Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n , 107 F.3d 1026 ( 1997 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    1997 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    2-28-1997
    MA Sch of Law v. Amer Bar Assn
    Precedential or Non-Precedential:
    Docket 96-1792
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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 96-1792
    MASSACHUSETTS SCHOOL OF LAW AT ANDOVER, INC.
    v.
    AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION; LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION
    SERVICES, INC.; LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL;
    THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, INC.;
    JAMES P. WHITE; NINA APPEL; JOSE R. GARCIA-PEDROSA;
    LAURA N. GASAWAY; FREDERICK M. HART; RUDOLPH C. HASL;
    CARL C. MONK; R. W. NAHSTOLL; HENRY RAMSEY, JR.;
    NORMAN REDLICH; JOHN E. RYAN; GORDON D. SCHABER;
    PAULINE SCHNEIDER; STEVEN R. SMITH; CLAUDE R. SOWLE;
    ROBERT A. STEIN; RENNARD STRICKLAND; ROY T. STUCKEY;
    LEIGH H. TAYLOR; FRANK K. WALWER; SHARP WHITMORE;
    PETER A. WINOGRAD
    Massachusetts School of
    Law at Andover, Inc.
    ("MSL"),
    Appellant
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civ. No. 93-06206)
    Argued December 10, 1996
    BEFORE:   BECKER, MANSMANN, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
    (Filed: February 28, 1997)
    Michael M. Baylson (argued)
    Elise E. Singer
    Edward G. Beister, III
    Melissa H. Maxman
    Duane, Morris & Heckscher
    4200 One Liberty Place
    Philadelphia, PA 19103-7396
    Lawrence R. Velvel (argued)
    Michael L. Coyne
    Constance L. Rudnick
    1
    Peter M. Malaguti
    Massachusetts School of Law at
    Andover
    500 Federal Street
    Andover, MA 01810
    Attorneys for Appellant
    David T. Pritikin (argued)
    Jeffrey H. Dean
    David R. Stewart
    Sidley & Austin
    One First National Plaza
    Chicago, IL 60603
    Barbara W. Mather
    L. Suzanne Forbis
    Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz
    18th & Arch Streets
    3000 Two Logan Square
    Philadelphia, PA 19103-2799
    Attorneys for Appellees
    American Bar Association
    James P. White, Nina
    Appel, Jose R. Garcia-
    Pedrosa, R.W. Nahstoll,
    Henry Ramsey, Jr., Norman
    Redlich, John E. Ryan,
    Gordon D. Schaber,
    Pauline Schneider,
    Steven R. Smith, Claude
    R. Sowle, Robert A.
    Stein, Rennard
    Strickland, Roy T.
    Stucky, Leigh H.
    Taylor, Frank K. Walwer,
    Sharp, Whitmore, and
    Peter A. Winograd
    Mark P. Edward (argued)
    Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
    2000 One Logan Square
    Philadelphia, PA 19103
    Attorneys for Appellees
    Law School Admission
    Services, Inc. and Law
    2
    School Admission Council
    Robert A. Burgoyne
    (argued)
    Stephen M. McNabb
    Fulbright & Jaworski
    801 Pennsylvania Avenue,
    N.W.
    Washington, DC 20004
    Attorneys for Appellees
    The Association of
    American Law Schools,
    Inc. and Carl C. Monk
    Joel I. Klein
    Acting Assistant Attorney
    General
    A. Douglas Melamed
    Deputy Assistant Attorney
    General
    Catherine G. O'Sullivan
    Andrea Limmer
    Marion L. Jetton
    Attorneys
    Department of Justice
    950 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
    Attorneys for United
    States as Amicus Curiae
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
    This case is before this court on appeal from an order
    of the district court granting summary judgment on all counts to
    the appellees in this antitrust action brought against them by
    3
    the Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc. (“MSL”).      The
    district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337,
    and this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.      This
    appeal principally presents a number of questions regarding the
    scope of immunities from the antitrust laws and related antitrust
    discovery issues.     An examination of the parties and conduct in
    question is first necessary.
    I.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    A.   The Parties
    MSL has been operating a law school in Massachusetts
    since 1988.   The Board of Regents of Massachusetts authorized MSL
    to grant the J.D. degree in 1990.      This authority allowed MSL's
    graduates to take several bar examinations, including that in
    Massachusetts.   MSL has the stated policy of providing low-cost
    but high quality legal education and attracting mid-life, working
    class, and minority students.     MSL facilitates this policy with
    its admissions procedure and a tuition of $9,000 per year.      Many
    of MSL's policies and practices conflict with American Bar
    Association ("ABA") accreditation standards, and MSL aggressively
    has sought changes in those standards.
    The ABA, a national professional organization of
    attorneys whose membership is open to members of any bar in the
    United States, has been concerned with legal education and bar
    admissions throughout its history.      In 1921, through its Section
    of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar (the “Section”), the
    ABA first developed standards of accreditation for legal
    4
    education programs.    The ABA petitioned state supreme courts to
    rely on its accreditation decisions in connection with bar
    admission decisions.    Now, all 50 states and the District of
    Columbia consider graduation from an ABA-accredited law school
    sufficient for the legal education requirement of bar admission.
    App. at 1396-1409.    The United States Secretary of Education
    considers the Council of the Section to be the national agency
    for accreditation of professional schools of law and a reliable
    authority concerning the quality of legal education.   App. at
    3378.   The ABA informs the states of its accreditation decisions
    and annually sends them the Review of Legal Education in the
    United States, the ABA accreditation standards, and any proposed
    revisions of the standards.    During the period at issue, there
    were 177 ABA-accredited law schools in the United States and over
    50 unaccredited schools with some form of state approval such as
    MSL enjoys.   The ABA consistently has opposed attempts to change
    or waive bar admission rules to allow graduates of schools not
    accredited by the ABA to take the bar examination.   See, e.g.,
    app. at 3623-53.
    Many states have methods of satisfying the legal
    education requirement other than graduation from an ABA-
    accredited school.    These methods include legal apprenticeship,
    practice in another state, and graduation from a school approved
    by the American Association of Law Schools (“AALS”) or a state
    agency.   The AALS is an association of 160 law schools which
    serves as a learned society for law schools and legal faculty and
    as a representative of the law school community with the federal
    5
    government and other education organizations.   Furthermore, in
    every state, a bar applicant or law school can petition the bar
    admission authority for revision or waiver of the rules.     MSL won
    a waiver of New Hampshire's rules to allow its graduates to take
    the bar in 1995, and has filed petitions seeking similar relief
    in Connecticut, Maine, New York, and Rhode Island.   Maryland and
    Washington, D.C. have granted petitions of graduates of MSL to
    take the bar.   MSL graduates can take the bar examination
    immediately after graduation in California, Massachusetts, New
    Hampshire, Vermont and West Virginia, and in 12 other states
    after practicing in another state first.
