Hinman v. Russo , 267 F. App'x 137 ( 2008 )

Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
1-10-2008
Hinman v. Russo
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 06-3814
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 06-3814
EMRETTA HINMAN;
WILLIAM HINMAN,
Appellants
v.
M.D. JOSEPH DELLO RUSSO;
NEW JERSEY EYE CENTER;
JOHN DOES 1-10;
ABC CORPORATIONS 1-10
_____________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 03-CV-00768)
District Judge: Honorable William G. Bassler
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on January 8, 2008
____________
Before: FISHER, HARDIMAN AND ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Filed January 10, 2008 )
OPINION
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge
Because we write exclusively for the parties and the parties are familiar with the
facts and proceedings below, we will not revisit them here.
I.
Informed consent concerns a physician’s duty “to disclose to a patient information
that will enable [the patient] to ‘evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the
risks attendant upon each’ before subjecting that patient to a course of treatment.”
Matthies v. Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 456, 461 (N.J. 1999) (quoting Perna v. Pirozzi, 457
A.2d 431, 438 (N.J. 1983)). In New Jersey, claims of medical malpractice and failure to
obtain informed consent are “sub-groups of a broad claim of medical negligence.”
Howard v. Univ. of Med. and Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 77 (N.J. 2002) (quoting
Teilhaber v. Greene, 727 A.2d 518, 523 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999)). Under New
Jersey law,
[t]o establish a prima facie case for medical negligence
premised on a theory of liability for lack of informed consent,
a plaintiff must show (1) the physician failed to comply with
the [reasonably-prudent-patient] standard for disclosure; (2)
the undisclosed risk occurred and harmed the plaintiff; (3) a
reasonable person under the circumstances would not have
consented and submitted to the operation or surgical
procedure had he or she been so informed; and (4) the
operation or surgical procedure was a proximate cause of
plaintiff’s injuries.
Id. at 79 (quoting Teilhaber, 727 A.2d at 524).
Here, we are satisfied that Ms. Hinman gave informed consent to Dr. Dello Russo
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to perform the LASIK procedure. In addition, we are satisfied that under existing New
Jersey law Dr. Dello Russo was not required to provide Ms. Hinman with a copy of the
Patient Information Booklet in order to obtain her informed consent. The testimony at
trial revealed that Ms. Hinman discussed the risks of the procedure with Dr. Dello Russo
and a nurse on his staff. The consent form signed by Ms. Hinman indicated that she was
fully aware of the risks of the procedure, that she had obtained satisfactory answers to all
of her questions and concerns regarding the procedure, and that she had rejected
alternatives to the LASIK procedure. Additionally, the Hinmans presented no evidence
that Dr. Dello Russo’s failure to provide her with the Patient Information Booklet was a
proximate cause of her injuries. The form signed by Ms. Hinman detailed the risks of the
procedure, and the risks discussed on the consent form were substantially similar to those
discussed in the Patient Information Booklet.
Therefore, exercising plenary review, we are satisfied that the District Court did
not err in denying the Hinmans’ motion for judgment as a matter of law and did not abuse
its discretion in denying the Hinmans’ motion for new trial. W.V. Realty, Inc. v. N. Ins.
Co., 334 F.3d 306, 311 (3d Cir. 2003). We also deny the Hinmans’ motion to certify the
question to the New Jersey Supreme Court.
II.
We are similarly satisfied that the District Judge did not abuse his discretion by
denying the Hinmans’ motion to recuse. Edelstein v. Wilentz, 812 F.2d 128, 131 (3d Cir.
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1987). A judge must recuse himself if “a reasonable person, with knowledge of all the
facts, would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” In re
Kensington Int’l Ltd. and Springfield Assocs., LLC, 353 F.3d 211, 220 (3d Cir. 2003)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)). A judge must also recuse himself “[w]here he has a personal
bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1).
Here, the District Judge explained on the record that, after two days of trial, he
learned from his independent, adult daughter that she obtained the services of Dr. Dello
Russo for a LASIK procedure approximately four years prior to the trial. Upon learning
this, the District Judge terminated the conversation. The District Judge had no
independent recollection of his daughter’s decision to use Dr. Dello Russo for the
procedure and took no part in her decision to do so. We are thus satisfied that the District
Judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion to recuse because a reasonable
person with knowledge of these facts would not reasonably question his impartiality nor
did he have knowledge of any disputed facts of this case, namely whether Dr. Dello
Russo obtained Ms. Hinman’s informed consent for her procedure.
III.
Finally, the Hinmans argue that the District Court’s instruction to counsel
regarding Ms. Hinman’s behavior on the witness stand warrants a new trial. Because the
Hinmans’ failed to object to the instruction at trial, we apply the plain error standard of
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review. Ryder v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 128 F.3d 128, 136 (3d Cir. 1997). Applying
the precepts of plain error review, see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-734
(1993), we do not find it unreasonable for the District Court to seek to have the jury
evaluate evidence presented by a level and composed witness. The written transcript
reveals that the District Court did not want the jury to be manipulated by appeals to
emotion and sympathy and therefore sought to curb what it perceived to be Ms. Hinman’s
excessive crying. The transcript indicates that the jury was excused from the courtroom
prior to the District Court’s instruction. The exchange between the District Court and
counsel for the Hinmans also suggests that Ms. Hinman was not present in the courtroom
and therefore was not intimidated or otherwise influenced by the instruction. Thus, we are
satisfied that no error that affected the outcome of the proceedings occurred.
We have considered all of the contentions raised by the parties and have concluded
that no further discussion is necessary.
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
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