United States v. Jenkins , 188 F. App'x 94 ( 2006 )

Opinions of the United
2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
7-21-2006
USA v. Jenkins
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-3155
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No: 05-3155
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
KENNETH JENKINS
also known as Kenny Frank
Kenneth Jenkins,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for District of New Jersey
(Crim. No. 03-cr-00759-1)
District Court: Hon. Freda L. Wolfson
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 11, 2006
Before: SLOVITER, MCKEE, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 21, 2006)
McKEE, Circuit Judge
Kenneth Jenkins appeals from his judgment of sentence challenging certain of the
district court’s evidentiary rulings. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
Inasmuch as we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with this case, we
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need not recite the facts or procedural history of this appeal. Jenkins first challenges the
district court’s conclusion his uncharged involvement with drugs and firearms was
admissible because it was intrinsic to the charged conspiracy. He also claims the court
erred in ruling that evidence of his uncharged drug involvement before and during the
charged conspiracy was admissible.
A. The Evidence Was intrinsic to The Charged Offenses.
As we will discuss more fully below, Fed. R. Evid 404(b) governs the
admissibility of evidence of uncharged “bad acts.” However, “Rule 404(b) does not
extend to evidence of acts which are intrinsic to the charged offense.” United States v.
Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 320 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
“[A]cts are intrinsic when they directly prove the charged conspiracy.” Id. Here, the
challenged evidence directly proved that Jenkins was not only part of the charged
conspiracy, but a very key player in it. See App. at 34, 36 - 37.
We have frequently observed that firearms are tools of the drug trade. See United
States v. Russell 134 F.3d 171, 183 (3d Cir. 1998) (“firearms are relevant evidence in the
prosecution of drug-related offenses, because guns are tools of the drug trade); United
States v. Price, 13 D.3d 711, 718-719 (3d Cir. 1994) (possession of weapons is ‘highly
probative of the large scale of narcotics distribution conspiracy and the type of protection
the conspirators felt they needed to protect their operation,” quoting United States v.
Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1152 (3d Cir. 1990)). Accordingly, the district court properly
concluded evidence of Jenkins’ possession and distribution of drugs and involvement
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with firearms was admissible because it was intrinsic to the charged conspiracy.
However, evidence which is relevant and admissible for a proper purpose may still
be excluded from trial “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. “A trial judge, therefore, may exclude logically
relevant other crimes evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
risk of undue prejudice.” United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1019 (3d Cir. 1988).
Here, the district court heard legal argument on this issue, and concluded “the probative
value outweighs [the prejudicial impact]. I will permit it.” Appellee’s App. at 47. Given
this record, that was not an abuse of discretion. Moreover, the court gave an appropriate
limiting instruction informing the jury of the proper purpose this evidence had, and
cautioning against using it improperly. See Appellee’s App. at 48. Although the limiting
instruction was directed toward concerns raised under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), it
nevertheless minimized the possibility that the jury would use the intrinsically intertwined
evidence to form conclusions about Jenkins’ criminal propensity.
B. Rule 404(b).
Jenkins argues since, in his estimation, the evidence of uncharged bad conduct was
not intrinsically intertwined with the charged crimes, its admissibility is governed by Rule
404(b). Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) bars “the introduction of evidence of extrinsic
acts that might adversely reflect on the actor’s character.” Huddleston v. United States,
485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988). However, evidence of other crimes may be introduced “for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
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knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). In order
for evidence of uncharged bad acts to be admissible, the government must first establish
that it has a proper purpose, is relevant, and its probative value outweighs its potential for
unfair prejudice. United States v. Cruz, 326 F.3d 392, 395 (3d Cir. 2003) citing
Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691-692; United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 886 (3d Cir.
1992). We have cautioned that “the proponent [of such evidence] must clearly articulate
how that evidence fits into a chain of logical inferences, no link of which may be the
inference that the defendant has the propensity to commit the crime charged.” United
States v. Morley, 199 F.3d 129, 133 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Himmelwright, 42
F.3d 777, 782; United States v. Jemel, 26 F.3d 1267, 1272 (3d Cir. 1994); Sampson, 980
F.2d at 887. Furthermore, the district court must still give a cautionary charge to the jury
that adequately explains the limited scope of any such evidence that is allowed. See Cruz,
326 F.3d at 395 (citations omitted). In addition, the court properly determined that the
probative value of that evidence outweighed its potentially prejudicial impact under Rule
403 as discussed above.
Here, the government explained at length how the proffered evidence fits into “the
chain of logical inferences” relevant to the charged conspiracy. See Appellee’s App. at
41-42, 45-46. The challenged evidence was relevant to Jenkins’ rise to power, and his
involvement in the charged conspiracy. As the government argues, the evidence
explained how the drug conspiracy grew, and how Jenkins became the leader of the drug
operation. Appellee’s App. at 46. It is relevant to the defendant’s scheme and plan as
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well as the design of the charged conspiracy, and the court properly concluded that the
evidence survived a Rule 403 balancing test.
III.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of
sentence.
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