jury instructions for plain error, but exercises
plenary review over the lower court’s interpretation of the relevant law. See Gov’t of the
Virgin Islands v. Rosa, 399 F.3d 283, 292-94 (3d Cir. 2005); Gov’t of the Virgin Islands
v. Fonseca, 274 F.3d 760, 765 (3d Cir. 2001).
5
Joyce was charged with first-degree rape under V.I. Code tit. 14, § 1701(2), which
provides that “[w]hoever perpetrates an act of sexual intercourse or sodomy with a
person— . . . (2) when the person’s resistance is forcibly overcome . . . is guilty of rape in
the first degree.” V.I. Code tit. 14, § 1701(2). On its face, the statute does not include a
mens rea element; all that is required is that sexual intercourse or sodomy occur and that
the victim’s “resistance [be] forcibly overcome.”
1
A comparison of subsection (2) of section 1701—under which Joyce was
charged—with the rest of that section leads ineluctably to the conclusion that the
omission of a mens rea requirement in subsection (2) was a deliberate choice by the
Legislature of the Virgin Islands.2 Although the statute includes a requirement of
2
Section 1701 sets forth five sets of circumstances under which sexual intercourse or
sodomy may become first-degree rape:
Whoever perpetrates an act of sexual intercourse or sodomy with a person–
(1) when through idiocy, imbecility or any unsoundness of
mind, either temporary or permanent, the person is incapable
of giving consent, or, by reason of mental or physical
weakness or immaturity or any bodily ailment, the person
does not offer resistance;
(2) when the person's resistance is forcibly overcome;
(3) when the person's resistance is prevented by fear of
immediate and great bodily harm which the person has
reasonable cause to believe will be inflicted upon the person;
(4) when the person's resistance is prevented by stupor or
weakness of mind produced by an intoxicating, narcotic or
anaesthetic agent, or when the person is known by the
defendant to be in such state of stupor or weakness of mind
from any cause; or
(5) when the person is, at the time, unconscious of the nature
6
subjective knowledge on the part of the defendant when the victim is unconscious or in
such a state of stupor or weakness of mind as to be unable to resist, § 1701(4)-(5), it does
not include such a requirement when the victim’s resistance is overcome by force or the
threat of force, § 1701(2)-(3). The Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands and the District
Court have examined other provisions of the Virgin Islands rape statutes and held that
where the Legislature did not set forth a mens rea element, such a choice was deliberate.
See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Richards, No. F40/01, 44 V.I. 47, 55, 2001 WL
1464765 at *5 (Terr. V.I. June 24, 2001) (“[I]t is clear that the omission of any intent
requirement from §§ 1702, 1709 was not merely an oversight by the Legislature. To the
contrary, it appears that the Legislature was fully aware of the significance of the
defendant's knowledge, yet, chose not to include intent in those sections. Therefore, it
would be inappropriate for the Court to engraft such a requirement.”); Francis v. Gov’t of
the Virgin Islands, 236 F. Supp. 2d 498, 500-502 (D.V.I. App. Div. 2002) (citing
Richards and applying the same logic to § 1700, another aggravated rape statute).
2
Joyce argues, however, that our decision in Government of the Virgin Islands v.
Rodriguez, 423 F.2d 9, 12-15 (3d Cir. 1970), compels us to read a mental state
requirement into the statute. Although we stated in Rodriguez that we presume that a
of the act and this is known to the defendant–
is guilty of rape in the first degree.
V.I. Code tit. 14, § 1701 (emphasis added).
7
criminal statute defining an offense includes a mental state requirement where none is
explicit in the statute, we added that we do so when “there is no reason to suppose that the
[legislature], by deliberate choice, omitted such a requirement.” Id. at 13 (quoting
Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 117 (1st Cir. 1952)). As explained above, here
there is a reason to suppose that the omission of any mental state requirement in Section
1701(2) was a deliberate choice.3
Moreover, the Supreme Court has explained recently that the canon of statutory
construction setting forth a presumption in favor of a mental state element in criminal
statutes “requires a court to read into a statute only that mens rea . . . necessary to
separate wrongful conduct from otherwise innocent conduct.” Carter v. United States,
530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, where the statute
includes the elements of force overcoming the victim’s resistance, at most the only mental
state required to separate criminal conduct from innocent conduct is general intent—that
the defendant intended to make the bodily movement that constitutes the act forbidden by
law, i.e. the act of penetration and the use of force to overcome resistance by the victim.
