Pavan Vaswani v. Attorney General United States ( 2022 )


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  •                                                                  NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 21-2904
    ____________
    PAVAN MAHESH VASWANI,
    Petitioner
    v.
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    ____________
    On Petition for Review of a Decision of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    (A089-640-309)
    Immigration Judge: Emily Farrar-Crockett
    ____________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    (November 14, 2022)
    Before: HARDIMAN, RESTREPO, and PORTER, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: November 15, 2022)
    ____________
    OPINION *
    ____________
    HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
    Pavan Vaswani petitions for review of a final order of removal issued by the
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    Board of Immigration Appeals. Vaswani contends the Board erred when it concluded that
    he failed to prove his removal would cause “extreme hardship” to his U.S.-citizen
    relatives. Because he challenges only factual and discretionary determinations, we lack
    jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(B)(i). We will dismiss Vaswani’s petition.
    I
    A native and citizen of India, Vaswani entered the United States on a student visa
    in 1998 and became a lawful permanent resident in 2007. In 2019, he was convicted of
    wire fraud and conspiracy, sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, and ordered to pay
    $5.8 million in restitution. The Department of Homeland Security charged Vaswani with
    removability under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(2)(A)(iii) because his convictions were for
    aggravated felonies, and an Immigration Judge found him removable.
    Vaswani later applied for adjustment of status under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1255
    (a) and
    sought a waiver of inadmissibility under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1182
    (h), arguing that his removal
    would cause extreme hardship to his wife, two children, and mother—all U.S. citizens.
    An IJ conducted a hearing to evaluate the extreme-hardship claim, at which Vaswani and
    his wife testified. They testified that Vaswani’s wife and children would not relocate to
    India if he were removed, though his mother might. They also detailed the risks
    Vaswani’s removal would pose to the physical and mental health of his four qualifying
    relatives based on his wife’s and mother’s preexisting medical conditions and his two
    school-aged children’s anxiety.
    The IJ determined that this testimony failed to show hardships that, even when
    combined, rise to the level of “extreme hardship.” So Vaswani was statutorily ineligible
    2
    for adjustment of status. Vaswani appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. After
    reviewing the hardships Vaswani’s wife, children, and mother would face, the Board
    dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the IJ that “the evidentiary record does not
    demonstrate that the hardships to [Vaswani’s relatives], when considered individually
    and in the aggregate, rise to the level of extreme hardship.” AR 9. Vaswani timely
    petitioned for review.
    II
    Our jurisdiction over petitions for review of Board decisions is governed by 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    . We lack jurisdiction here because Vaswani challenges the Board’s
    discretionary hardship determination without raising any colorable constitutional or legal
    claim. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(B)(i), (D); Cospito v. Att’y Gen., 
    539 F.3d 166
    , 170–71
    (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
    Vaswani challenges only one finding by the Board: that he failed to demonstrate
    his removal will result in extreme hardship to his qualifying relatives. Vaswani sought
    relief under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1182
    (h)(1)(B), which provides the Attorney General discretion to
    waive the application of certain criminal inadmissibility grounds if an alien’s removal
    “would result in extreme hardship to the [alien’s] United States citizen or lawfully
    resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter.” We lack jurisdiction to review challenges to
    factual or discretionary decisions regarding § 1182(h) extreme-hardship determinations, 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(B)(i); Patel v. Garland, 
    142 S. Ct. 1614
    , 1627 (2022), and retain
    only the “narrowly circumscribed” jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(D) to review
    “colorable constitutional claims or questions of law,” Cospito, 
    539 F.3d at 170
     (internal
    3
    quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Vaswani raises no colorable constitutional or legal claim; he challenges only the
    Agency’s factfinding and exercise of discretion. This challenge fails for the same reasons
    we explained in Cospito. See 
    539 F.3d at
    170–71. There, we held that we lacked
    jurisdiction over a petition that argued the Agency gave insufficient weight to certain
    evidence, ignored other evidence, failed to adequately consider the emotional impact of
    removal, and evaluated hardships individually rather than jointly. Cospito, 
    539 F.3d at 170
    . Vaswani’s arguments that the Agency failed to “aggregate the ordinary hardships to
    determine if they equal a determination of extreme hardship,” Vaswani Br. 10, and
    “grossly misapplied the applicable legal standard,” Vaswani Br. 22, are indistinguishable
    from those in Cospito.
    Vaswani’s framing on appeal—purporting to dispute the Board’s “statutory
    interpretation of the standard for extreme hardship” and alleging that the Board’s
    “misapplication of the legal standard in question also constitutes a violation of due
    process,” Vaswani Br. 1—cannot save his petition. Vaswani “may not dress up a claim
    with legal clothing to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction.” Hernandez-Morales v. Att’y Gen.,
    
    977 F.3d 247
    , 249 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also
    Cospito, 
    539 F.3d at 170
     (“A party cannot confer jurisdiction on this Court where none
    exists simply by attaching a particular label to the claim raised in a petition for review.”).
    Here, both the Board and IJ invoked the correct rule in concluding that he failed to show
    the hardships, “when considered individually and in the aggregate, rise to the level of
    extreme hardship.” See AR 9 (emphasis added); AR 79. Vaswani faults the Agency for
    4
    failing to properly apply the asserted aggregation rule, which calls into question only the
    Agency’s factfinding and discretion.
    For these reasons, we will dismiss the petition for review.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-2904

Filed Date: 11/15/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/15/2022