United States v. Clifford Fleming , 523 F. App'x 202 ( 2013 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 12-4019
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CLIFFORD FLEMING,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 3-10-cr-00064-001)
District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 16, 2013
Before: SMITH, FISHER, and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: July 9, 2013 )
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OPINION
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Clifford Fleming was sentenced to 87 months of imprisonment for possession and
distribution of methamphetamine and use of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime.
That sentence reflected the District Court’s decision to grant the Government’s motion
for a downward departure based on cooperation. Fleming appeals his sentence, arguing
that the District Court should have granted him a further downward departure. For the
reasons explained below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of sentence.
I.
Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will recount only those
facts necessary to our disposition.
Fleming pled guilty to two counts of the indictment: Count 1, which charged him
with distributing and possessing with intent to distribute a mixture containing
methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(A)(1) and Count 2, which charged him
with using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). The District Court determined that Fleming had a total offense level
of 25 with a criminal history category of I on Count 1, which translated to an advisory
guidelines range of 57 to 71 months. On Count 2, the District Court determined that
Fleming was subject to a five-year mandatory minimum sentence, which he was required
to serve consecutively to his sentence on Count 1.
Due to Fleming’s cooperation with law enforcement, the Government moved for a
seven-level reduction on Count 1 pursuant to section 5K1.1 of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines. Appendix (“App.”) 51. The Government explicitly declined to
move for a sentence below the mandatory minimum applicable to Count 2. Supplemental
App. 5-6. The District Court granted the Government’s motion, making Fleming’s new
range on Count 127 to 33 months. Following the Government’s recommendation that
Fleming be sentenced at the bottom of this range, the District Court imposed a sentence
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of 27 months on Count 1 and 60 months, the statutory minimum, on Count 2. Fleming
now argues that the District Court erred in imposing the mandatory minimum sentence on
Count 2, suggesting that he should have received an even greater downward departure.
II.1
It is not entirely clear whether Fleming argues that the District Court committed
error by not departing downward further than it did or by failing to recognize that it had
the ability to depart below the five-year mandatory minimum sentence applicable to
Count 2. In either case, his challenge is meritless. To the extent that his appeal is based
on a belief that he should have been granted a greater downward departure, this Court
lacks jurisdiction to consider it. United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 332-33 (3d Cir.
2006) (reaffirming our earlier holding that appellate courts lack jurisdiction to entertain
appeals challenging the extent of downward departures), abrogated on other grounds by
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). If, on the other hand, Fleming suggests
that the District Court was incorrect in treating the mandatory minimum as mandatory,
his suggestion is simply incorrect. The Government’s section 5K1.1 motion was a
limited motion that only sought a downward departure on Count 1; the motion
specifically stated that the Government did not move for a sentence below the mandatory
minimum and consecutive nature of Count 2 and the Government never filed a separate
motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) asking the District Court to depart below the statutory
minimum. Under such circumstances, the District Court did not have the authority to
1
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This Court
has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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depart below the mandatory minimum. Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 123
(1996).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s sentence.
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