United States v. R. Stackpole , 406 F. App'x 586 ( 2011 )

CLD-080 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-3723
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
R. STEVEN STACKPOLE,
Appellant
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 1-00-cr-00046-001)
District Judge: William W. Caldwell
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Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
January 6, 2011
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 20, 2011)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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PER CURIAM
R. Steven Stackpole, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his motion seeking
credit against his federal sentence for time served in state custody. We will affirm the
District Court’s order.
In 2000, a federal jury found Stackpole guilty of several offenses, including mail
fraud and money laundering, and he was subsequently sentenced by Judge Caldwell to
150 months’ imprisonment. In 2007, Stackpole filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 in which he argued that the Bureau of Prisons improperly refused to modify his
federal sentence to give him credit for time served in state detention. The District Court
(per Judge Vanaskie) denied the petition, explaining its reasoning in a thorough
memorandum.
In lieu of appealing this order, Stackpole filed the instant “motion for credit for
time served” with Judge Caldwell. Stackpole asked Judge Caldwell “to clear up the
ambiguity suggested by Judge Vanaskie’s finding and specifically order that R. Steven
Stackpole receive retroactive credit for all the time he has been incarcerated.” Judge
Caldwell denied the motion on the merits, stating that he did not intend to give Stackpole
retroactive credit for time served. Stackpole appealed, and subsequently requested that
we appoint counsel. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Notably, Stackpole has cited no statutory basis for his motion. Because Stackpole
has challenged the manner in which his sentence was executed (as opposed to the validity
of his sentence), he seeks relief that is exclusively available under § 2241. See Coady v.
Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § “2241 is the only
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statute that confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner who is
challenging not the validity but the execution of his sentence”); United States v. Grimes,
641 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting proper request for credit on federal sentence for
time spent in state custody prior to trial should be pursued under § 2241); see also United
States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333-35 (1992) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3585 authorizes
the Attorney General, not the sentencing court, to compute pre-sentence credit). 1
Construed as a § 2241 petition, it is clear that Stackpole is entitled to no relief. No
circuit or district judge need evaluate the legality of a detention where the legality has
previously been determined by a federal judge or a federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a).
This rule applies with full force to claims brought under § 2241. See Queen v. Miner,
530 F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2008). Stackpole raised the precise claim he presents here in
his previous § 2241 petition, and the District Court considered and rejected it. Neither
we nor the District Court need consider the same claim again. See Chambers v. United
States, 106 F.3d 472, 475 (2d Cir. 1997) (relying on § 2244(a) to dismiss a jail-credit
claim brought in an earlier § 2241 petition).
Moreover, Stackpole has failed to identify any error whatsoever in the District
Court’s short order denying his motion. Accordingly, even notwithstanding § 2244(a)’s
1
Indeed, Stackpole seems to realize that his request should have been raised under
§ 2241. In his brief to the District Court, he stated that “this Court may lack the
jurisdiction to effectuate a remedy in this ‘Motion for Time Credit’ form because it
should be filed as a 18 U.S.C. § 2241.”
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bar, Stackpole is entitled to no relief. We will thus summarily affirm the District Court’s
order denying Stackpole’s motion for credit for time served. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4;
I.O.P. 10.6. We will also deny Stackpole’s request for appointment of counsel. 2
2
In his motion for appointment of counsel, Stackpole asserts, for the first time,
several ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Stackpole filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255motion in the District Court in 2004, and accordingly, he must obtain this Court’s
authorization before filing a second or successive § 2255 motion. See § 2255(h).
Because Stackpole’s claims do not satisfy the exacting requirements of § 2255(h), we
decline to certify these claims.
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