United States v. Henry Jones , 381 F. App'x 148 ( 2010 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 08-2429
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
HENRY JONES,
a/k/a Diddy
Henry Jones,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 06-cr-00048)
District Judge: Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Junior
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 19, 2010
Before: FUENTES, HARDIMAN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: May 21, 2010)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Henry Jones appeals his judgment of conviction. We will affirm.
I.
Because we write exclusively for the parties, we recount only the essential facts.
In 2005, officers of the Springboro, Pennsylvania police department began investigating a
crack cocaine distribution ring operating in their town. Officers suspected that the group
was led by Jerome “Boo” Morrow and included Boo’s sister, Jennia “Gwen” Morrow,
and the appellant, Henry “Diddy” Jones.
To aid their investigation, police recruited a confidential informant, James
MacLaren, who had previously obtained crack from the group. Through Gwen,
MacLaren arranged to purchase two ounces of crack from Boo on February 28, 2006.
That evening, MacLaren, who was wearing a wire, drove with Gwen to Jones’s home in
Springboro. Officers observed Jones walk from Boo’s nearby house to MacLaren’s
vehicle, where Jones handed Gwen a bag containing crack cocaine.
Gwen immediately realized that Jones had not delivered the agreed-upon amount
of crack and called Boo to request more. Jones quickly reappeared with a second bag.
After MacLaren questioned the weight of this second delivery as well, Gwen told him
that Jones frequently stole Boo’s crack and had likely skimmed some for himself. Several
days later, MacLaren reiterated his complaint to Gwen in a telephone conversation
recorded by the police. Gwen, however, merely repeated her belief that Jones took some
2
of the crack, explaining that although Boo had confirmed the bags of crack were closed
when he gave them to Jones, the bags were open when Gwen and MacLaren received
them.
In August 2006, a federal grand jury returned a two-count indictment against Boo,
Gwen, and Jones. Count One charged the trio with conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Count
Two charged the group with possession with intent to distribute and distribution of five
grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). All three pleaded
not guilty. Following a one-day trial, a jury convicted the defendants on all counts. After
the District Court sentenced Jones to 63 months imprisonment, he appealed.1
II.
A.
Jones first attacks the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s guilty
verdict. We apply a highly “deferential standard in determining whether a jury’s verdict
rests on sufficient evidence.” United States. v. Ozcelik, 527 F.3d 88, 93 (3d Cir. 2008).
Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we will uphold
the jury’s verdict unless no “rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citations omitted). Jones thus “bears a very
1
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1).
3
heavy burden” to establish that the Government’s evidence was insufficient. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Jones first contends the Government failed to prove that he knowingly joined the
conspiracy, arguing that the evidence showed only that he was a mere acquaintance of the
Morrows who ran occasional errands for Boo. Contrary to Jones’s protestations, the
evidence that he knowingly joined and participated in the conspiracy was overwhelming.
Though Gwen arranged the February 28th purchase, Jones was directly involved in the
transaction, making not one but two deliveries of crack cocaine to MacLaren that
evening. MacLaren himself testified that Jones had delivered crack to him on behalf of
Boo on at least two prior occasions, suggesting that Jones had a regular and well-defined
role in the conspiracy.2 Moreover, the jury heard recordings in which both of the
Morrows discussed their belief that Jones was skimming crack from deliveries,
confirming that Jones was an active participant in their operation. Cf. United States v.
Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 485 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding co-conspirator testimony sufficient to
show that a defendant joined a conspiracy with knowledge of its illegal objective). The
foregoing evidence was more than sufficient for a jury to infer that Jones conspired with
the Morrows to possess and distribute crack cocaine.
2
Jones attacks MacLaren’s credibility, arguing that he “had a long history of
dishonesty . . . .” On appeal, however, we do not weigh the evidence or question the
credibility of witnesses. United States v. Soto, 539 F.3d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 2008). Though
the jury was free to disbelieve MacLaren, it chose not do so.
4
Jones also argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to show that he knew
the bags he delivered to Gwen and MacLaren contained crack cocaine. To convict Jones
of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, the Government had to show that
he knew the bags contained a controlled substance. See United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d
491, 497 (3d Cir. 2006). And to convict Jones of conspiracy, the Government had to
demonstrate that Jones knew the conspiracy involved distribution of a controlled
substance, not some other form of contraband. See Boria, 592 F.3d at 481.
