Sook Lee v. Jonathan Kim , 654 F. App'x 64 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                  NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 15-2602
    _____________
    SOOK HEE LEE,
    Appellant
    v.
    JONATHAN KIM;
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY;
    ATTORNEY GENERAL NEW JERSEY
    _____________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civ No. 2-14-cv-07560)
    District Judge: Hon. Susan D. Wigenton
    ______________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    March 22, 2016
    ______________
    Before: GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: June 20, 2016)
    ___________
    OPINION*
    ___________
    VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
    does not constitute binding precedent.
    Appellant Sook Hee Lee appeals the District Court’s order dismissing her
    Amended Complaint challenging the validity of a New Jersey statute which requires that
    promises to provide financial support in the context of a non-marital personal relationship
    be in writing with the advice of counsel in order to be enforceable. For the reasons that
    follow, we conclude that Lee failed to plead facts in her Amended Complaint that could
    plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment
    of the District Court.
    I.
    Sook Hee Lee and Jonathan Kim began dating in June of 2010. Approximately
    one year later, Lee became pregnant with Kim’s child and, according to Lee, Kim orally
    promised to support her financially. After Lee gave birth to the child in March of 2012,
    Lee alleges that Kim presented a financial support arrangement to her and again orally
    promised to support her and the child. In May of 2014, however, after their romantic
    relationship dissolved, Kim offered Lee a “one-time buyout” of his financial obligations
    for a lump sum of $100,000, subject to a number of conditions.
    Lee responded by filing a Complaint in the New Jersey Superior Court seeking:
    (1) palimony payments; (2) a child support modification; and (3) discovery of Kim’s
    financials. Kim demanded that Lee withdraw her palimony claim, relying on a 2010
    amendment to New Jersey’s Statute of Frauds, known as the “Palimony Law,”1 
    N.J. Stat. Ann. § 25:1-5
    , which states:
    “Palimony” refers to a financial support arrangement that is entered into by
    1
    unmarried couples who have, or had, a marriage-like relationship.
    2
    No action shall be brought upon any of the following
    agreements or promises, unless the agreement or promise,
    upon which such action shall be brought or some
    memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed
    by the party to be charged therewith, or by some other person
    thereunto by him lawfully authorized:
    ....
    h. A promise by one party to a non-marital personal
    relationship to provide support or other consideration for the
    other party, either during the course of such relationship or
    after its termination. For the purposes of this subsection, no
    such written promise is binding unless it was made with the
    independent advice of counsel for both parties.
    
    N.J. Stat. Ann. § 25:1-5
    (h). New Jersey enacted the Palimony Law in order to “provid[e]
    greater clarity in the enforcement of palimony agreements.” (App. 400.) Following
    Kim’s demand, Lee withdrew her Complaint in the New Jersey Superior Court.
    On December 3, 2014, Lee brought this lawsuit in the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey against Kim and the State of New Jersey, challenging the
    constitutionality of the Palimony Law pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . Specifically, Lee
    asserted that the Palimony Law: (1) infringed upon her right to free speech; (2) denied
    her equal protection under the law; and (3) violated her constitutional right to privacy.2
    On January 12, 2015, New Jersey filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint, asserting
    Eleventh Amendment immunity. Lee responded by filing a “Cross-Motion for Summary
    Judgment and for Judgment on the Pleadings” on January 28, 2015. (App. 78.) On April
    1, 2015, New Jersey filed a brief in opposition to Lee’s motion, and in further support of
    its motion to dismiss, arguing again that it was immune from suit under the Eleventh
    2
    Lee also contended that the Palimony Law infringed upon her right to make
    contracts. Lee, however, does not pursue this claim on appeal.
    3
    Amendment and that Lee’s Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
    granted. Thereafter, Lee filed a motion for leave to amend her Complaint, seeking to
    substitute the acting Attorney General of New Jersey as a defendant in place of the State
    of New Jersey. On May 11, 2015, Kim also filed a motion to dismiss.
