Leslie Shapiro v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co , 430 F. App'x 169 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                       NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 10-2551
    _____________
    LESLIE SHAPIRO,
    Appellant
    v.
    METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY;
    THE AT&T DISABILITY INCOME PROGRAM WHICH
    INCORPORATES THE TERMS OF THE AT&T LONG TERM
    DISABILITY PLAN FOR MANAGEMENT EMPLOYEES,
    f/k/a THE SBC DISABILITY INCOME PLAN;
    NETWORK MEDICAL REVIEW COMPANY, LTD. d/b/a NRM;
    R. KEVIN SMITH, D.O.
    _____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civil No. 3-08-cv-06204)
    District Judge: Honorable Joel A. Pisano
    _____________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    May 27, 2011
    Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SCIRICA and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion Filed: June 7, 2011)
    _____________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    _____________
    RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
    The Appellant, Leslie Shapiro, challenges the dismissal of his claim against
    Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, et al (“Appellees”), for improperly offsetting his
    disability benefits with the proceeds he receives from his pension fund. The dismissal
    was pursuant to District Court’s grant of the Appellees’ motion for summary judgment.
    Shapiro claims that the District Court erred in concluding that the language of the
    disability plan (“Plan”) unambiguously entitled the Plan to offset Shapiro’s disability
    benefits with his pension proceeds. Additionally, Shapiro claims that the District Court
    erred in its alternative reasoning, that even if the language of the Plan was ambiguous, the
    claim administrator’s interpretation of the language, authorized by the Plan, was not
    arbitrary and capricious. We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . As the District Court dismissed this case on summary judgment, our standard of
    review is plenary. McLeod v. Hartford Life, 
    372 F.3d 618
    , 623 (3d Cir. 2004). We
    agree with the District Court that the language of the Plan unambiguously requires the
    offset, or in the alternative, it was reasonable for the claim administrator to reach that
    conclusion. Accordingly, we will affirm.
    The first step in the inquiry as to whether language of the Plan requires the offset
    of Shapiro’s benefits is to determine whether the language of the Plan is ambiguous. Bill
    Gray Enters. V. Gnourley, 
    248 F.3d 206
    , 218 (3d Cir. 2001). Terms are ambiguous when
    reasonable alternative interpretations exist. 
    Id.
     If unambiguous, then the inquiry is
    complete; however, if the terms are found to be ambiguous and the Plan gives the claim
    administrator the authority to interpret the Plan, we must then determine whether the
    2
    interpretation of the administrator is reasonable. 
    Id.
     We review the claim administrator’s
    interpretation under an “arbitrary and capricious” standard, which requires that we will
    only overturn the decision if it is “clearly not supported by the evidence in the record or
    the administrator has failed to comply with procedures required by the plan.” Vitale v.
    Latrobe Area Hosp., 
    420 F.3d 278
    , 281-82 (3d Cir. 2005).
    In a thoroughly reasoned opinion, the District Court found that the plain language
    of the Plan, in context, was not ambiguous, and “clearly states that when a participant
    receives his pension benefits during the same period where [disability] benefits are
    distributed that an offset is required.” A-11. The District Court reasoned that “Shapiro
    has been and will continue to receive his monthly reinstated [disability] benefits while
    also receiving his pension annuity making the offset applicable.” 
    Id.
     Additionally, the
    District Court found that, even if it erred in finding the language unambiguous, the claim
    administrator had the authority to interpret the language and its interpretation was not
    “arbitrary and capricious,” as it was in accordance with an express provision of the Plan,
    and therefore, was supported by evidence in the record and is clearly reasonable. We
    have no basis for disturbing the District Court’s findings, and, accordingly, we will
    affirm.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-2551

Citation Numbers: 430 F. App'x 169

Judges: McKee, Scirica, Rendell

Filed Date: 6/7/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024