The Government introduced ample evidence at trial from which a reasonable jury
could have inferred Jones’s knowledge. The jury could have concluded, for example, that
Jones knew the bags he delivered to MacLaren on February 28th contained crack because
both Boo’s and Gwen’s recorded statements suggested that he had opened them.
MacLaren also testified that two of Jones’s previous deliveries had been similarly
deficient, which allowed the jury to infer that Jones regularly skimmed crack cocaine
from deliveries. Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to the Government, there
was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude not only that Jones knew he was dealing a
controlled substance, but also that he knew it was crack cocaine.
B.
Jones next contends that the District Court erred by admitting a recording of Gwen
explaining to MacLaren why she believed Jones was responsible for the missing crack.
Because Gwen did not testify, Jones moved to exclude the recording as violating his Sixth
5
Amendment right to confront witnesses against him, as articulated in Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The District Court denied the motion and admitted the
recording into evidence. On appeal, Jones reiterates his Bruton argument.
In Bruton, the Supreme Court held that in certain circumstances, admission of a
non-testifying co-defendant’s confession that inculpates the defendant violates the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause because the defendant has no opportunity for cross
examination. 391 U.S. at 126. We have interpreted Bruton’s rule broadly, applying it not
only to custodial confessions but also to informal statements such as Gwen’s. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ruff, 717 F.2d 855, 857-58 (3d Cir. 1983).
Subsequent to Bruton, the Supreme Court held that admission of a non-testifying
co-conspirator’s statement against a defendant does not offend the Confrontation Clause
as long as the statement satisfies the co-conspirator exclusion of Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(E). Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1987). Relying on
Bourjaily, the District Court held that Gwen’s statements were not hearsay under Rule
801(d)(2)(E) and therefore were not barred by Bruton.
Jones does not dispute this conclusion on appeal. Nor could he. As discussed
previously, the Government’s evidence was more than sufficient to demonstrate that
Gwen and Jones were co-conspirators. Moreover, Gwen’s statements placating
MacLaren, a regular customer of the group, were made in furtherance of the conspiracy.
6
Because Gwen’s statements satisfied Rule 801(d)(2)(e), the District Court did not err in
admitting the recording.
C.
Finally, Jones claims the District Court erred by allowing MacLaren to testify
about Jones’s prior drug deliveries. Jones contends this testimony was inadmissible
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) because it was offered only to show Jones’s
propensity to engage in drug deals similar to the one that occurred on February 28th.
Under Rule 404(b), evidence of a defendant’s “other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). However, such evidence is admissible to show, among
other things, a defendant’s knowledge or the existence of a plan or scheme. Id.Before admitting evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts, a district court must
ensure that the evidence is both offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b) and
relevant under Rule 402. United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 886 (3d Cir. 1992)
(citing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988)). Next, the district
court must consider whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice under Rule 403. Id. Finally, the court
must instruct the jury to consider the evidence only for the limited purposes for which it is
admitted. Id.7
Here, MacLaren’s testimony regarding Jones’s prior crack deliveries was both
relevant under Rule 402 and introduced for several permissible purposes under Rule
404(b). As noted previously, evidence that Jones skimmed from earlier deliveries
allowed the jury to infer that Jones knew the packages he delivered for Boo—including
the bags given to MacLaren on the 28th— contained crack, which the Government was
required to prove to convict Jones of both charged offenses. Jones’s prior conduct also
revealed the modus operandi of the conspiracy and demonstrated Jones’s regular and
well-defined role in the operation as Boo’s deliveryman.
Jones’s principal argument on appeal is that the probative value of MacLaren’s
testimony was outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. However, “[w]hen a court
engages in a Rule 403 balancing and articulates on the record a rational explanation, we
will rarely disturb its ruling.” Sampson, 980 F.2d at 889. Here, the District Court
correctly found that the considerable probative value of MacLaren’s testimony
outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice. Furthermore, the District Court minimized
the potential for prejudice by giving the jury a thorough and comprehensive limiting
instruction. In light of the “considerable leeway” we afford district courts when they
make both Rule 404(b) and Rule 403 determinations, id. at 886, allowing MacLaren to
testify about Jones’s prior deliveries was not an abuse of discretion.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Jones’s judgment of conviction.
8