Sharma v. Attorney General of the United States ( 2006 )

Opinions of the United
2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
6-7-2006
Sharma v. Atty Gen USA
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 06-1613
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"Sharma v. Atty Gen USA" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 938.
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DPS-212 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-1613
________________
RAJ KUMAR SHARMA,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
_________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A72 432 452)
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 4, 2006
BEFORE: FUENTES, VAN ANTWERPEN, and 1ROTH CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: June 7, 2006)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Raj Kumar Sharma, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of an order
1
The Honorable Jane R. Roth assumed senior status on May 31, 2006.
of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his motion to reopen his
immigration proceedings. The Government moves for a summary affirmance of the
BIA’s order. We will grant the Government’s motion and deny the petition for review.
In 1991, Sharma entered the United States without inspection. A notice to appear
was issued in 1998. Sharma conceded his removability for being present without being
admitted or paroled. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture. Sharma claimed that he feared the police in India would
persecute him because they believed he supported the Sikhs. An Immigration Judge
(“IJ”) found Sharma not credible and denied his applications for relief. In 2002, the BIA
affirmed the IJ’s decision. Sharma did not file a petition for review. In 2005, Sharma
filed a motion to reconsider the BIA’s decision. The BIA found the motion untimely and
denied it. This Court denied Sharma’s petition for review of the BIA’s denial of
reconsideration.
Sharma subsequently filed a motion to reopen the BIA’s decision. He conceded
the motion was untimely, but he maintained that he satisfied the exception to the filing
deadline based upon changed circumstances in India. Sharma stated that the Indian
government promulgated new anti-terrorism legislation that increased the power of law
enforcement agencies. He stated that the police have engaged in human rights abuses
with impunity. Sharma argued that his life is now at greater risk should he return to India
because the police believed he supported the Sikhs. Sharma further argued that the IJ’s
adverse credibility determination was incorrect.
2
In denying the motion to reopen, the BIA explained that, even if Sharma satisfied
the exception to the filing deadline based upon changed circumstances in India, he did not
establish prima facie eligibility for asylum. The BIA also construed Sharma’s motion to
reopen as a motion to reconsider its 2002 affirmance of the IJ’s decision denying his
applications for relief from removal. The BIA denied the motion to reconsider as
untimely and number-barred.
Sharma filed a counseled petition for review and a motion for a stay of removal.
The Government moves for summary affirmance of the BIA’s decision. The Court
reviews the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Guo v. Ashcroft,
386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004). Under this standard, the Court will reverse the BIA’s
decision only if it is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law. Id.
The BIA correctly concluded that, even if Sharma satisfied the exception to the
filing deadline based upon changed circumstances in India, he did not establish prima
facie eligibility for asylum. See Guo, 386 F.3d at 563 (stating that the prima facie
standard requires the applicant to produce objective evidence showing a reasonable
likelihood that he can establish that he is entitled to relief). As recognized by the BIA,
the IJ had already found not credible Sharma’s claim that the police would persecute him
because they believed he supported the Sikhs. In his motion to reopen, Sharma argued
that, in making the adverse credibility determination, the IJ relied on minor
inconsistencies and was insensitive to his cultural differences. Sharma, however,
provided no examples of the alleged errors by the IJ. His conclusory arguments do not
3
cast doubt on the IJ’s decision.
In his response to the Government’s motion for summary affirmance, Sharma
argues that the BIA erred in relying on the IJ’s adverse credibility determination in
denying his motion to reopen under our decision in Guo. We disagree. The alien in Guo,
who was a Chinese citizen, sought asylum based upon a claim of religious persecution.
The IJ found her not credible. The alien then filed a motion to reopen based upon her
subsequent pregnancy and a claim that she would be persecuted for violating China’s
one-child policy. The Court concluded that the BIA erred in relying on the IJ’s adverse
credibility determination in evaluating the motion to reopen where that determination was
unrelated to the claim raised in the motion to reopen. Guo, 386 F.3d at 562. The present
case is distinguishable from Guo because Sharma’s motion to reopen is based upon the
same claim of persecution as his asylum application, which the IJ found not credible.
Sharma also challenges the BIA’s conclusion that his motion to reopen, when
construed as a motion to reconsider the BIA’s 2002 affirmance of the IJ’s decision, is
number-barred. Sharma recognizes that the immigration regulations only allow the filing
of one motion to reconsider “any given decision.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Sharma
argues, however, that the regulations are not controlling because the Immigration and
Nationality Act is silent as to the permissible number of motions to reconsider a denial of
asylum. He notes that the statute only provides that an alien may file “one motion to
reconsider a decision that the alien is removable from the United States.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(6)(A).
4
This argument lacks merit. Under Sharma’s reading of the statute, he would not be
permitted to file a motion to reconsider the denial of asylum at all. After all, under his
reading, the statute only authorizes the filing of a motion to reconsider a decision that an
alien is removable. We instead understand the statutory and regulatory framework to
allow an alien to file one motion to reconsider a prior decision. As the BIA correctly
held, Sharma has already moved once to have the original asylum decision reconsidered.
He was entitled to no more attempts to have the same decision reconsidered.
Because this appeal does not raise a substantial question, the Government’s motion
for summary affirmance is granted. We will deny the petition for review.2
2
Sharma’s motion for a stay of removal is denied.
5