Julie Aymonier v. United States ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                  NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    __________
    No. 11-1047
    __________
    JULIE AYMONIER,
    Appellant,
    v.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
    __________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. No. 3-09-cv-04757)
    District Judge: Hon. Freda L. Wolfson
    __________
    Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    June 20, 2011
    Before: HARDIMAN and ALDISERT Circuit Judges ,and RESTANI,* Int’l Trade
    Judge.
    (Filed: June 22, 2011)
    __________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    __________
    ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
    * Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge of the United States Court of International Trade,
    sitting by designation.
    1
    This appeal by Julie Aymonier from summary judgment entered by the United
    States District Court for the District of New Jersey in favor of the United States requires
    us to decide whether the United States was liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1346
    (b) et seq., and 
    id.
     § 2671 et seq., or whether the District Court properly
    held that her claim was barred by the New Jersey Landowner Liability Act, which
    provides tort immunity to owners of rural and semi-rural properties. N.J. Stat. Ann.
    § A:42A-3. We are satisfied that the New Jersey Act applies, and will affirm.
    I.
    The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1346
    . We have
    jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment under a plenary
    standard, applying the same test employed by the District Court.” Smith v. Borough of
    Dunmore, 
    633 F.3d 176
    , 179 (3d Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). Summary judgment is
    appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
    fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(a), Federal Rules
    of Civil Procedure. In making this determination, we draw inferences “from the
    underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Bayer v. Monroe
    Cnty. Children & Youth Servs., 
    577 F.3d 186
    , 191 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).
    II.
    Aymonier’s lawsuit alleged that she sustained injuries as a result of a slip and fall
    at “Sandy Hook,” which is part of the federally-owned Gateway National Recreation
    Area. Specifically, she averred that while walking on a paved path called Fisherman’s
    Trail she tripped over an object that appeared to be a metal post protruding one inch
    above the surface of the walkway. She sustained a fractured wrist that healed with a
    2
    visible deformity.
    Sandy Hook consists of approximately 2,070 acres of land with several miles of
    beaches and approximately eight miles of recreational trails. The vast majority of Sandy
    Hook is uninhabited, comprising mainly beaches, salt marshes, dunes, a maritime forest,
    and a habitat for migratory birds. The only structures on Sandy Hook are related to Fort
    Hancock, a decommissioned military base, and Station Sandy Hook, an active United
    States Coast Guard Base that is fenced off from the public.
    The District Court granted the government’s motion for Summary Judgment. It
    found that the dominant character of the land at Sandy Hook was rural, quiet, and remote,
    which meant the Landowner Liability Act barred Aymonier’s suit as a matter of state
    law. She timely appealed.
    III.
    The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) allows plaintiffs to bring claims based on
    the actions of government employees, if private persons engaging in analogous behavior
    would be liable under state law. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1346
    (b)(1). Importantly, state law
    determines whether there is an underlying cause of action. Miller v. Pa. Geriatric Ctr.,
    
    463 F.3d 266
    , 271 (3d Cir. 2006). In this case, Aymonier sued the federal government
    pursuant to the FTCA, based on a theory of negligence under New Jersey law. “[T]o
    sustain a common law cause of action in negligence,” under New Jersey law, “a plaintiff
    must prove four core elements: (1) a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) proximate
    cause, and (4) actual damages.” Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex, 
    960 A.2d 375
    , 384 (N.J. 2008)
    (internal quotation omitted). Although New Jersey law imposes upon landowners “the
    duty of maintaining sidewalks in safe condition,” Stewart v. 104 Wallace Street, Inc., 
    432 A.2d 881
    , 884 (N.J. 1981), the state legislature has abrogated that duty in the case of
    3
    landowners who allow the public to use their property for recreation:
    a. An owner, lessee or occupant of premises, whether or not posted as
    provided in section 23:7-7 of the Revised Statutes, and whether or not
    improved or maintained in a natural condition, or used as part of a
    commercial enterprise, owes no duty to keep the premises safe for
    entry or use by others for sport and recreational activities, or to give
    warning of any hazardous condition of the land or in connection with
    the use of any structure or by reason of any activity on such premises
    to persons entering for such purposes;
    b. An owner, lessee or occupant of premises who gives permission to
    another to enter upon such premises for a sport or recreational
    activity or purpose does not thereby (1) extend any assurance that the
    premises are safe for such purpose, or (2) constitute the person to
    whom permission is granted an invitee to whom a duty of care is
    owed, or (3) assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury
    to person or property caused by any act of persons to whom the
    permission is granted.
    N.J. Stat. Ann. § A:42A-3. Section A:42A-3 was intended to provide tort immunity to
    “those owners of rural or semi-rural tracts of land on whose property the enumerated
    activities occurred.” Harrison v. Middlesex Water Co., 
    403 A.2d 910
    , 913 (N.J. 1979).
    The issue on this appeal is whether Sandy Hook is a “rural or semi-rural” tract of land. 
    Id.
    Aymonier contends that the District Court erred in finding that Fisherman’s Trail,
    the site of her injury, was “rural or semi-rural.” 
    Id.
     She maintains that it lacks the
    characteristics typically associated with rural or semi-rural areas because of its close
    proximity to Fort Hancock and Sandy Hook Station. Alternatively, she contends that
    because Sandy Hook is part of the Gateway National Recreation Area—which extends
    throughout portions of New York and New Jersey—it should be viewed in the context of
    “the largest metropolitan area in the country.” We are not persuaded by her arguments;
    the vast majority of Sandy Hook consists of undeveloped beaches and marshland. Indeed,
    Aymonier herself described the area where she fell as “wilderness.” App. 129-30. Nor do
    4
    the proximity of Fort Hancock and Station Sandy Hook deprive Fisherman’s Trail of its
    semi-rural character. Cf. Weber v. United States, 
    991 F. Supp. 694
     (D.N.J. 1998)
    (applying New Jersey law and concluding that a publicly accessible swing set located on
    the Fort Dix Military Reservation qualified for immunity under the Landowner Liability
    Act). We therefore agree with the District Court that Sandy Hook is semi-rural land, and
    that the United States is entitled to immunity under the Landowner Liability Act.
    *****
    We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    __________
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-1047

Judges: Hardiman, Aldisert, Restani, Trade

Filed Date: 6/22/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024