Hilton Mincy v. Governor of Pennsylvania ( 2022 )


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  • BLD-175                                                    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 21-3263
    ___________
    HILTON KARRIEM MINCY,
    Appellant
    v.
    GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; SECRETARY
    PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; SUPERINTENDENT OF
    SCE-HUNTINGDON; SECRETARY FOR THE PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT
    OF HEALTH; KOHLER, Deputy Superintendent for Facilities Management SCI-
    Huntingdon; WALTERS, Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Services SCI-
    Huntingdon; WALTER HOUSE, Major of the Guard SCI-Huntingdon; CRYSTAL LOY,
    Major of Unit Management SCI-Huntingdon; M. GOSS, Unit Manager SCI-Huntingdon
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (M.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 1-20-cv-00717)
    District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner
    ____________________________________
    Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B) or
    Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    June 16, 2022
    Before: MCKEE, GREENAWAY, JR., and PORTER, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: September 9, 2022)
    _________
    OPINION *
    _________
    PER CURIAM
    Hilton Mincy, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District
    Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing his civil rights action. For the
    reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    In April 2020, Mincy, who was then incarcerated at SCI-Huntingdon in
    Pennsylvania, filed a complaint pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     against Commonwealth and
    prison officials and prison employees arising from his conditions of confinement during
    the COVID-19 pandemic. In his second amended complaint, Mincy alleged that prison
    policies and practices were inadequate and failed to prevent the spread of COVID-19. He
    averred, among other things, that the policies did not mandate testing staff and inmates
    for the virus. He also averred that, contrary to the policies that were established, inmates
    interacted with inmates outside of their cohorts and staff failed to properly wear personal
    protective equipment.
    Mincy alleged that the inadequate policies and practices resulted in the lock down
    of the prison in April 2020. He stated that he became infected with COVID-19 at that
    time and suffered various symptoms, including a fever, shortness of breath, and an
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    2
    irregular heartbeat. He also exhibited COVID-19 symptoms in June 2020. Mincy
    claimed that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his health and violated
    the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. He sought injunctive and declaratory relief,
    nominal and punitive damages, and the costs of his suit.
    The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the second amended
    complaint. It ruled that Mincy had failed to plead facts suggesting that the defendants
    were deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm presented by COVID-19. The District
    Court denied Mincy’s motion to file a third amended complaint and concluded that
    further amendment would be futile. This appeal followed. 1 In February 2022, Mincy
    was released from SCI-Huntingdon. According to the defendants, he was released to a
    community corrections facility. He currently resides in California.
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . Because Mincy is no longer
    confined at SCI-Huntingdon, his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief related to his
    conditions of confinement are moot. See Sutton v. Rasheed, 
    323 F.3d 236
    , 248 (3d Cir.
    2003). His damages claims, however, are still justiciable. 
    Id. at 249
    . Our standard of
    review is plenary. Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 
    806 F.3d 210
    , 218 (3d Cir. 2015).
    To state an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must allege that he was
    incarcerated under conditions imposing a substantial risk of serious harm, and that the
    defendant was deliberately indifferent to that risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 
    511 U.S. 825
    , 834
    1
    The District Court also denied Mincy’s motion for reconsideration. Mincy did not file a
    notice of appeal as to that order so it is not before us. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii).
    3
    (1994); Porter v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 
    974 F.3d 431
    , 441 (3d Cir. 2020). Deliberate
    indifference requires that a defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to
    inmate health and safety. Farmer, 
    511 U.S. at 837
    . Prison officials who knew of a
    substantial risk of harm are not liable if they responded reasonably to the risk. 
    Id. at 844
    .
    We agree with the District Court that Mincy did not plead facts suggesting that the
    defendants acted with deliberate indifference in implementing policies addressing
    COVID-19. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (requiring sufficient factual
    matter to state a claim that is plausible on its face). To the extent Mincy contends that the
    Department of Corrections’ policies were inadequate, the District Court noted many
    preventative measures that were taken from the start of the pandemic, including the
    suspension of in-person visits, screening of staff for the virus, inmate quarantines, and the
    provision of masks and cleaning materials. In light of these measures and the
    unprecedented and evolving nature of the pandemic, Mincy does not have a plausible
    claim that prison officials disregarded an excessive risk of harm. See Wilson v.
    Williams, 
    961 F.3d 829
    , 841 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding that the Bureau of Prisons was not
    deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm in light of preventative measures taken in
    response to COVID-19).
    To the extent Mincy avers that officials and staff at SCI-Huntingdon failed to
    follow all of the Department of Corrections’ policies, he does not allege sufficient facts to
    conclude that these defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm. See
    Hope v. Warden York Cty. Prison, 
    972 F.3d 310
    , 330 (3d Cir. 2020) (stating that the
    4
    failure to eliminate all risk of contracting COVID-19 in immigration detention did not
    establish deliberate indifference). Mincy recognizes that the age and design of SCI-
    Huntingdon presented unique challenges in responding to COVID-19. The District Court
    also properly dismissed Mincy’s equal protection claim, which lacked supporting factual
    allegations, and his claims against Governor Tom Wolf and the Secretary of the
    Pennsylvania Department of Health, which were not based on their personal involvement
    in the operation of SCI-Huntingdon. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 
    845 F.2d 1195
    , 1207 (3d
    Cir. 1988). Finally, the District Court did not err in concluding that, in light of the
    preventative measures that were taken, further amendment of the complaint would be
    futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 
    293 F.3d 103
    , 111 (3d Cir. 2002).
    Accordingly, because this appeal does not raise a substantial question, we will
    summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
    5