United States v. Rahiem Brooks ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                   NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 15-2347
    _____________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    RAHIEM J. BROOKS,
    Appellant
    ______________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. 14-cr-00334-1)
    District Judge: Honorable Gerald A. McHugh
    __________________________________________
    Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R.
    March 24, 2016
    ___________________________
    Before: GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE, SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion Filed: April 19, 2016)
    _____________
    OPINION*
    _____________
    GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge:
    This appeal presents the question of whether the District Court committed
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
    not constitute binding precedent.
    procedural error during sentencing by failing to acknowledge and respond to one of
    Defendant-Appellant Raheim J. Brooks’s arguments in support of a lower sentence.
    Because the District Court’s sentencing statement was sufficient to meet plain-error
    review, we will affirm.
    I. Background
    Brooks was indicted on, and eventually pled guilty to, seven counts of access
    device fraud and aiding and abetting in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1029
    (a)(2), (b)(1) and 2.
    In 2013, the Amtrak Police Department received information that numerous train tickets
    were being purchased with stolen credit card information. Investigators eventually traced
    these purchases to Brooks. In addition to the train ticket purchases, Brooks used the
    credit cards to obtain other goods and services. Brooks pleaded guilty to all counts
    charged in the indictment in open court.
    Following Brooks’s guilty plea, the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”),
    which used the 2014 version of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”),
    set Brooks’s total offense level at 13 and classified his criminal history at VI.
    Accordingly, the Guidelines sentence for Brooks’s conviction included 33 to 41 months’
    imprisonment.
    In a sentencing memorandum, Brooks presented mitigating arguments in support
    of a downward variance. The memorandum emphasized Brooks’s abusive upbringing
    and his efforts to rehabilitate. Brooks argued that a below-Guidelines range sentence was
    appropriate under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a), and that a within-Guidelines range sentence
    2
    would be “excessive and unwarranted to achieve the statutory objective.” J.A. 34.
    During sentencing, Brooks reiterated his arguments for a downward variance based on
    his upbringing.
    The District Court sentenced Brooks to a within-Guidelines sentence range of 38
    months’ imprisonment followed by a three-year term of supervised release for all counts,
    and $43,036.67 in restitution. Before announcing the sentence, the Court noted the
    nature of the crime, Brooks’s criminal history, and the need to promote deterrence. The
    Court’s statements did not include any reference to Brooks’s upbringing. After
    announcing the sentence, the District Court asked: “Counsel, is there anything else that
    requires attention?” J.A. 82. Brooks’s counsel replied, “No, Your Honor.” J.A. 82.
    Brooks timely appealed. He argues that the District Court committed procedural
    error by failing to meaningfully consider his personal characteristics, specifically his
    upbringing, which he believes supported a downward variance.
    II. Standard of Review1
    Brooks did not preserve the instant issue for appeal, and thus we review for plain
    error. United States v. Flores-Mejia, 
    759 F.3d 253
    , 255 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc). An
    error is plain if it, inter alia, “affected the outcome of the District Court proceedings.” 
    Id. at 259
     (internal citations and quotations omitted).
    III. Analysis
    1
    The District Court had jurisdiction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3231
    . We have jurisdiction
    pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    (a).
    3
    We will affirm as Brooks does not show that the error of which he complains
    affected the outcome of the proceedings. During the sentencing colloquy, the District
    Court explained that the nature and circumstances of the offense supported a within-
    Guidelines range sentence, stating that the crime displayed a “level of self-indulgence,”
    noting that the instant offense reflected Brooks’s “repeated violations of the law,” and
    stressing the “troubling” nature of Brooks’s criminal history. J.A. 79–80. It went on to
    observe that “the Probation Department pointed out that indeed one might even raise [the
    sentence] higher than it is.” J.A. 80. The Court also expressed its “concern[] about the
    fact that the crimes repeat.” J.A. 80.   Taking these factors into consideration, the Court
    told Brooks: “a guideline sentence is warranted and, candidly, sir, toward the higher
    range of the guidelines.” J.A. 80.
    Thus, the Court’s sentencing statements evinced its belief that the nature and
    circumstances of the offense and the extent of Brooks’s criminal history strongly
    militated against a lower sentence. Given these statements, we cannot conclude that the
    District Court would have imposed a different sentence if it had specifically addressed
    Brooks’s arguments about his upbringing.2
    IV. Conclusion
    2
    Brooks argues that there is a reasonable probability that the court would have
    imposed a lower sentence, because the instant conviction was not “egregious,” and his
    abusive childhood was “unquestionably mitigating.” Reply Br. 7–8. The record
    suggests, however, that the District Court had great concerns regarding the seriousness of
    the conviction, especially in the context of Brooks’s criminal history. Thus, given the
    District Court’s statements in support of the sentence it imposed, we cannot conclude that
    4
    For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction.
    there is a reasonable probability that the Court would have imposed a lower sentence.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-2347

Judges: Greenaway, Vanaskie, Shwartz

Filed Date: 4/19/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024