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Sinacole v. Igate Capital , 287 F. App'x 993 ( 2008 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2008 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    8-5-2008
    Sinacole v. Igate Cap
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 07-1141
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008
    Recommended Citation
    "Sinacole v. Igate Cap" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 714.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/714
    This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2008 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 07-1141
    ___________
    PATRICIA HUNT SINACOLE,
    Appellant
    v.
    IGATE CAPITAL,
    also known as
    IGATE CAPITAL CORP.
    also known as
    IGATE CORPORATION
    ___________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil No. 04-cv-00921)
    District Judge: The Honorable David Stewart Cercone
    ___________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    May 21, 2008
    BEFORE: SMITH and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges,
    and STAFFORD,* District Judge.
    *.
    Honorable William H. Stafford, Jr., Senior District Judge for the United States
    District Court for the Northern District of Florida, sitting by designation.
    (Filed: August 5, 2008)
    ___________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ___________
    NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
    Patricia Sinacole appeals from an order of the District Court granting summary
    judgment to her former employer iGate Capital on her claims of sexual discrimination,
    interference with her rights under the Family Medical Leave Act, and breach of contract.
    We will affirm.
    I.
    Sinacole and iGate entered into an employment contract in 1998. In 1999, she
    chose to change her job from a salaried position to work as needed on an hourly, part-time
    basis for iGate and its subsidiary companies. Her job responsibilities changed from
    supervision to special projects and policy drafting. She continued to work on this basis
    for iGate, but also performed work for subsidiary companies of iGate.
    On November 28, 2000, Sinacole submitted to iGate the specified paperwork
    requesting FMLA leave for a pregnancy. She specified that the leave would likely
    commence on April 4, 2001. iGate did not respond to Sinacole’s application.
    2
    Sinacole took her leave on April 6, 2001. She did not request, nor did she take
    leave from any of the subsidiary companies.1 She resumed part-time work with one
    subsidiary six days after the birth of her child. Sinacole submitted to iGate her “Notice of
    Intent to Return from Leave” on May 23, 2001. She specified that she would return to
    work on July 2, 2001. On June 22, 2001, iGate sent a letter to Sinacole terminating her
    employment with iGate and its subsidiaries.
    In explaining the termination to the District Court iGate noted that it experienced
    significant financial difficulties that resulted in a reduction in force. Between iGate and
    its subsidiaries 2,600 of 4,000 employees were terminated from late 2000 until December
    2002. Without counting the subsidiaries, iGate, alone, reduced the number of employees
    from 55 to 36. Two of three employees who performed policy and special project work
    that was similar to Sinacole were terminated: both were men.
    II.
    Sinacole is challenging the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
    iGate on her claim that iGate interfered with her FMLA rights.2 Sinacole specifically
    references the expectation raised in the FMLA that those who are legitimately on leave under
    1.
    iGate notes that it did not request Sinacole to do any work at any time after
    January 27, 2001.
    2.
    The standard of review concerning the District Court’s grant of summary
    judgment is plenary. Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 
    475 F.3d 524
    , 535
    (3d Cir. 2007).
    3
    the FMLA have the right to return to their former position upon concluding leave. 29
    U.S.C.A. § 2614(a)(1).
    We have characterized the FMLA as setting a floor of employer conduct. Therefore,
    to assert an interference claim, “the employee only needs to show that he was entitled to
    benefits under the FMLA and that he was denied them.” Callison v. City of Philadelphia, 
    430 F.3d 117
    , 119 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(a), 2614(a)).3
    iGate successfully argued before the District Court that Sinacole cannot raise an
    FMLA interference claim because she worked an insufficient number of hours to be an
    “eligible employee.” She does not dispute the calculation of hours, but argues in equity that
    the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of iGate was reversible error.
    Specifically, Sinacole relies upon a regulation promulgated by the Department of
    Labor that states:
    The determination of whether an employee has worked for the employer for
    at least 1250 hours in the past 12 months and has been employed by the
    employer for a total of at least 12 months must be made as of the date leave
    commences. If an employee notifies the employer of need for FMLA leave
    before the employee meets these eligibility criteria, the employer must either
    confirm the employee’s eligibility based upon a projection that the employee
    will be eligible on the date leave would commence or must advise the
    employee when the eligibility requirement is met. If the employer confirms
    3.
    “Under this theory, the employee need not show that he was treated differently
    than others[, and] the employer cannot justify its actions by establishing a legitimate
    business purpose for its decision.” 
    Id. at 119-120.
    Because the FMLA is not about
    discrimination, a McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting analysis is not required. Sommer v.
    The Vanguard Group, 
    461 F.3d 397
    , 399 (3d Cir. 2006).
    4
    eligibility at the time the notice for leave is received, the employed may not
    subsequently challenge the employee’s eligibility. . . . .If the employer fails to
    advise the employee whether the employee is eligible prior to the date
    requested leave is to commence, the employee will be deemed eligible. The
    employer may not, then, deny the leave.