    On June 17, 2015, the District Court heard oral argument on New Jersey’s motion
    to dismiss, Kim’s motion to dismiss, and Lee’s motion for summary judgment. The
    District Court proceeded as if Lee’s Complaint had been amended to substitute the acting
    Attorney General of New Jersey as the proper defendant.3 The District Court did not
    analyze Lee’s claims in detail, except for her Equal Protection claim, which the District
    Court concluded should be analyzed under rational basis review because Lee did not
    assert she was a member of a protected class. After the completion of the parties’
    arguments, the District Court issued a ruling from the bench, denying Lee’s motion for
    summary judgment and granting the motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint.4
    Thereafter, Lee timely filed this appeal.
    3
    On appeal, Lee proceeds as if her claims are directed at the Attorney General of
    New Jersey, not the State of New Jersey. As such, this opinion will treat all claims
    against the State of New Jersey as dismissed and only address Lee’s claims as they relate
    to the Attorney General of New Jersey.
    4
    In granting Kim’s motion to dismiss, the District Court concluded “[t]here’s
    nothing that’s been presented to the Court in its pleadings . . . that would indicate that he
    somehow has acted under color of state law and would therefore be subject to any
    violations or be deemed to have violated anything under [§] 1983.” (Oral Arg. Tr. at 21–
    22.) The Court’s dismissal as to Kim was summarily affirmed by this Court and will not
    be further addressed in this opinion. See Order, September 10, 2015, Lee v. Kim, No. 15-
    2602 (3d Cir. 2015).
    4
    II.
    The District Court had jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1331
    . We have appellate
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We exercise plenary review over a District Court’s
    decision to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    12(b)(6). Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 
    578 F.3d 203
    , 206 (3d Cir. 2009). In considering
    a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we “are required to accept as true all allegations in the complaint
    and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the
    light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 
    754 F.3d 153
    , 154 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 
    20 F.3d 1250
    , 1261 (3d Cir. 1994)). “However, . . . we disregard legal conclusions and
    recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements.”
    Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 
    809 F.3d 780
    , 786 n.2 (3d Cir. 2016).
    III.
    “Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court reviewing
    the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps.” 
    Id. at 787
     (footnote omitted). First,
    the reviewing court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a
    claim.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 675 (2009). Second, the court should identify
    allegations “that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
    assumption of truth.” 
    Id. at 679
    . Finally, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual
    allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
    plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 
    Id.
    5
    A. Step One: Noting the Elements Necessary to State a Claim
    The first step requires the reviewing Court to take note of the elements the plaintiff
    must plead to state a claim. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must “prove two
    essential elements: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting
    under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights,
    privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”
    Schneyder v. Smith, 
    653 F.3d 313
    , 319 (3d Cir. 2011). Here, Lee complains she is
    deprived of her right to free speech, her right to equal protection under the law, and her
    constitutional right of privacy. Because the Attorney General of New Jersey’s
    enforcement of the Palimony Law is accomplished under the color of state law, Lee’s
    claims will survive if she pleads sufficient factual allegations “to raise a reasonable
    expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” that she was deprived of any of these
    rights. See Connelly, 809 F.3d at 789 (quoting Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 
    515 F.3d 224
    , 234 (3d Cir. 2008)).
    B. Step Two: Identifying and Excluding Conclusory Allegations
    “At the second step in our pleading analysis, we identify those allegations that,
    being merely conclusory, are not entitled to the presumption of truth.” Id.; James v. City
    of Wilkes-Barre, 
    700 F.3d 675
    , 679 (3d Cir. 2012) (In reviewing the sufficiency of a
    complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), “we disregard rote recitals of the elements of a cause of
    action, legal conclusions, and mere conclusory statements.”). In our plenary review of
    the motion to dismiss, we find the following allegations are mere legal conclusions: (1)
    that the Palimony Law “impairs plaintiff’s rights to free speech, to family planning, and
    6
    privacy rights” (App. 409); (2) that the Palimony Law “is a content based restriction
    which invades plaintiff’s family planning rights and privacy rights of the most intimate
    matters” (App. 410); (3) that “by the continuing effectiveness and validity of the
    [Palimony Law], plaintiff is denied equal protection of the laws under the U.S.
    Constitution” (App. 411); and (4) that “by the continuing effectiveness and validity of the
    [Palimony Law], plaintiff is denied her privacy rights relating to familial matters under
    the U.S. Constitution” (App. 411). Because these allegations are “mere legal
    conclusions,” they will be discounted. Connelly, 809 F.3d at 790.
