United States v. William Bagley ( 2017 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 16-2776
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
WILLIAM PERRY BAGLEY,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(W.D. Pa. No. 2-14-cr-00098-001)
District Judge: Honorable Gustave Diamond
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 20, 2017
Before: FISHER, HARDIMAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges.
(Filed: January 30, 2017)
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OPINION*
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
William Bagley appeals his judgment of conviction for counterfeiting Federal
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.
Reserve notes, claiming that evidence admitted against him was obtained pursuant to a
defective search warrant. Because we conclude that the warrant was not defective, we
will affirm.
I
In May 2013, the United States Secret Service began an investigation into the
passing of counterfeit $100 Federal Reserve notes in Pennsylvania. After a confidential
informant and two cooperating suspects implicated Bagley in the scheme, Magistrate
Judge Eddy issued a search warrant for the apartment he occupied with Sherita Howard.
The subsequent search of Howard’s apartment turned up evidence of counterfeiting,
including counterfeit bus passes and associated printing equipment. Bagley was indicted
for counterfeiting and conspiracy to counterfeit and pass fraudulent Federal Reserve
notes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, §§ 471–72.
Prior to trial, Bagley moved to suppress the evidence seized from the apartment,
arguing the warrant did not particularly describe the place to be searched. The warrant
referenced an “Apt #2” on the “second floor,” but the apartment searched was actually on
the third floor. Bagley Supp. App. 115; Gov’t Supp. App. 44. Accordingly, Bagley
contended that his apartment was number 3, not 2. The District Court disagreed and
denied the motion to suppress, finding that the warrant described the apartment with
sufficient particularity. Alternatively, the Court held that the good faith exception applied
to deny suppression of the evidence.
2
After his motion to suppress was denied, Bagley entered a conditional plea of
guilty on the counterfeiting and conspiracy charges, preserving the suppression issue. The
District Court sentenced Bagley to 41 months’ imprisonment on each charge, to be served
concurrently, along with $14,300 in restitution and assessment fees. Bagley timely
appealed on the suppression issue alone.
II1
The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants “particularly describ[e] the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Bagley
asserts that the warrant did not describe his apartment with sufficient particularity because
it misstated the number and floor of his residence. We disagree.
Regarding the residence number, the District Court found that the apartment under
investigation was Apartment #2, not #3 as Bagley contends. The District Court’s finding
was supported by both information on Howard’s driver’s license and uncontroverted
testimony from Special Agent Mark Kernan that there are only two mailboxes outside the
relevant address. Bagley provided no contrary evidence, so the District Court’s
conclusion was not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d
Cir. 2002).
1
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3
Regarding the floor, Bagley argues that the phrase “second floor” in the warrant
was inaccurate in referencing a third-story apartment. App. 71. But the warrant also refers
to the deli in the three-story building as being on the “ground floor,” not the first floor. Id.
Accordingly, investigating agents could have readily inferred that the second floor
corresponded to the third story.2 These circumstances are unlike those found in the cases
cited by Bagley where the warrant described a residence other than the one searched. See,
e.g., United States v. Bershchansky, 958 F. Supp. 2d 354, 381 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (warrant
naming Apartment #2 used to search an Apartment #1), aff’d 788 F.3d 102 (2d Cir.
2015); United States v. Trainor, 979 F. Supp. 933, 935 (D. Mass. 1997) (warrant naming
street number 136 used to search number 138).
In addition, we agree with the District Court that even if the warrant were
deficient, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply. “[T]he purpose
of the exclusionary rule—to deter police misconduct—[is not] furthered by suppressing
evidence . . . ‘when an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search
warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope.’” United States v. Tracey,
597 F.3d 140, 150 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919–20
2
The warrant was also executed by Agent Kernan, who knew from prior
surveillance that the relevant apartment was on the top floor. It was therefore unlikely that
any ambiguity in the warrant description would have confused officers. See United States
v. Clement, 747 F.2d 460, 461 (8th Cir. 1984) (declining to invalidate search based on
partial error in warrant’s description of residence where officers’ familiarity with
residence ensured “no probability of a mistaken search”).
4
(1984)). Although we will not apply the good faith exception when a warrant is “so
facially deficient that it failed to particularize the place to be searched,” Tracey, 597 F.3d
at 151, any ambiguity in this warrant does not rise to that level.
* * *
We will affirm the District Court’s judgment for the reasons stated.
5