    The ABA allows graduates of non-accredited schools to
    join the ABA once they are admitted to a bar and does not
    prohibit its members from hiring or otherwise dealing with
    graduates of such schools.   The ABA does not prevent its members
    from teaching at non-ABA-accredited schools, but it does not
    allow its accredited schools to let students transfer credits
    from unaccredited schools or to accept graduates of unaccredited
    schools into graduate programs.
    ABA accreditation is open to any law school that
    applies and meets the ABA standards.   The ABA grants provisional
    accreditation to schools that substantially comply with its
    standards and promise to comply fully within three years.    An
    Accreditation Committee makes an initial evaluation of a school
    for provisional accreditation and gives a recommendation to the
    Council of the Section.   The Council then makes a recommendation
    6
    to the ABA House of Delegates, which has the ultimate decision-
    making authority.
    A law school must have been teaching students for five
    years and graduated three classes to be eligible for AALS
    membership.    The AALS holds an annual meeting, professional
    conferences and workshops,1 and publishes the Journal of Legal
    Education.     All of its current members are ABA-accredited, but
    accreditation is neither necessary nor sufficient for membership
    approval.     The AALS accredits schools in the sense that it
    determines whether a school meets its membership requirements,
    but it has accreditation standards and procedures separate from
    those of the ABA.     The AALS conducts a site visit, independently
    of the ABA, when a school applies for membership, and it conducts
    periodic visits after membership, usually jointly with the ABA if
    the school is ABA-accredited.     The AALS is not involved with site
    inspections for provisional ABA accreditation, such as the one
    the ABA undertook at MSL.
    The Law School Admissions Council, Inc. (“LSAC”) is the
    successor organization to the Law School Admission Council and
    Law School Admission Services, Inc.     The LSAC, as have its
    predecessors, administers the Law School Admissions Test
    (“LSAT”).     The LSAC is not affiliated formally with either the
    ABA or the AALS and does not participate in the ABA accreditation
    process.    Membership in the LSAC is open to any United States law
    1.     The AALS does not prohibit non-members from
    attending these conferences, and representatives of MSL have
    attended them, even though MSL is not a member and never has
    applied for membership. App. at 2279-80.
    7
    school that (1) requires that “substantially all of its
    applicants for admission take the Law School Admission Test,” and
    (2) is ABA-accredited or an AALS member.        App. at 2552.   MSL does
    not require the LSAT, never has applied for AALS membership, and
    is not ABA-accredited, so thus is not eligible for LSAC
    membership.
    In addition to administering the LSAT, the LSAC
    performs a number of other services.       The Candidate Referral
    Service (“CRS”) provides lists of names and addresses of people
    who have taken the LSAT.    Use of the CRS is open to any school
    which has degree granting authority from a state, regardless of
    LSAC membership or ABA accreditation, and MSL has made use of
    this service.   App. at 2410-12, 2511-12, 2427-29.      The Law School
    Data Assembly Service (“LSDAS”) provides a summary of a law
    school applicant's college record and LSAT score.        LSDAS is also
    open to all schools and has been used by MSL.        App. at 2410-12.
    The LSAC publishes a handbook, The Official Guide to U.S. Law
    Schools, with a two-page description of each United States LSAC
    member school, and two appendices with the names and addresses of
    Canadian LSAC members and unaccredited United States law schools,
    including MSL, known to the LSAC.      The LSAC also sponsors
    regional recruiting forums for law school applicants and
    conferences of pre-law advisors which are only open to LSAC
    members.
    B.   The Complaint
    MSL applied for provisional ABA accreditation during
    the fall of 1992 and early 1993.       MSL never claimed it was or
    8
    would be in compliance with ABA standards, but instead asked for
    a waiver under Standard 802 which allows the Council to grant
    variances from the standards.    Following the established process,
    a seven-member site evaluation team appointed by and representing
    only the ABA visited MSL and then prepared a 76-page report which
    was sent to MSL.    MSL sent a 90-page response to the site team
    report.
    The Accreditation Committee, after reviewing the site
    report and the MSL materials, and hearing a presentation from six
    MSL representatives, recommended denial of MSL's accreditation
    application because it did not meet the ABA requirements.    The
    Committee also recommended denial of the waiver request.    In a
    letter to MSL explaining its denial recommendation, the Committee
    listed 11 areas where MSL failed to comply with ABA standards.
    App. at 837-48.    These areas included the high student/faculty
    ratio, over reliance on part-time faculty, the heavy teaching
    load of full-time faculty, the lack of adequate sabbaticals for
    faculty, the use of a for-credit bar review class, the failure to
    limit the hours students may be employed, and the failure to use
    the LSAT or give evidence validating its own admission test.2
    App. at 845-46.    The body of the letter discussed the inadequacy
    of MSL's law library, but the letter did not cite that inadequacy
    as one of the reasons for the denial recommendation.    App. at
    842-43; see app. at 845-46.     The letter did not discuss the
    2.     MSL challenged all these standards, as well as
    standards on faculty salaries and law libraries, in its antitrust
    complaint.
    9
    salaries of MSL's faculty.    Invoking ABA procedures, MSL appealed
    but, after a full review at which MSL had the opportunity to make
    a presentation, the denial of accreditation was upheld on
    February 8, 1994.
    MSL filed this action on November 23, 1993, alleging
    that the ABA, AALS, LSAC, and 22 individuals combined and
    conspired to organize and enforce a group boycott in violation of
    section 1 of the Sherman Act and conspired to monopolize legal
    education, law school accreditation, and the licensing of
    lawyers, in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.    15 U.S.C.
    §§ 1-2.   The complaint basically alleged that the appellees
    conspired to enforce the ABA's anticompetitive accreditation
    standards by:   (1) fixing the price of faculty salaries; (2)
    requiring reduced teaching hours and non-teaching duties; (3)
    requiring paid sabbaticals; (4) forcing the hiring of more
    professors in order to lower student/faculty ratios; (5) limiting
    the use of adjunct professors; (6) prohibiting the use of
    required or for-credit bar review courses; (7) forcing schools to
    limit the number of hours students could work; (8) prohibiting
    ABA-accredited schools from accepting credit transfers from
    unaccredited schools and from enrolling graduates of unaccredited
    schools in graduate programs; (9) requiring more expensive and
    elaborate physical and library facilities; and (10) requiring
    schools to use the LSAT.3    MSL alleged that enforcement of these
    3.     MSL alleges that a self-interested cabal of legal
    educators who enforce the allegedly anti-competitive criteria to
    their own advantage has "captured" the ABA accreditation process.
