United States v. Chamberlain ( 2008 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2008 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    7-25-2008
    USA v. Chamberlain
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 07-1290
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    Recommended Citation
    "USA v. Chamberlain" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 793.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/793
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 07-1290
    _____________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    BYRON CHAMBERLAIN,
    Appellant
    _______________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. No. 05-cr-0399)
    District Judge: Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter
    _______________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    June 6, 2008
    Before: FISHER, JORDAN, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
    _____________
    (Filed: July 25, 2008)
    _______________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    _______________
    JORDAN, Circuit Judge
    Byron Chamberlain appeals his sentence, imposed pursuant to the Armed Career
    Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), for violations of that Act and 18 U.S.C.
    § 922(g)(1), which prohibits convicted felons from carrying firearms. He asserts that the
    District Court erred in applying the ACCA at sentencing because one of his prior state
    drug convictions did not qualify as an ACCA predicate offense. He further asserts that
    his sentence should be vacated because the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that his
    predicate offenses be charged in the indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
    doubt. We will affirm the District Court’s judgment of sentence.1
    I.        Background
    On June 13, 2006, Chamberlain was convicted by a jury for possession of a
    firearm by a convicted felon. His conviction stemmed from an incident on October 22,
    2004, when Philadelphia police officers arrested him for carrying a loaded twelve gauge
    shotgun in a city park. On January 29, 2007, the District Court imposed the mandatory
    minimum sentence required by the ACCA, sentencing Chamberlain to fifteen years’
    imprisonment, three years’ supervised release, and a $100 special assessment fee.
    II.       Discussion
    The ACCA applies to recidivists with three or more prior convictions for violent
    felonies or “serious drug [offenses].” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). A serious drug offense is
    1
    The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate
    jurisdiction pursuant to both 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We exercise
    plenary review over Chamberlain’s claim that he was not subject to the ACCA. United
    States v. Jones, 
    332 F.3d 688
    , 690-91 (3d Cir. 2003). We also exercise plenary review
    over his claim that the failure to charge his predicate offenses in the indictment and prove
    them to the jury violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. United States v.
    Williams, 
    235 F.3d 858
    , 861 (3d Cir. 2000).
    2
    defined as including “an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing,
    or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance ... for which
    a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.” 18 U.S.C.
    § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The District Court applied the ACCA during Chamberlain’s
    sentencing because he had previously pleaded guilty to three felony drug convictions.
    Those convictions arose from incidents of drug possession and distribution that took
    place on September 7, 1993 (the “September offense”), February 25, 1994 (the “February
    offense”); and April 27, 1994 (the “April offense”).
    On appeal, Chamberlain acknowledges that his convictions for the February and
    April offenses are ACCA predicate offenses because each of those convictions exposed
    him to a punishment of ten years or more. He claims, however, that the government
    cannot show that his conviction stemming from the September offense exposed him to a
    minimum ten-year sentence and that, as a result, he lacks the three convictions necessary
    to enhance his sentence under the ACCA.
    The charging document for the September offense indicates that Chamberlain was
    charged with–and pleaded guilty to–a violation of 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30)
    (2005) which proscribes “the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to
    manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance.” The same document also lists the
    controlled substance at issue as “cocaine, marihuana.” (App. at 36.) With certain
    exceptions not relevant here, Pennsylvania law punishes a conviction for possession with
    3
    the intent to distribute marijuana with a maximum of five years imprisonment, and
    punishes a conviction for possession with the intent to distribute cocaine with a maximum
    of ten years imprisonment. 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 780-113(f)(1.1) and (2).
    Relying on the differing potential penalties imposed under Pennsylvania law for
    possession with the intent to distribute marijuana and for possession with intent to
    distribute cocaine, Chamberlain argues that because the charging document for the
    September offense lists both cocaine and marijuana, he might have pleaded guilty to
    possession with intent to distribute only marijuana, not cocaine. Therefore, he argues,
    because a marijuana conviction does not carry a possible ten-year sentence, his conviction
    for the September offense cannot be an ACCA predicate offense, and the District Court
    erred by applying an enhanced sentence.
    Chamberlain’s argument does not withstand scrutiny. In analyzing when a prior
    conviction may serve as an ACCA predicate offense, the permissible evidentiary scope is
    limited. Trial courts should “look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory
    definition of a prior offense” in determining whether an offense constitutes an ACCA
    predicate. Taylor v. United States, 
    495 U.S. 575
    , 602 (1990). In addition, the trial court
    may also rely on “the terms of the charging document ... or transcript of colloquy between
    judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the
    defendant or ... some comparable record of [the same] information.” Shepard v. United
    States, 
    544 U.S. 13
    , 26 (2005).
    4
    Here, the plea colloquy between Chamberlain and the Pennsylvania sentencing
    court regarding the September offense makes clear that, as a result of that offense,
    Chamberlain faced a maximum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment. During that
    colloquy, the prosecutor expressly told Chamberlain that his maximum term of
    imprisonment for the September offense was ten years. When asked in the presence of
    the court whether he understood that potential sentence, Chamberlain replied in the
    affirmative. In addition, Chamberlain admitted during the colloquy that, as part of the
    September offense, he possessed nearly three grams of cocaine divided into sixty-two
    individual packets. Thus, Chamberlain’s plea colloquy was one “in which the factual
    basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant.” 
    Id. Thus, his
    attempt to manufacture
    an ambiguity based on the charging document for the September offense fails.
    Chamberlain next argues that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated
    because none of his predicate offenses were charged in the indictment or proven to a jury
    beyond a reasonable doubt. He seems to recognize, however, that his position is contrary
    to precedent (Appellant’s Brief at 32), and we reject his argument. See Apprendi v. New
    Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    , 490 (2000) (explaining that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior
    conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
    maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”) (emphasis
    added); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 224
    , 247 (1998) (rejecting claim
    that “recidivism must be treated as an element of [an] offense”); United States v.
    5
    Thornton, 
    327 F.3d 268
    , 273 (3d Cir. 2003) (rejecting claim that characterization of
    armed career criminal should be treated as element of an offense).
    III.   Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of
    conviction and sentence.
    6