    29 C.F.R. §825.110(d). iGate acknowledged that it failed to give such notice to Sinacole.
    We agree with other federal courts of appeal that this regulation is invalid to the
    extent that it expands the scope of employees who are covered by the FMLA by giving
    otherwise non-eligible employees a cause of action for an employer’s failure to respond to
    an application for FMLA leave. See e.g. Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank, 
    223 F.3d 579
    ,
    582 (7 th Cir. 2000); Brungart v. Bellsouth, 
    231 F.3d 791
    (11 th Cir. 2000); Woodford v.
    Community Action of Greene County, 
    268 F.3d 51
    (2d Cir. 2001). It is the sole province
    of the Congress to establish the scope of employees who have rights under the FMLA.
    Sinacole does not dispute this point, but instead relies upon the regulation only to
    establish an employer duty upon which equitable estoppel can be asserted. In light of this
    regulation, Sinacole contends that iGate’s silence after she applied for FMLA prevents it
    from proffering evidence of her ineligibility as a defense to her FMLA leave interference
    claim.
    A party claiming equitable estoppel must establish that a misrepresentation of fact
    was made, upon which the party detrimentally relied. See In re RFE Industries, Inc. 
    283 F.3d 159
    , 164 (3d Cir. 2002). Assuming, arguendo, that iGate’s silence can be construed
    as a misrepresentation upon which she relied, Sinacole nonetheless failed to provide any
    5
    evidence demonstrating that she suffered a detriment, in the context of an FMLA
    interference claim, for her reliance upon iGate’s silence.
    As we stated above, to assert an interference claim an employee must show that
    she was entitled to benefits under the FMLA and that her employer illegitimately
    prevented her from obtaining those benefits. “An interference action is not about
    discrimination, it is only about whether the employer provided the employee with the
    entitlements guaranteed by the FMLA.” Callison v. City of Philadelphia, 
    430 F.3d 117
    ,
    120 (3d Cir. 2005). It was Sinacole’s burden to proffer facts to establish that she had
    FMLA rights with which iGate interfered, and she did not do so.
    The FMLA does not provide a private right of action for any employee, but rather
    only for eligible employees. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(1). iGate introduced evidence that
    Sinacole did not work the 1250 hours that are required to gain entitlement to FMLA
    benefits. Sinacole did not dispute the truth of this fact. This precluded Sinacole from
    proffering facts sufficient to establish her interference claim.
    Sinacole, obviously aware of the problems with her prima facie case, argues that
    her reliance on iGate’s silence eliminated her opportunity to either delay leave until she
    did become eligible under the FMLA, or take a brief, presumably non-FMLA, leave
    around the time that the baby was born. There are insurmountable problems with both
    arguments.
    6
    First, regarding the possibility of a delayed leave, it is not reasonable for us to infer
    that she could have worked more hours before the birth of her child. Sinacole worked at
    the discretion of iGate; she did not have control over the number of hours for which iGate
    requested her to work. We do presume that she would have had control over refusing
    work offered by iGate, but she does not provide any facts for us to reasonably infer that
    she actually did so in the time period relevant to this claim. The record, therefore, allows
    us to reasonably infer only that, with proper information about her ineligibility, Sinacole
    could have delayed family leave to a date well past the birth of her child, when she had
    worked the required minimum number of hours.4 Yet, under this scenario, Sinacole
    would have needed a different qualifying reason to request the later FMLA leave, since
    the original leave was premised upon the birth of her child. She did not offer any
    evidence to even imply that such a reason existed.
    With regard to the possibility that Sinacole could have taken a shortened leave at
    the time of the birth of her child, we must presume that she is referring to a non-FMLA
    leave, since she admits that she was not FMLA-eligible at that time. As such, she would
    not have had any basis to bring her FMLA interference claim.
    Therefore, under every scenario that Sinacole submitted, her interference claim
    could not have survived summary judgment because she could not produce evidence that
    4.
    Sinacole needed over 250 additional hours to qualify for benefits at the time of
    her April 6, 2001 leave.
    7
    she was eligibile for any FMLA benefits. As a result, we cannot find any basis to
    conclude that Sinacole suffered any detriment resulting from her reliance upon iGate’s
    silence. For this reason, we conclude that the District Court did not err in refusing to
    apply equitable estoppel in this case, and did not err in dismissing her FMLA interference
    claim. 5
    III.
    We easily dispose of the remaining two claims on appeal. First, with regard to
    Sinacole’s Title VII claim, Sinacole fails to discredit as pretext the explanation offered by
    iGate for her dismissal. iGate clearly articulated that it terminated Sinacole because she was
    a part-time, W-2 hourly employee working remotely from home whose job functions could
    be eliminated or absorbed by in-house salaried employees. iGate also produced evidence of
    a sizeable work-force reduction, necessitated by a financial downturn, that encompassed the
    time relevant to this claim. The District Court did not err in ruling that Sinacole failed to
    produce evidence that iGate’s stated reason for the termination was a pretext for
    discrimination.
    With regard to Sinacole’s breach of contract claim, we find that the District Court
    correctly concluded that she voluntarily changed the type and conditions of her employment
    5.
    We do not make any comment upon the applicability of this equitable estoppel
    theory to an FMLA discrimination claim.
    8
    from salaried to part-time, as needed, which eliminated the applicability of the severance
    provisions of her contract that she claimed.
    IV.
    For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary
    judgment in favor of iGate Capital.
    9