    10
    anticompetitive criteria led to the denial of its application for
    provisional accreditation and caused MSL to suffer a “loss of
    prestige” and direct economic damage in the form of declining
    enrollments4 and tuition revenue.
    After MSL filed its complaint, the Antitrust Division
    of the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) began an
    investigation of the ABA's accreditation process and on June 27,
    1995, filed suit against the ABA in the United States District
    Court for the District of Columbia alleging violations of section
    1 of the Sherman Act.   The ABA entered into a consent decree with
    the DOJ on June 25, 1996, settling that case.
    After a period of discovery under Rule of Reason
    standards, the district court granted the appellees summary
    judgment on both counts.   The court held MSL did not suffer a
    cognizable antitrust injury; any disadvantage it incurred was
    attributable to the decision by the individual states to preclude
    graduates of unaccredited schools from taking bar examinations,
    and such injury “cannot be the basis for antitrust liability”
    under Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
    Inc., 
    365 U.S. 127
    , 
    81 S. Ct. 523
    (1961).   Massachusetts School of
    Law v. American Bar Ass'n, 
    937 F. Supp. 435
    , 441 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
    The court also held that to the extent that the unaccredited
    status creates a stigma which injures MSL, Noerr precludes
    recovery for the injury because it is “incidental to the primary,
    4.     MSL says that its entering classes are now only 40%
    of what they were before the denial of accreditation. MSL br. at
    4.
    11
    protected injury resulting from governmental decisions to
    preclude MSL graduates from taking certain bar examinations.”
    
    Id. at 442.
       In the alternative, the court held that even if the
    stigmatic injury were not incidental to Noerr-protected conduct,
    the claim still would fail because the ABA has done nothing more
    than express its opinion, which is speech protected by the First
    Amendment, and not conduct for which there can be antitrust
    liability.    
    Id. at 442-46.
    MSL appeals from the order for summary judgment and a
    number of prior orders related to discovery, the dismissal of the
    individual appellees for lack of personal jurisdiction, the
    denial of a motion to recuse Judge Ditter, and the
    disqualification of MSL's inside counsel.      The DOJ has filed an
    amicus brief arguing that the district court erred in holding
    that any stigmatic injury from non-accredited status was
    incidental to a Noerr-protected injury to the extent that there
    was no actual petitioning of government in this case.     The DOJ
    also argues that the district court erred in holding that the
    First Amendment immunizes anticompetitive effects brought about
    through speech.
    II.   DISCUSSION
    A.   Standard of Review
    We review a district court order granting summary
    judgment de novo both as to factual and legal questions.      Mathews
    v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 
    87 F.3d 624
    , 632 (3d Cir. 1996);
    Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998
    
    12 F.2d 1224
    , 1230 (3d Cir. 1993).    We review discovery orders under
    an abuse of discretion standard.       Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville
    Corp., 
    812 F.2d 81
    , 90 (3d Cir. 1987); Marroquin-Manriquez v.
    INS, 
    699 F.2d 129
    , 134 (3d Cir. 1983).       As germane here, MSL has
    to show that the district court's denial of discovery “made it
    impossible to obtain crucial evidence, and implicit in such a
    showing is proof that more diligent discovery was impossible.”
    In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 
    685 F.2d 810
    , 818 (3d Cir.
    1982) (citation omitted).    We review the district court's denial
    of the motion for recusal for abuse of discretion.      Blanche Road
    Corp. v. Bensalem Township, 
    57 F.3d 253
    , 265 (3d Cir.), cert.
    denied, 
    116 S. Ct. 303
    (1995); United States v. Antar, 
    53 F.3d 568
    , 573 (3d Cir. 1995).
    B.    Discovery Issues
    1. Price Fixing
    MSL argues that a district court order of May 20, 1994,
    which held that the ABA standards were not price fixing and per
    se unlawful and that discovery would proceed under a Rule of
    Reason analysis, MSL, 
    853 F. Supp. 837
    (E.D. Pa. 1994), is
    contrary to law and should be reversed.      MSL contends that the
    district court held in this order that “the ABA had not fixed
    prices,” and that that holding is contrary to settled law.      MSL
    br. at 40.   This argument mischaracterizes the district court's
    holding.   As the district court correctly noted, ABA Standard
    405(a) (considering faculty salaries as part of school's ability
    to attract and retain quality faculty) is somewhat vague.
    Although not dispositive, the lack of a specific price floor or
    13
    ceiling suggests that the standard represents something other
    than a classic price-fixing arrangement.     
    MSL, 853 F. Supp. at 840
    .   The court, however, did say that the standard was “price-
    affecting,” which in many cases is sufficient for a per se
    approach.   
    Id. See United
    States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 
    310 U.S. 150
    , 221-24, 
    60 S. Ct. 811
    , 843-46 (1940).
    The court properly then went on to consider the context
    of the case.      In this regard, it is significant that the ABA is a
    professional society and the Supreme Court has indicated that it
    has “been slow to condemn rules adopted by professional societies
    as unreasonable per se,” even when the behavior resembles conduct
    usually subject to a per se approach.      FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of
    Dentists, 
    476 U.S. 447
    , 458, 
    106 S. Ct. 2009
    , 2018 (1986) (Rule of
    Reason approach even though behavior resembled group boycott);
    see also National Soc'y of Prof. Eng. v. United States, 
    435 U.S. 679
    , 692-94, 
    98 S. Ct. 1355
    , 1365-66 (1978) (using Rule of Reason
    analysis even though agreement affected prices); Goldfarb v.
    Virginia State Bar, 
    421 U.S. 773
    , 788 n.17, 
    95 S. Ct. 2004
    , 2013
    n.17 (1975) (distinguishing between practice of professions and
    other business activities); United States v. Brown Univ., 
    5 F.3d 658
    , 672 (3d Cir. 1993) (Rule of Reason approach used even though
    behavior resembled price fixing).
    MSL nevertheless argues that the price fixing aspect of
    the ABA standards has infected the entire conspiracy, justifying
    a per se approach, and that the Supreme Court has discouraged
    finding new exceptions to the per se standard.      See FTC v.
    Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 
    493 U.S. 411
    , 428-31, 110
    
    14 S. Ct. 768
    , 778-79 (1990).    We, however, do not apply a new
    exception to the per se approach here.      Rather, the use of the
    Rule of Reason is appropriate here because where “a conspiracy of
    this sort is alleged in the context of a profession, the nature
    and extent of [the] anticompetitive effect are too uncertain to
    be amenable to per se treatment.”      Wilk v. American Medical
    Ass'n, 
    719 F.2d 207
    , 221 (7th Cir. 1983).
