Donovan Moncrieffe v. John Yost , 397 F. App'x 738 ( 2010 )

BLD-294 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-2981
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DONOVAN A. MONCRIEFFE,
Appellant
v.
JOHN YOST, Warden;
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 09-cv-00276)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
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Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
September 23, 2010
Before: RENDELL, CHAGARES and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 13, 2010)
_________
OPINION
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PER CURIAM.
Donovan A. Moncrieffe filed a pro se habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania seeking to challenge
a recommendation by his Unit Team at FPC-Loretto that he serve only the final 90-120
days of his 33-month federal sentence in a half-way house or Residential Reentry Center
(“RRC”). Moncrieffe argued that he needed a longer period at an RRC to prepare for
reentry into the community. He thus challenged the length of his pre-release custody and
argued that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) erred in failing to afford an individualized
determination to support its decision.
The District Court summarily denied the § 2241 petition on the merits, and
Moncrieffe appealed. This Court vacated the judgment and remanded for further
proceedings. See C.A. No. 09-4418. We observed that Moncrieffe stated a potential
ground for habeas relief inasmuch as he claimed that the BOP erred by imposing an
“ordinary and customary” period of RRC placement without providing an individualized
assessment of the statutory factors that govern the determination.
The District Court ordered service of the habeas petition upon remand, and
respondents moved to dismiss for mootness. They noted that Moncrieffe was transferred
to an RRC in Maryland on May 13, 2010, and they argued that his petition had become
moot because the relief sought “is no longer needed or has now been granted.” Docket
#19 at 2. A Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing the petition as moot. He
observed that, absent a change in the status quo, Moncrieffe would remain at the RRC
until expiration of his sentence, and his transfer mooted the relief sought. Further,
Moncrieffe did not allege any collateral consequences stemming from his RRC
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placement. The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and dismissed the
habeas petition as moot. Moncrieffe timely filed this appeal.
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “The standard of review
over the District Court’s mootness determination is plenary.” Burkey v. Marberry, 556
F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2009). The parties were advised that this Court might take
summary action, which is appropriate “if it clearly appears that no substantial question is
presented or that ... a change in circumstances warrants such action.” 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
“Article III [of the Constitution] extends the Judicial Power of the United States
only to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’” Unalachtigo Band of Nanticoke Lenni Lenape
Nation v. Corzine, 606 F.3d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 2010). “Article III requires that a
plaintiff’s claim be live not just when he first brings the suit but throughout the entire
litigation, and once the controversy ceases to exist the court must dismiss the case for lack
of jurisdiction.” Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 974 (3d Cir. 1992). “[F]ederal
courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in
the case before them.” North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971).
We are satisfied that this case is moot not only because Moncrieffe was transferred
to an RRC while this matter was pending before the District Court, but also because he
was released from BOP custody on September 10, 2010, after filing this appeal.
Moncrieffe’s habeas petition seeks to compel the BOP to re-determine the length of his
RRC placement. This is a request for relief that can no longer be afforded. See Demis v.
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Sniezek, 558 F.3d 508, 513 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Because Demis already was transferred to
[an RRC] and now has been released from custody, no actual injury remains that the
Court could redress with a favorable decision in this appeal. We therefore must dismiss
Demis’ appeal as moot.”). In addition, as the Magistrate Judge observed, Moncrieffe has
not shown “collateral consequences” sufficient to maintain this action. See Demis, 558
F.3d at 516 (“Because Demis can point to no ‘collateral consequences’ that are the result
of his delayed placement in [an RRC], and certainly none that persist after the expiration
of his sentence or which this Court could remedy in the habeas context, Demis’ reliance
on the ‘collateral consequences’ exception to mootness is unavailing.”). Notably,
Moncrieffe has not claimed collateral consequences based on delayed commencement of
any term of supervised release that he may be serving, nor would such a claim be
sufficient in light of his release from custody. See Burkey, 556 F.3d at 148.
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal as moot.1
1
In light of this disposition, appellees’ motions to summarily affirm and to stay
issuance of a briefing schedule are denied.
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