Golda Harris v. William Anderson , 672 F. App'x 148 ( 2017 )


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  • BLD-040                                                       NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 16-3693
    ____________
    GOLDA D. HARRIS,
    Appellant
    v.
    WILLIAM ANDERSON; JAMES PLOUSIS; YVONNE
    PIERCE; VALERIE ARTHUR; JAMES BARNES; HELEN
    ADAMS; STEVEN JOHNSON; KIESHA FISHER; CELESTE
    THATCHER; ALAN WALLIBILLICH; ALLEN TOMPKIN;
    GARY LANIGAN; MARCUS POWELL; AMILLIA
    RENSHAW; ROBIN KELLER; MELINDA MINORICS;
    ROBERT LEONARD; MR. PICELLI; SARAH DAVIS;
    ROBERT MORANCO; DOUGLAS D. CHIESA;
    MARILYN MONTIJO; JOSEPH SOKOLOF; MATEJCEK
    __________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civ. No. 3-16-cv-01914)
    District Judge: Michael A. Shipp
    __________________________________
    Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect or
    Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    November 10, 2016
    Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed January 5, 2017)
    ____________
    OPINION
    ____________
    PER CURIAM
    Golda D. Harris appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing her civil
    action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For the reasons that follow, we will
    summarily affirm.
    Harris, a state prisoner, filed an in forma pauperis petition for writ of mandamus in
    the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. She named as
    “respondents” numerous New Jersey state officials, and she asked the District Court to
    order them to reinstate 25 private criminal complaints she had filed. In an order entered
    on August 8, 2016, the District Court dismissed the petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
    § 1915(e)(2)(ii). The District Court first construed Harris’s filing as a civil rights action,
    42 U.S.C. § 1983, concluding that she should not be able to evade § 1915’s requirements
    by disguising her civil action as a mandamus petition. The District Court then concluded
    that Harris had failed to state a claim for relief. The Court acknowledged that private
    citizens may file a criminal complaint in New Jersey state court pursuant to state court
    rules, see N.J. Court Rule 3:2-1(a), but held that there is no federal constitutional right to
    the investigation of a private criminal complaint.
    Harris appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1 We will
    summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial question is
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute
    binding precedent.
    2
    presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. As explained by the
    District Court, any action improperly styled as a mandamus petition must meet the fee
    requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See Madden v. Myers, 
    102 F.3d 74
    ,
    78 (3d Cir. 1996). “It is the nature of the document, rather than the label attached by the
    litigant, that controls.” 
    Id. Section 1361
    of title 28 provides that “[t]he district courts
    shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an
    officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to
    the plaintiff.” Insofar as a request to have New Jersey state officials investigate her state
    criminal complaints is not a request to compel an officer or employee of the United States
    to perform a duty owed to her, 
    id., the District
    Court properly declined to treat Harris’s
    submission as a petition for writ of mandamus. Cf. Weaver v. Wilcox, 
    650 F.2d 22
    , 25
    (3d Cir. 1981) (mandamus inapplicable since appellant brought his action against state
    officials, not federal officers).
    The District Court also properly dismissed Harris’s submission for failure to state
    a claim upon which relief may be granted. Section 1915 of title 28 provides that the
    District Court shall dismiss a case at any time if it “fails to state a claim on which relief
    may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
    plaintiff must, in pertinent part, allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or
    laws of the United States. West v. Atkins, 
    487 U.S. 42
    , 48 (1988). “The first step in
    evaluating a section 1983 claim is to ‘identify the exact contours of the underlying right
    1
    Harris mailed a notice of appeal to the Clerk’s Office of this Court. Our Clerk’s Office
    staff then forwarded the notice to the District Court with an instruction to docket it as of
    August 26, 2016. The appeal is thus timely filed. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
    3
    said to have been violated’ and to [then] determine ‘whether the plaintiff has alleged a
    deprivation of a constitutional right at all.” Nicini v. Morra, 
    212 F.3d 798
    , 806 (3d Cir.
    2000) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 
    523 U.S. 833
    , 841 n.5 (1998)).
    Generally, there is no federal constitutional right to criminally prosecute another person;
    that power resides exclusively in the Executive Branch of the United States Government.
    See United States v. Nixon, 
    418 U.S. 683
    , 693 (1974). Although New Jersey allows a
    private citizen to file a criminal complaint alleging a violation of state law, “a citizen
    lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is
    neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 
    410 U.S. 614
    , 619 (1973) (“in American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially
    cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another”).
    For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court
    dismissing Harris’s civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
    4