    MSL also appeals the district court's July 20, 1994
    discovery order which held that MSL had not been injured by the
    alleged price fixing, and therefore denied discovery as to the
    faculty salary standard except insofar as it related to MSL's
    accreditation application.    MSL, 
    857 F. Supp. 455
    (E.D. Pa.
    1994).   Contrary to MSL's argument, this order did not hold as a
    final matter that the alleged salary fixing had no impact on MSL.
    It merely stated that "the evidence presently at hand does not
    support MSL's contention that one of the reasons the ABA declined
    to accredit MSL was noncompliance with the salary standard[].”
    
    Id. at 458.
        The court allowed MSL to continue discovery to
    ascertain whether salary was a factor in accreditation denial,
    but barred broader discovery as to the development and
    implementation of that standard.
    MSL did find evidence that the ABA had data on its
    salaries (collected as part of general fact-finding about the
    school) and evidence that the ABA had warned other schools about
    low salaries.    Nevertheless, MSL is not able to point to any
    evidence, or draw a reasonable inference, that the ABA actually
    used salary as a factor in denying MSL's accreditation or that
    15
    the ABA's stated reasons for denying it accreditation were
    pretextual.    In fact, the evidence and inferences point the other
    way, demonstrating that the ABA explicitly states low salaries as
    a factor when it is one.      Thus, we cannot find that the district
    court's limitation of discovery in this manner was an abuse of
    discretion.
    2.     Conspiracy
    MSL argues that the district court denied it the
    discovery necessary to prove its allegations of conspiracy.        MSL
    complains generally about the lack of usefulness of the materials
    it did receive during discovery, but largely confines its
    argument to the materials the ABA turned over to the DOJ, some
    544,000 pages.    MSL cites a number of cases, including Golden
    Quality Ice Cream Co. v. Deerfield Speciality Papers, Inc., 
    87 F.R.D. 53
    (E.D. Pa. 1980), for the proposition that civil
    antitrust plaintiffs can obtain discovery of documents produced
    for government antitrust cases.     Br. at 37.   In these cases,
    however, the government case had begun before the civil case, and
    the civil plaintiffs sought copies of the material given to the
    government at the outset of discovery in their cases.     See Golden
    
    Quality, 87 F.R.D. at 59
    .5
    In the present case, the government's investigation
    began after MSL's, and MSL sought all of the documents given to
    5.     Further, these cases involved requests to stay the
    civil proceedings until the completion of the government
    investigation. See, e.g., Golden 
    Quality, 87 F.R.D. at 55
    . Of
    course, we recognize that the government's case against the ABA
    was civil but we are using civil to mean a non-governmental case.
    16
    the government after the court set the confines of discovery in
    MSL's case.    Thus, the district court held in an order dated
    August 6, 1996, that a request for all documents given to the
    government was an attempt “to do an end run around” the existing
    discovery framework.    The court found that MSL could have
    obtained all those documents which were relevant through the
    existing discovery framework.    See Board of Educ. of Evanston
    Township v. Admiral Heating and Ventilation, Inc., 
    513 F. Supp. 600
    , 603-04 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (denying complete turnover of all
    materials collected by grand jury investigation).     Given the
    context of this case, the court did not abuse its discretion in
    this ruling.
    MSL also argues that it was not given sufficient
    opportunity to conduct discovery to withstand the appellees'
    summary judgment motion.    MSL cites several cases for the
    proposition that granting summary judgment before the opposing
    party has had sufficient opportunity for discovery can be
    reversible error.     See, e.g., Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. General
    Motors Corp., 
    786 F.2d 564
    , 568 (3d Cir. 1986); Mannington Mills,
    Inc. v. Congoleum Indus., Inc., 
    610 F.2d 1059
    , 1073 (3d Cir.
    1979).   Br. at 4.   These cases are in tension with another line
    of cases which encourages the use of summary judgment in order to
    avoid burdensome litigation expenses when the allegations are
    theoretical or speculative.     See, e.g., Pennsylvania ex. rel.
    Zimmerman v. Pepsico, Inc., 
    836 F.2d 173
    , 182 (3d Cir. 1988);
    Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. Medical Serv. Ass’n, 
    745 F.2d 248
    ,
    262 (3d Cir. 1984).    While the present case fits neither paradigm
    17
    exactly, the district court, by allowing fairly extensive
    discovery and then closing discovery and entertaining the summary
    judgment motion, did not abuse its discretion.
    C.   Summary Judgment
    MSL asserts three types of injury resulting from the
    ABA's allegedly anticompetitive conduct.    The first is that MSL
    is at a competitive disadvantage in recruiting students because
    graduates of unaccredited schools cannot take the bar examination
    in most states.   Second, MSL says that denial of accreditation
    creates a stigma, independent of the bar examination issue.
    Finally, MSL contends that the ABA's enforcement of its
    accreditation standards injures it directly by increasing the
    cost of faculty salaries and creating a boycott of unaccredited
    schools.
    In granting summary judgment to the appellees, the
    district court held that they were not subject to antitrust
    liability for MSL's principal alleged injury, a competitive
    disadvantage in recruiting students, to the extent that the
    decisions of the individual states to prohibit graduates of
    unaccredited schools from taking their bar examinations caused
    the injury.   
    MSL, 937 F. Supp. at 441
    .   The court based this
    holding on the principles of Noerr, 
    365 U.S. 127
    , 
    81 S. Ct. 523
    .
    MSL argues on appeal that the Noerr principles do not apply here
    because private anti-competitive conduct is immunized only where
    it is (1) clearly and affirmatively authorized by state policy,
    and (2) actively supervised by the state.      California Retail
    Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 
    445 U.S. 97
    , 105,
    18
    
    100 S. Ct. 937
    , 943 (1980).     See also FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co.,
    
    504 U.S. 621
    , 
    112 S. Ct. 2169
    (1992); Patrick v. Burget, 
    486 U.S. 94
    , 
    108 S. Ct. 1658
    (1988).    The DOJ, in its amicus brief, does
    not challenge this aspect of the district court's holding.
    In Parker v. Brown the Supreme Court held that the
    Sherman Act does not prohibit an anticompetitive restraint
    imposed by a state as an act of government.    
