Randy Baadhio v. ( 2016 )

*AMENDED BLD-160 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 16-1326
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IN RE: RANDY BAADHIO,
Petitioner
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On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
(Related to D.N.J. Civ. Nos. 15-cv-02444, 15-cv-02752, and 15-cv-08809)
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Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
March 1, 2016
Before: FUENTES, KRAUSE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 3, 2016)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
Randy Baadhio is a plaintiff in the civil actions docketed at D.N.J. Civ. Nos. 15-
cv-02444, 15-cv-02752, and 15-cv-08809. Presently before us is Baadhio’s petition for a
writ of mandamus essentially seeking: an order “reversing the district court order [in No.
15-cv-08809] denying Emergency Removal from the Sleepy Hollow Motel” and
“compelling the State of New Jersey . . . to pay for adequate rental housing”; the
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
immediate recusal “of the US District Court, Trenton, in this matter and all others”; and
the “transfer of all cases to another District Court pending [a] decision on appeal.” See
Mandamus Pet. at 1, 8. We will deny the petition.
Mandamus is a drastic remedy that is granted only in extraordinary cases. In re
Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005). To demonstrate that
mandamus is appropriate, a petitioner must establish that he has “no other adequate
means” to obtain the relief requested, and that he has a “clear and indisputable” right to
issuance of the writ. Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996). Baadhio seeks
mandamus relief because he believes that District Judge Michael Shipp, as well as other
District Judges and Magistrate Judges from the District of New Jersey, should recuse due
to, inter alia, their alleged lack of impartiality and unnamed ethical violations. Baadhio
asserts that Judge Shipp’s partiality, in particular, has resulted in the erroneous denial of
injunctive relief and in forma pauperis status in Civ. No. 15-cv-08809.
A mandamus petition is a proper means of challenging a District Judge’s refusal to
recuse pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455. See In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 775 (3d
Cir. 1992). The District Court entered an order on February 5, 2016, permitting Baadhio
leave to reopen his civil action at No. 15-cv-08809 by submitting the filing fee on or
before March 14, 2016. If Baadhio remits the fee, the District Court will then consider
the merits of the recusal motion that it had previously found to be moot. When a District
Judge has yet to refuse a request for recusal, it cannot be said that the petitioner has no
recourse but to seek the extraordinary remedy of mandamus from this Court. See In re
Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 224 (3d Cir. 2003). Upon reopening, the District
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Court would also consider Baadhio’s request for injunctive relief. We note that any order
denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis and/or for injunctive relief can be challenged
on appeal. Thus, we conclude that Baadhio cannot make the required showing that he
has no other adequate means to attain the desired relief.
It likewise appears that Baadhio’s motions for recusal remain pending in his civil
actions at Nos. 15-cv-02444 and 15-cv-02752. Moreover, although mandamus may be
warranted when a district court’s “undue delay is tantamount to a failure to exercise
jurisdiction,” Madden, 102 F.3d at 79, the underlying civil actions do not present such a
situation. At the time Baadhio filed his mandamus petition, his motions for recusal had
been pending in Nos. 15-cv-02444 and 15-cv-02752 for less than two weeks. We do not
hesitate to conclude that this time period “does not yet rise to the level of a denial of due
process.” Id. (stating that several months of inaction is insufficient to warrant mandamus
relief). We are confident that the district court will rule on Baadhio’s filings in due
course.
Baadhio’s mandamus petition also contains what can be viewed as a request to
change venue. The express terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provide that a district court may
transfer civil actions from one district court to another. While the Supreme Court has
found that a court of appeals may effect a transfer by direct order where “unusual
circumstances” require “extraordinary action,” see Koehring Co. v. Hyde Constr. Co.,
382 U.S. 362, 364-65 (1966), no such unusual circumstances appear based on Baadhio’s
petition. To the extent that Baadhio may be seeking to disqualify the District Judges
sitting in the District of New Jersey based on alleged bias and prejudice, his petition does
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not establish that a reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts, would conclude
that the District Judges’ impartiality might reasonably be questioned. See 28 U.S.C. §
455(a); In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d at 220; see also In re United States, 666 F.2d
690, 694 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that recusal is not required on the basis of
“unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation”).
Accordingly, we will deny Baadhio’s mandamus petition. Baadhio’s request that
we rule on his petition in an expedited manner is denied as moot.1
1
We note that on February 29, 2016, Baadhio filed an emergency motion for injunctive
relief seeking an order to bar the State of New Jersey from terminating his emergency
housing assistance effective March 2, 2016. A litigant “seeking a preliminary injunction
must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in
his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Given our analysis and disposition of Baadhio’s
mandamus petition, it is obvious that he has failed to establish a likelihood of success on
the merits in the context of this proceeding. Additionally, it appears that he has been
afforded an opportunity to request a hearing and to request that his benefits be continued
until that hearing takes place. See Emergency Mot. at 11-12. However, Petitioner
apparently has not pursued those opportunities to date. *Accordingly, we deny his
emergency motion, but we will do so without prejudice to his filing the motion in the
appropriate District Court action.
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