See id. at 268-70; United States v. Dollar Bank Money Market Account No. 1591768456,
980 F.2d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 1992); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, §
3
Joyce also relies on V.I. Code tit. 14, § 14(5), which makes a defense of mistake of
fact available in some instances. As the Territorial Court explained in Richards, the
statute provides that mistake of fact “disproves any criminal intent,” and is unavailing
where, as here, criminal intent is not an element of the offense. Richards, 44 V.I. at 49,
2001 WL 1464765 at *1-*2.
8
17.2(b), at 613-17 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing general and specific intent in the context of
rape statutes). As noted, Joyce’s argument is that the statute includes an element of
specific intent, viz. that the defendant subjectively knew that the victim did not consent.
Several state courts, construing their own rape statutes, have rejected this argument and
held that where a statute defines the crime of rape to include an element of force, no
mental state is necessary to separate innocent and criminal conduct. State v. Walden, 841
P.2d 81, 83-84 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (“Since one cannot accidentally or innocently
induce another person to engage in sexual intercourse by means of force or threat, there is
no need to imply specific intent as an element of the crime in order to prevent
nonculpable conduct from being criminal.”); see also Commonwealth v. Lopez, 745 N.E.
2d 961, 968-69 (Mass. 2001) (collecting cases from Illinois, Iowa, Maine, New
Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Washington, and Wisconsin similarly declining to
interpret their respective rape statutes as requiring a mental state on the part of the
defendant where none is set forth in the statute and where force or the threat of force is an
element of the offense); Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 A.2d 765, 769 (Pa. Super. 1982)
(“If the element of the defendant's belief as to the victim's state of mind is to be
established as a defense to the crime of rape then it should be done by our legislature
which has the power to define crimes and offenses. We refuse to create such a defense.”);
cf. 2 LaFave, § 17.2(b), at 613-17 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that most states do not recognize
mistake of fact regarding the victim’s consent as a defense to rape). We reject Joyce’s
argument as well.
9
As we read the statute, the Legislature of the Virgin Islands did not intend to make
the mental state element for which Joyce argues an element of the crime of first-degree
rape under V.I. Code tit. 14, § 1701(2), and the cases in which courts have found implicit
mens rea requirements in criminal statutes do not compel a contrary result.4
B
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) and United States v. Garrett, 574 F.2d
778 (3d Cir.1978) disapprove of jury instructions that relieve the prosecution of its burden
to prove all elements of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and those cases
hold that an instruction such as was given in the present case may tend to have such an
effect where the defendant’s subjective intent is an element of the charged offense.
Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 524; Garrett, 547 F.2d at 782-83. The Supreme Court has held,
however, that harmless error analysis applies to Sandstrom-type challenges to jury
4
In his appeals to this court and to the Appellate Division of the District Court, Mr.
Joyce does not appear to challenge his convictions for unlawful sexual contact under V.I.
Code tit. 14, § 1708(1). To the extent that he does, however, our analysis of section
1701(2) is equally applicable to section 1708(1). Section 1708(1) provides that “[a]
person who engages in sexual contact with a person not the perpetrator’s spouse . . . when
force or coercion is used to accomplish the sexual contact . . . is guilty of unlawful sexual
contact and shall be imprisoned not more than 15 years.” Like section 1701, section 1708
of the Virgin Islands Criminal Code includes several subsections, some of which include
a mens rea requirement, others of which do not. Like section 1701(2), section 1708(1)
includes no mens rea requirement in its text, but includes “force or coercion” as an
element of the offense. As such, the lack of a mens rea requirement in the text of section
1708(1) appears to be a deliberate choice by the Legislature of the Virgin Islands.
Moreover, because section 1708(1) includes an element of “force or coercion,” it is not
necessary to require subjective knowledge of lack of consent on the part of the defendant
in order to separate innocent and criminal conduct. See Carter, 530 U.S. at 269.
10
instructions. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 581 (1986). Because we have rejected Joyce’s
argument that the offense with which he was charged includes an element regarding the
defendant’s subjective intent as to whether the victim consented, the prosecution had no
burden to prove such an element, and any error by the Territorial Court in giving the
challenged instruction was necessarily harmless. See Collins v. Francis, 728 F.2d 1322,
1352 (11th Cir. 1984) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (“Intent was not an element of the crime of
rape in Georgia when Collins was tried . . . The challenged instruction bore only on intent
so, in this context, Sandstrom was not implicated.”); cf. United States v. Allah, 130 F.3d
33, 43 (2d Cir. 1997) (Sandstrom error harmless where specific intent was an element of
the crime, but was not contested); Hill v. Kemp, 833 F.2d 927, 929-30 (11th Cir. 1987)
(same).
We will therefore affirm the judgment below.
11