    317 U.S. 341
    , 352,
    
    63 S. Ct. 307
    , 314 (1943).    The decision in Noerr reaffirmed the
    Parker doctrine in stating “where a restraint upon trade or
    monopolization is the result of valid governmental action, as
    opposed to private action, no violation of the Act can be made
    
    out.” 365 U.S. at 136
    , 81 S.Ct. at 529.   Noerr went on to hold
    that any attempt to petition or influence the government to
    impose an anticompetitive restraint is immune from antitrust
    action.6   
    Id. Further, even
    if the anticompetitive restraint
    results directly from private action, it is still immune if it is
    an “incidental effect” of a legitimate attempt to influence
    governmental action.    
    Id. at 143-44,
    81 S.Ct. at 533.   As the
    Supreme Court put it, “Parker and Noerr are complementary
    expressions of the principle that the antitrust laws regulate
    business, not politics; the former decision protects the States'
    acts of governing, and the latter the citizens' participation in
    government.”     City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,
    6.     Noerr dealt specifically with legislative lobbying,
    but its principles were applied to cover attempts to influence
    the executive and judicial branches in United Mine Workers v.
    Pennington, 
    381 U.S. 657
    , 
    85 S. Ct. 1585
    (1965), and California
    Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 
    404 U.S. 508
    , 
    92 S. Ct. 609
    (1972).
    19
    
    499 U.S. 365
    , 383, 
    111 S. Ct. 1344
    , 1355 (1991).    Thus, the
    initial substantive issues on this appeal are whether state or
    private conduct caused the injury MSL alleges it suffered because
    its graduates could not take the bar examination in most states,
    and whether, if MSL suffered an injury as a result of the ABA's
    conduct, the injury was an incidental effect of the ABA's attempt
    to influence the states with respect to establishing criteria for
    bar admission.    We will discuss each alleged injury separately.
    1. Injury from bar examination requirements
    Each state retains the authority to decide what
    applicants may take its bar examination and may be admitted to
    the bar.7   Accordingly, MSL's argument that the ABA received
    “carte-blanche delegated authority to decide who can take bar
    exams,” MSL reply br. at 19, is simply wrong.   See cases cited
    supra note 7.    Many, but not all, states consider the
    accreditation decisions of the ABA in their legal education
    requirement (one of many requirements) for taking the bar
    examination.    Yet, every state retains the final authority to set
    7.     See, e.g., Hoover v. Ronwin, 
    466 U.S. 558
    , 569, 
    104 S. Ct. 1989
    , 1996 (1984) (“Pursuant to the State Constitution the
    Arizona Supreme Court has plenary authority to determine
    admissions to the bar.”); In re Murphy, 
    393 A.2d 369
    , 371 (Pa.
    1978) (bar admission “exercised [] exclusively by the Supreme
    Court”); In re Hansen, 
    275 N.W.2d 790
    , 796 (Minn. 1978) (“We have
    not delegated our authority to the ABA but, instead, have simply
    made a rational decision to follow the standards of educational
    excellence it has developed.”); Potter v. New Jersey Supreme
    Court, 
    403 F. Supp. 1036
    , 1040 (D.N.J. 1975) (State's adoption of
    “the standards of an approving body does not support a conclusion
    that such adoption is an abrogation or delegation of the power or
    duty to supervise the practice of law in this State pursuant to
    the mandate of the State Constitution.”), aff’d, 
    546 F.2d 418
    (3d
    Cir. 1976).
    20
    all the bar admission rules, and individual applicants or law
    schools can petition the states for waivers or changes.
    To the extent that MSL's alleged injury arises from the
    inability of its graduates to take the bar examination in most
    states, the injury is the result of state action and thus is
    immune from antitrust action under the doctrine of Parker v.
    
    Brown, 317 U.S. at 352
    , 63 S.Ct. at 314.     The ABA does not
    decide who can take the bar examinations.     Rather, it makes an
    accreditation decision which it conveys to the states, but the
    states make the decisions as to bar admissions.     Without state
    action, the ABA's accreditation decisions would not affect state
    bar admissions requirements.   Because the states are sovereign in
    imposing the bar admission requirements, the clear articulation
    and active supervision requirements urged by MSL are
    inapplicable.    See Quinn v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 
    617 F. Supp. 1226
    , 1240 (D. Del. 1985).   In short, this case does not involve
    a delegation of state authority.      To the contrary, the states use
    the ABA to assist them in their decision-making processes.      Thus,
    we have here a government action case.
    Our holding is consistent with current antitrust
    jurisprudence.   The Supreme Court held in a challenge to
    Arizona's bar admissions policies that the conduct in question
    "was in reality that of the Arizona Supreme Court," and thus
    immune under Parker.   Hoover v. Ronwin, 
    466 U.S. 558
    , 573-74, 
    104 S. Ct. 1989
    , 1998 (1984).   Further, the Supreme Court has held
    that when a state supreme court adopts a state bar rule banning
    legal advertising, and retains final enforcement authority over
    21
    it, Parker immunity applies.    Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 
    433 U.S. 350
    , 361, 
    97 S. Ct. 2691
    , 2697 (1977) (“The Arizona Supreme
    Court is the real party in interest; it adopted the rules, and it
    is the ultimate trier of fact and law in the enforcement
    process.”). This case is entirely analogous.    The states do not
    adopt the ABA's accreditation processes, but they do adopt and
    give effect to the results.8   Thus, the cases cited by MSL
    (Midcal, Patrick, ant Ticor) are inapplicable because they dealt
    with situations where private parties were engaging in conduct,
    whether price-fixing (Midcal and Ticor) or denying hospital
    privileges (Patrick), which led directly to the alleged antitrust
    injury.    Here, the state action setting the bar examination
    requirements led to the alleged injury.9
    Our holding is also consistent with several court of
    appeals and district court decisions applying the principles of
    Noerr.    In Lawline v. American Bar Ass’n, 
    956 F.2d 1378
    (7th Cir.
    1992), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held under
    Noerr that the ABA could not be held liable for any antitrust
    injury resulting from the Illinois Supreme Court's adoption of
    ethical standards developed and promulgated by the ABA.    
    Id. at 8.
        The Supreme Court opinion in Allied Tube & Conduit
    Corp. v. Indian head, Inc, 
    486 U.S. 492
    , 
    108 S. Ct. 1931
    (1988),
    is also consistent with our holding because it specifically
    excluded from consideration any injury resulting from the
    adoption of the challenged standards by any government and dealt
    only with the independent marketplace effect of the defendant's
    conduct. 
    Id. at 500,
    108 S.Ct. at 1937.
    9.     In its reply brief, MSL continues to miss the crucial
    point that it is the direct action of the states which causes its
    injury and continues to discuss cases where private conduct
    caused the alleged antitrust injury. MSL reply br. at 11-15.