    C. Step Three: Construing the Allegations in Lee’s Favor
    The final step in our analysis is to take the remaining allegations in the complaint,
    “assume their veracity[,] and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
    entitlement to relief.” Id. at 787 (quoting Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. at 679
    ). When stripped of its
    legal conclusions, Lee’s Amended Complaint consists of the following allegations: (1)
    background facts about Lee’s and Kim’s relationship, and the lawsuit Lee filed in New
    Jersey Superior Court; (2) statistics regarding the prevalence of childbirth out of wedlock
    in the United States; (3) an analysis of the origins of enforcing palimony agreements in
    New Jersey; (4) statements from the New Jersey legislature and New Jersey Governor at
    the time the Palimony Law was enacted; (5) an analysis of New Jersey case law
    concerning the retroactivity of the Palimony Law; and (6) lengthy quotations from Stilp v.
    Contino, 
    613 F.3d 405
     (3d Cir. 2010), concerning First Amendment legal principles.
    Even accepting these allegations as true, we find that they do not plausibly give rise to an
    7
    entitlement to relief for infringing Lee’s right to free speech, denying Lee equal
    protection under the law, or violating Lee’s constitutional right to privacy.
    First, when the Amended Complaint is stripped of Lee’s conclusory allegation that
    the Palimony Law is “a content based restriction” (App. 410), it contains no factual
    allegations concerning how the Palimony Law prohibits, compels, or restricts speech in
    any way. Lee’s Amended Complaint contains no allegations from which we could
    plausibly conclude that the Palimony Law compels Lee to say anything, prevents Lee
    from saying anything, or restricts the manner of Lee’s speech. Quite simply, the
    Palimony Law “neither limits what [Lee] may say nor requires [Lee] to say anything” and
    there are no allegations in Lee’s Amended Complaint from which we could plausibly
    conclude otherwise. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 
    547 U.S. 47
    , 60 (2006). Accordingly, Lee’s Amended Complaint fails to state a First Amendment
    claim upon which relief can be granted.
    Second, with respect to the Equal Protection claim, Lee’s Amended Complaint
    does not allege intentional discrimination. See Hassan v. City of New York, 
    804 F.3d 277
    , 294 (3d Cir. 2015) (“To state an equal-protection claim, Plaintiffs must allege (and
    ultimately prove) ‘intentional discrimination.’” (quoting Washington v. Davis, 
    426 U.S. 229
    , 241 (1976))). Additionally, because Lee does not allege that she is a member of a
    “suspect” or “quasi-suspect” class, her claim would be subject to rational basis review.
    See 
    id.
     at 298–99. Lee would not plausibly be entitled to relief under this standard
    because, as the District Court observed, the Palimony Law is “extremely rationally
    related to the end goal” (Oral Arg. Tr. at 23), of “providing greater clarity in the
    8
    enforcement of palimony agreements” (App. 400). See F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc.,
    
    508 U.S. 307
    , 313 (1993) (holding that a law survives rational basis review so long as
    there is “any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for
    the classification”). Accordingly, Lee’s Amended Complaint fails to state an equal
    protection claim upon which relief can be granted.
    Finally, Lee’s Amended Complaint contains no factual allegations concerning how
    the Palimony Law infringes upon her constitutional right to privacy. The constitutional
    right to privacy encompasses “the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
    important decisions.” C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 
    430 F.3d 159
    , 178 (3d Cir. 2005)
    (quoting Hedges v. Musco, 
    204 F.3d 109
    , 121 (3d Cir. 2000)). This includes “matters
    relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and parental child
    rearing and education decisions.” Malleus v. George, 
    641 F.3d 560
    , 565 (3d Cir. 2011).
    Lee’s Amended Complaint contains no allegations concerning how the Palimony Law
    invades upon her autonomy in making decisions on these matters, or how it usurps Lee’s
    ability to make decisions concerning a palimony agreement. To the contrary, Lee is still
    free to enter into any palimony arrangement she desires, on whatever terms she and the
    other party agree. The Palimony Law only requires Lee to memorialize an agreement
    with the advice of counsel if she wishes to enforce that agreement in a New Jersey court.
    Accordingly, Lee’s Amended Complaint fails to state a constitutional right of privacy
    claim upon which relief can be granted.
    IV.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    9