American Corporate Society v. Valley Forge Insurance , 424 F. App'x 86 ( 2011 )


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  • ALD-158                                                    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 10-3560
    ___________
    AMERICAN CORPORATE SOCIETY;
    DR. MAX ANTOINE
    v.
    VALLEY FORGE INSURANCE COMPANY;
    CNA-INSURANCE COMPANY;
    JAMES WHITE, et al
    Dr. Max Antoine,
    Appellant
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-05568)
    District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini
    ____________________________________
    Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to
    Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    April 7, 2011
    Before: SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: April 20, 2011)
    _________
    OPINION
    _________
    PER CURIAM
    Appellant Max Antoine, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court‟s order
    dismissing his complaint.1 For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm.
    I
    In April 2009, law enforcement officials conducted a raid on the Bloomfield, New
    Jersey office of Antoine‟s company, ACS. Antoine was arrested during the raid. After
    the raid, Antoine contacted ACS‟s property insurer, Valley Forge Insurance Company,
    and submitted a claim for property damage, alleging that the office sustained damage
    during and after the raid because authorities left it unsecured for three days afterwards.
    Valley Forge investigated the matter, but ultimately denied ACS‟s claim because the
    damage fell within the policy‟s “governmental action” exclusion -- i.e., ACS‟s policy did
    not cover damage caused directly or indirectly “by order of governmental authority.”
    Antoine and ACS then filed in New Jersey Superior Court a complaint against
    Valley Forge, claims adjuster James White, and “CNA Insurance Company,” which
    included 10 counts:
    1
    To the extent that Antoine also seeks to appeal the District Court‟s order on
    behalf of his company, American Corporate Society (“ACS”), he cannot do so because a
    corporation may appear and be represented in this Court only by a licensed attorney who
    is also a member of this Court‟s bar. See Simbraw, Inc. v. United States, 
    367 F.2d 373
    ,
    373-75 (3d Cir. 1966). Accordingly, as to any claims against ACS, the appeal is
    dismissed.
    2
    Count 22: breach of contract and insurance fraud;
    Count 3: violation of good faith and fair finance dealing;
    Count 4: violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and common
    law fraud;
    Count 5: a claim for recission of contract that was the product of fraud,
    deception and malice;
    Count 6: negligent hiring of adjuster James White;
    Count 7: malicious prosecution;
    Count 8: personal injuries resulting from the police raid;
    Count 9: discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against
    Discrimination, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the
    Americans with Disabilities Act;
    Count 10: conspiracy; and
    Count 11: “Anti-Trust Law, Broad Defamation.”
    The defendants removed the action to the District Court based on diversity of citizenship
    and filed a motion to dismiss. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss, and
    Antoine appealed.
    II
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We may affirm on any
    grounds supported by the record, see Hughes v. Long, 
    242 F.3d 121
    , 122 n.1 (3d Cir.
    2001), and we may summarily affirm if Antoine does not raise a substantial question on
    2
    Count 1 of the complaint did not assert a cause of action; rather, it recounted
    relevant background facts.
    3
    appeal. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. We review de novo a district
    court‟s decision to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
    be granted.3 See Dique v. N.J. State Police, 
    603 F.3d 181
    , 188 (3d Cir. 2010). “In
    deciding a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be taken
    as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and all inferences must
    be drawn in favor of them.” McTernan v. City of York, 
    577 F.3d 521
    , 526 (3d Cir. 2009)
    (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
    dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a
    claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 
    129 S. Ct. 1937
    , 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007)).
    “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
    statements, do not suffice.” 
    Id.
     In addition to the complaint and any exhibits attached
    thereto, we may also consider “an undisputedly authentic document . . . attache[d] as an
    exhibit to [the] motion to dismiss if the plaintiff‟s claims are based on the document,”
    such as ACS‟s insurance policy. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol.
    Indus., 
    998 F.2d 1192
    , 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
    The District Court first reasoned that Antoine lacked standing to assert, on his own
    3
    The District Court also reasoned that dismissal as to CNA-Insurance was
    appropriate because it is a trademark not capable of being sued. Likewise, White was
    dismissed as a defendant because, in the District Court‟s view, Antoine did not establish
    that the District Court could exercise personal jurisdiction over White. We do not
    address these issues because, as explained below, we agree that Antoine failed to assert
    any claim for which relief could be granted.
    4
    behalf, Counts 2, 3, 5, 6, and 9, which all stemmed from his dissatisfaction with Valley
    Forge‟s denial of ACS‟s insurance claim. We agree. Under New Jersey law, which the
    District Court was required to apply, see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
    304 U.S. 64
    , 78
    (1938), an individual not a party to a contract may not seek enforcement of that contract
    “unless it is clear that the parties to the contract intended to confer upon him the right to
    enforce it.” First Nat‟l State Bank of N.J. v. Carlyle House, Inc., 
    246 A.2d 22
    , 34 (N.J.
    Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1968). As the District Court noted, the Valley Forge policy applies
    solely to ACS, and nothing in the policy indicates that the parties intended for Antoine to
    have a personal right of enforcement. Accordingly, the District Court properly dismissed
    Counts 2, 3, 5, 6, and 9 as to Antoine.
    Count 4 was also properly dismissed. Antoine alleged that Valley Forge‟s conduct
    amounted to fraud under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, 
    N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 56:8-1
    ,
    et seq., and at common law. To establish a prima facie case under the Consumer Fraud
    Act, a litigant must show: “1) unlawful conduct by the defendant; 2) an ascertainable
    loss by plaintiff; and 3) a causal relationship between the unlawful conduct and the
    ascertainable loss.” Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc. 
    964 A.2d 741
    , 749 (N.J. 2009). We
    perceive no error in the District Court‟s determination that dismissal was appropriate
    because, at base, Antoine‟s allegation stemmed from his disagreement with the basis for
    denying ACS‟s insurance claim, not allegedly unlawful conduct. Likewise, Antoine‟s
    claim of common law fraud failed because he did not identify a material
    misrepresentation by Valley Forge. See Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 
    691 A.2d 350
    ,
    5
    367 (N.J. 1997). Valley Forge‟s mere denial of his claim is not evidence of fraudulent
    misconduct, given the language of the policy exclusion.
    The District Court also properly dismissed Antoine‟s malicious prosecution claim.
    Antoine alleged that, after denying ACS‟s claim, Valley Forge initiated unwarranted
    criminal charges against him. A litigant alleging malicious prosecution, in violation of
    federal or New Jersey law, must demonstrate, inter alia, criminal proceedings brought by
    the defendants against the plaintiff that ended in the plaintiff‟s favor. See Estate of Smith
    v. Marasco, 
    318 F.3d 497
    , 521 (3d Cir. 2003) (federal claims); Lind v. Schmid, 
    337 A.2d 365
    , 368 (N.J. 1975). Antoine did not allege that any criminal complaint Valley Forge
    may have filed resulted in criminal charges, or that such charges were resolved in his
    favor.
    As to Count 8, which includes Antoine‟s claim against Valley Forge for physical
    and psychological injuries resulting from the police raid, we agree with the District Court
    that the claim must fail. Antoine did not allege that Valley Forge had any role in the raid;
    therefore Valley Forge could not be subjected to liability for personal injuries he incurred
    during the raid.
    We turn next to Antoine‟s Count 11, which alleges “Anti-Trust Law, Broad
    Defamation.” As the District Court noted, despite the reference to “anti-trust law,”
    nothing in Antoine‟s complaint suggests that Valley Forge violated the Sherman Antitrust
    Act. Rather, Antoine claimed that Valley Forge defamed him by filing a criminal
    6
    complaint against him.4 To make out a prima facie case of defamation under New Jersey
    law, Antoine had to demonstrate, inter alia, that any allegedly false statement by Valley
    Forge caused him harm. However, his bare assertion that Valley Forge‟s alleged
    statements “have proximately caused great public harms to the plaintiffs [sic] public
    image, and business strata,” Complaint, 11, is insufficient under Iqbal to survive a motion
    to dismiss.
    Finally, we consider Count 10, in which Antoine alleges that Valley Forge entered
    into a conspiracy against him. In New Jersey, a civil conspiracy is:
    a combination of two or more persons acting in concert to
    commit an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by
    unlawful means, the principal element of which is an
    agreement between the parties to inflict a wrong against or
    injury upon another, and an overt act that results in damage.
    Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 
    876 A.2d 253
    , 263 (N.J. 2005) (internal quotation marks
    omitted). “The gist of the claim is not the unlawful agreement, but the underlying wrong
    which, absent the conspiracy, would give a right of action.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks
    omitted). We agree with the District Court that, because Antoine failed to state any other
    claim for which relief could be granted, he could not prevail on a civil conspiracy claim,
    and dismissal was appropriate.
    Further, we agree with the District Court that it would have been futile for Antoine
    to amend his complaint. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 
    293 F.3d 103
    , 108 (3d
    4
    We note that Valley Forge denied filing any complaint -- criminal or civil --
    against Antoine or ACS.
    7
    Cir. 2002); Cockrell v. Sparks, 
    510 F.3d 1307
    , 1310 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Leave to amend a
    complaint is futile when the complaint as amended would still be properly dismissed or
    be immediately subject to summary judgment for the defendant.”). To the extent
    Antoine‟s complaint included claims stemming from the police raid and the denial of
    ACS‟s insurance claim, granting him leave to amend his complaint would have been
    futile, as he could have presented no additional facts that would have established a basis
    on which he could assert a claim for relief. As to his defamation claim, Antoine failed to
    allege, in both his complaint and counseled response to the defendants‟ motion to
    dismiss, any facts indicating that the defendants made a defamatory statement or that he
    suffered any harm as a result.
    Accordingly, we will summarily affirm.
    8