    22
    1383.   Similarly, in Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Mfg.,
    Inc., 
    17 F.3d 295
    , 299 (9th Cir. 1994), the Court of Appeals for
    the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant which convinced a private
    association to produce a code that was adopted by or relied upon
    by a number of municipalities, and that injured the plaintiff,
    was immune from antitrust liability because the “injuries for
    which [plaintiff] seeks recovery flowed directly from government
    action.”10    
    Id. at 299.
      These cases cannot be distinguished
    effectively from this case.
    In another analogous case, an organization that
    accredited chiropractic schools was held immune from Sherman Act
    liability for denying a school's accreditation because of a
    dispute over educational philosophy, when the alleged injury
    resulted from state decisions to deny licenses to graduates of
    unaccredited schools and from the effects of lobbying in favor of
    those state decisions.      Sherman College of Straight Chiropractic
    v. American Chiropractic Ass’n, 
    654 F. Supp. 716
    , 722-23 (N.D.
    Ga. 1986), aff'd, 
    813 F.2d 349
    (11th Cir. 1987).     See also
    Zavaletta v. American Bar Ass'n, 
    721 F. Supp. 96
    (E.D. Va. 1989)
    (dismissing suit by students at unaccredited law school because
    of Noerr immunity).     In these circumstances, MSL's claim that the
    ABA's conduct injured it because its graduates cannot take the
    bar examination in most states fails.
    2. Stigma injury
    10.     In Sessions, the injury resulted from the denial of
    permits, while here the injury is from the prohibition precluding
    applicants from taking bar examinations in many states.
    23
    MSL also alleges that independent of any bar
    examination requirements, it was injured by the stigmatic effect
    in the market place of the denial of accreditation.      MSL claims
    that the ABA has conducted a campaign to convey the idea that ABA
    accreditation is the sine qua non of quality and that the ABA is
    the most, or only, competent organization to judge law schools.
    There is enough evidence to create a genuine dispute of material
    fact on this issue.    See app. at 2105-09, 3570-72.   Nevertheless,
    the district court ruled that this injury could not form the
    basis for antitrust liability because it was “incidental to the
    primary, protected injury,” and thus immune under Noerr.     
    MSL, 937 F. Supp. at 442
    .    MSL challenges this holding on the grounds
    that there was no petitioning of government here, and therefore
    Noerr does not apply.    The DOJ as amicus challenges the holding
    to the extent it finds petitioning unnecessary for immunity for
    stigma injury, but takes no position on whether any petitioning
    took place.   We hold that there was sufficient petitioning to
    invoke Noerr immunity.11
    MSL relies extensively on the Supreme Court's decision
    in Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc, 
    486 U.S. 492
    ,
    11.     In its reply brief, MSL seriously misstates the
    Noerr doctrine, arguing that only "successful petitioning of
    courts to clearly and affirmatively authorize . . . closely
    supervise, review and approve" the ABA's conduct would provide
    immunity. MSL reply br. at 19. Under Noerr, any solicitation of
    government action is immune, whether or not it is successful.
    This mischaracterization stems from MSL's continued inability to
    recognize that there is state action at issue here, not private
    conduct.
    24
    
    108 S. Ct. 1931
    (1988).12    In Allied Tube, a producer of
    electrical conduit sought approval of its product from the
    National Fire Protection Association for inclusion of the product
    in the Association's National Electrical Code.     A substantial
    number of state and local governments adopted the code virtually
    without change.   To be included in the code, all that was
    required was a majority vote of the members present at the annual
    meeting of the Association.    To prevent approval of the
    electrical conduit at question in the case, competitors of the
    producer stacked the annual meeting with persons who pledged to
    vote against approval.     On the facts in Allied Tube the Court
    held that the code developed by the defendants had a force in the
    marketplace independent of any government adoption (or
    petitioning for such adoption) in that there was a conspiracy
    among manufacturers, distributors, and consumers not to trade in
    products not approved by the 
    code. 486 U.S. at 503
    , 
    507, 108 S. Ct. at 1938-40
    .    Further, the Court held that the application
    of Noerr immunity depends “on the context and nature of the . . .
    activity,” and found the challenged conduct to be “the type of
    commercial activity that has traditionally had its validity
    determined by the antitrust 
    laws.” 486 U.S. at 504-05
    , 108 S.Ct.
    at 1939.   That was so, the Court reasoned, because the activity
    12.     MSL's additional reliance on American Soc'y of
    Mechanical Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 
    456 U.S. 556
    , 
    102 S. Ct. 1935
    (1982), is misplaced because that case dealt with
    agency and apparent authority issues and does not consider Parker
    or Noerr immunity. It also dealt with an attempt to interfere
    directly with a company's 
    customers, 456 U.S. at 562
    , 102 S.Ct.
    at 1940, an exception to Noerr inapplicable here.
    25
    of which the producer complained involved the dubious commercial
    practices of economically interested actors that had an impact on
    the political process; it was not political activity that had an
    impact on commerce.
    The conduct of which MSL complains here is basically
    the ABA's justification of its accreditation decisions and MSL is
    asserting a loss of prestige resulting from it.     This conduct is
    neither normal commercial activity nor the type of restraint of
    trade involved in Allied Tube, and thus that case is not
    controlling.    A loss of prestige resulting from a refusal to
    approve a product or service does not alone make out an antitrust
    claim.   See Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc.,
    
    870 F.2d 397
    , 399 (7th Cir. 1989); Consolidated Metal Prods.,
    Inc. v. American Petroleum Inst., 
    846 F.2d 284
    , 293 (5th Cir.
    1988).
    Noerr immunity is proper in this case because the ABA
    engaged in petitioning activity, and the stigma injury which MSL
    suffered was incidental to that activity.13    MSL admits that in
    the past, “from the 1920's to approximately the mid 1970's,” the
    ABA petitioned the states in a campaign to prohibit graduates
    from unaccredited schools from taking bar examinations.    See MSL
    br. at 16.     This campaign was obviously successful as now most
    states require graduation from an ABA-accredited school for
    admission to the bar.    The ABA's current conduct surely would be
    considered petitioning if it took place during the past campaign.
    13.     There is no “conspiracy” exception to either Noerr
    or Parker immunity. 
    Omni, 499 U.S. at 383
    , 111 S.Ct. at 1355.
    26
    The fact that the ABA was successful in lobbying the states does
    not weaken its position.   The ABA continues to communicate its
    accreditation decisions to the states, and it desires that they
    continue to give them credence.    Discussing the quality and
    competence of its decisions is a legitimate, although somewhat
    indirect, way of petitioning the states to continue to follow its
    guidance.   Yet, such activity is no more indirect than the public
    relations campaign held to be petitioning in 
    Noerr. 365 U.S. at 140-41
    , 81 S.Ct. at 531.
    There is an exception to Noerr immunity that would
    apply if the ABA “attempted directly to persuade anyone not to
    deal with” MSL.   See 
    Noerr, 365 U.S. at 142
    , 81 S.Ct. at 532.
    There is no evidence that the ABA made such an attempt (there was
    such evidence in Allied Tube), nor is there any other evidence
    suggesting that Noerr immunity should not apply here.    In a
    supplemental filing of information after oral argument, MSL
    produced two instances where it claims the ABA directly mentioned
    MSL.   The first is a Boston Globe article about the denial of
    accreditation to MSL in which an ABA governor defended the ABA
    standards as providing “a minimum level of quality and consumer
    protection assurance to the public.”    John H. Kennedy, “Andover
    Law School Loses Appeal for Accreditation,” Boston Globe,
    February 9, 1994, at 42.   The second proffered piece of evidence
    is a transcript of the ABA House of Delegates debate of MSL's
    accreditation application, where one member urged the denial of
    MSL's application and stated that the standards with which MSL
    did not comply “lie at the heart of a quality institution.”
    27
    Both of these statements do nothing more than defend
    the ABA standards.   As we discuss above, this is valid, if
    indirect, petitioning activity.    The ABA is not saying directly
    that MSL is a bad institution, or that a particular student
    should not go there.   MSL's attempts to characterize all the
    ABA's comments about the quality of its accreditation process as
    direct attacks on MSL does not make them direct attacks.     We also
    point out that if a claim for stigma injury could be advanced in
    circumstances like those here, Noerr immunity would be confined
    severely; a petitioner for governmental action is likely to urge
    that the action is needed to ensure that standards are met,
    thereby suggesting that some entities do not meet appropriate
    standards.
    3. Direct injury from ABA standards
    MSL alleges a third injury which occurs directly from
    the ABA's enforcement of its standards, independent of both the
    bar examination and stigma issues.     The challenged standards
    relate to faculty salaries (MSL charges price-fixing) and
    limitations on accredited schools accepting transfers or graduate
    students from unaccredited schools (MSL charges a boycott).
    Although the ABA is immune from liability attributable to the
    state action in requiring applicants for the bar examination to
    have graduated from an ABA-accredited law school and from any
    stigma injury resulting from the denial of accreditation under
    the Noerr petitioning doctrine, the ABA is not immune in the
    actual enforcement of its standards.     The state action relates to
    the use of the results of the accreditation process, not the
    28
    process itself.   The process is entirely private conduct which
    has not been approved or supervised explicitly by any state.     See
    Midcal, 
    445 U.S. 97
    , 
    100 S. Ct. 937
    .    Thus, the ABA's enforcement
    of an anticompetitive standard which injures MSL would not be
    immune from possible antitrust liability.    Extending Noerr
    immunity to this type of private activity would run counter to
    Allied Tube.
    We start our analysis of this direct injury issue by
    pointing out that “to survive [] motion for summary judgment,
    [the plaintiff] must establish that there is a genuine issue of
    material fact as to whether [the defendants] entered into an
    illegal conspiracy that caused [the plaintiff] to suffer a
    cognizable injury.”   Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
    Corp., 
    475 U.S. 574
    , 585-86, 
    106 S. Ct. 1348
    , 1355 (1986).      The
    district court held that MSL did not raise a genuine issue of
    fact as to whether it was injured by the salary, transfer or
    graduate student standards.   
    MSL, 937 F. Supp. at 441
    n.10, 445
    n.20.
    As we discuss above, MSL failed to show sufficient
    evidence that it was denied accreditation because it did not
    comply with the salary standard.     Therefore, MSL has to show that
    the ABA's alleged fixing of salaries at its accredited schools
    somehow injured it in another way.    At first glance, the argument
    that the ABA's faculty salary standards injured MSL makes no
    economic sense.   As the district court commented, if ABA-
    accredited schools are required to pay higher salaries, an
    unaccredited school should have a cost advantage.    See MSL, 
    937 29 F. Supp. at 441
    n.10.    Indeed, it would appear that a conspiracy
    to increase the conspirators' costs would be no more logical than
    would a conspiracy to reduce the conspirators' income.     Cf. Advo,
    Inc. v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 
    51 F.3d 1191
    , 1195-1204
    (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing predatory pricing monopoly case).
    Thus, while we consider this appeal on ordinary summary judgment
    standards, we point out that it could be argued that MSL "must
    come forward with more persuasive evidence to support [its] claim
    than would otherwise be necessary."     
    Matushita, 475 U.S. at 587
    ,
    106 S.Ct. at 1356.
    MSL alleges that the faculty salary standards injured
    it in two ways.   First, MSL asserts that it raised its salaries
    in an attempt to get accreditation.     This claim is in direct
    conflict to its consistent assertion that it refused to comply
    with the ABA's anticompetitive standards and for that reason was
    denied accreditation.    See, e.g., MSL br. at 3-4.   The claim also
    is remarkable because MSL made it clear that it would not comply
    with ABA standards to obtain certification.     Further, MSL's
    assistant dean testified that MSL salaries have “never been tied
    to” ABA standards.14    App. at 439.   Rather, its dean stated that
    the salary increases were made out of fairness and as a reward
    for hard work.    App. at 393.   The only other related evidence
    shows that MSL acted independently to increase its salaries, and
    then later found that this action might help it get
    14.     MSL points out that the assistant dean has no role
    in setting MSL's salaries, so he is only giving his personal
    belief on the issue. MSL reply br. at 30, sup. app. at 5476-79.
    30
    accreditation.   See app. at 828.     Unsupported allegations to the
    contrary, see app. at 2123, are not sufficient without
    explanation to outweigh the prior testimony and avoid summary
    judgment.   See Hackman v. Valley Fair, 
    932 F.2d 239
    , 241 (3d Cir.
    1991); Martin v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 
    851 F.2d 703
    , 706 (3d
    Cir. 1988); but see Videon Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors
    Corp., 
    992 F.2d 482
    , 488 (3d Cir. 1993) (distinguishing Martin
    and holding that statements have to be clearly contradictory and
    without explanation to be insufficient to defeat summary judgment
    motion).    There has not been sufficient explanation of the
    contradiction to create a genuine issue of material fact and
    justify reversing the summary judgment.
    MSL's second contention that the ABA's salary standards
    injured it is that the standards inflated the market cost of law
    professors, thereby increasing the salaries MSL must pay its
    faculty.    This market price argument is equally unavailing.
    MSL's stated policy was to rely on adjunct faculty.     MSL did not
    produce evidence that any of its faculty other than its dean ever
    had been employed at another law school.     In effect, MSL was
    hiring faculty from a different market, one unaffected by the
    ABA's conduct, or at least a different provider in the same
    market (teachers who never taught at ABA-accredited schools).
    The report by MSL's economic expert does not contradict this
    point, app. at 3568, because it contains only general and
    theoretical observations and is not tied to evidence in the
    31
    record.15   Thus, we can disregard it for the purposes of
    reviewing the summary judgment.    See Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v.
    Medical Serv. Ass'n, 
    745 F.2d 248
    , 262 (3d Cir. 1984).      Our
    result is supported by MSL's policy towards salaries: “because a
    professor at MSL must prove himself or herself as a full-time
    faculty member before obtaining a large salary, MSL retained a
    level of starting salaries that are below ABA requirements.”
    App. at 2123.16
    The situation here is analogous to that in Mid-West
    Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 
    596 F.2d 573
    (3d
    Cir. 1979).   In that case we held that a purchaser from
    competitors of a price-fixer did not have standing to sue the
    price-fixer on the grounds that the general market price
    increased as a result of the price fixing.    
    Id. at 587.
      We
    explained Mid-West Paper in In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore
    Antitrust Litig., 
    998 F.2d 1144
    , 1167-68 (3d Cir. 1993), where we
    focused on how direct an impact the challenged conduct had on the
    15.     "[A]s I understand it, MSL was forced to raise its
    salaries to levels above what it would have otherwise (a) in an
    attempt to satisfy the standards and (b) because of the market
    effects of the standards on prices in the input markets. The
    anticompetitive effects of those practices affect input prices
    (salaries, etc.) for MSL, as well for every other law school.
    The practices injure all of the schools that have accepted the
    standards, as well as those that have not. Because the standards
    have an undeniable impact on input costs, every school is forced
    to incur higher costs, along with the reduction in the
    flexibility needed to respond efficiently to changing conditions,
    all schools suffer competitive injury as well." App. at 3568.
    16.     It is interesting to note that MSL charges that the
    ABA and the AALS engaged in a conspiracy to restrain trade. It
    thus appears that insofar as the salary standards are concerned,
    MSL believes that the AALS conspired to increase its member law
    schools' costs.
    32
    plaintiff.    MSL was not impacted directly by the ABA's criteria
    because it was hiring a different kind of professor.     Mid-West
    Paper thus controls, and summary judgment was proper.17
    MSL also alleges a boycott in that the ABA prevented
    its accredited schools from accepting transfers or graduate
    students from unaccredited schools.     The district court held that
    MSL had not produced any evidence that it was injured by either
    of these rules.    
    MSL, 937 F. Supp. at 445
    n.20.   This holding is
    correct.   MSL has done nothing more than state the standards and
    allege that they injured MSL.    See app. at 2108, 2120.   There is
    no factual support for these allegations.    Further, the evidence
    shows that MSL actively opposed its students transferring, both
    in policy and practice.18    MSL therefore cannot claim that the
    ABA's prohibition on transfers with credit injured it.19
    17.     This is true even though Mid-West Paper dealt with
    standing and we deal here with whether there is a genuine issue
    of fact as to MSL’s injury, for the concepts are similar.
    18.     Its dean testified in another proceeding “MSL would
    have [] denied admission had it known [a student] intended to
    seek transfer away as soon as possible.” App. at 1415.    MSL
    considered transfers to be “extremely harmful to the school,” 
    id. at 1416,
    and that assisting students in transferring was “self-
    destructive.” 
    Id. at 1231.
    19.     MSL's reliance on the allegations in the
    government's antitrust case which we described above is
    unavailing for two reasons. First, those allegations never were
    proven because the case was settled, and therefore cannot be
    taken as true in this case. See United States v. Microsoft
    Corp., 
    56 F.3d 1448
    , 1460-61 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Petruzzi's IGA v.
    
    Darling-Delaware, 998 F.2d at 1247
    . Second, the government never
    alleged that MSL suffered any injury from these standards and
    does not so argue in its amicus brief in this case. See, e.g.,
    DOJ br. at 6-7.
    33
    MSL also alleges that the AALS boycotted MSL by
    refusing membership and that the LSAC boycotted MSL by refusing
    to allow it to attend certain recruiting conferences.     See MSL
    br. at 59.   The allegations regarding the AALS are simply
    incorrect.   AALS membership is independent of ABA accreditation,
    and MSL never has applied for such membership.     App. at 2278-80.
    Even though it is not a member, MSL can attend AALS conferences
    and has done so.   
    Id. at 2280.
       Therefore MSL has not suffered
    any injury at the hands of the AALS.
    The LSAC's failure to invite MSL to its conferences
    does not constitute a boycott.20    Under the fact-pattern here to
    demonstrate a boycott, MSL has to show that these conferences are
    an essential facility for recruiting students as there is no
    other potential basis for the boycott claim.     Such an essential
    facility or claim fails whenever a plaintiff (1) cannot show that
    the defendant has a monopoly over the alleged essential facility;
    (2) the facility cannot be duplicated in a reasonable manner; and
    (3) the plaintiff has been denied its use.     Ideal Dairy Farms,
    Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 
    90 F.3d 737
    , 748 (3d Cir. 1996).     MSL
    has shown only that the LSAC denies it participation.     There is
    no evidence suggesting that the LSAC has a monopoly over access
    to law students or pre-law advisors, or even over recruiting
    fairs.   The LSAC does not hinder MSL's recruiting in any way, it
    20.     LSAC conferences are only open to LSAC member
    schools. MSL is not a member of the LSAC because it does not use
    the LSAT and it is not accredited by either the ABA or the AALS.
    34
    just does not aid it by allowing MSL to attend its conferences.21
    Such activity is not required by the antitrust laws, and its
    absence does not constitute antitrust injury.
    Further, MSL has not shown that the LSAC injured it.
    The LSAC never allowed MSL to attend its conferences and, prior
    to ABA accreditation denial, MSL's enrollment exceeded its
    projections.    App. at 2420-24.   It was the denial of
    accreditation which caused MSL’s enrollment to decline, and as
    discussed above, in light of Parker and Noerr that loss cannot be
    the basis for antitrust liability.      MSL contends that as long as
    it was injured in some way by the overall alleged conspiracy, it
    need not show injury from its individual aspects, and cites in
    this respect In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust 
    Litig., 998 F.2d at 1172
    .   Reply br. at 35.    While this principle is correct,
    it is inapplicable here.   In re Lower Lake Erie did not involve
    state action or petitioning of government immunity issues.      Here,
    MSL must show that it was injured in some way by the ABA's
    enforcement of its standards, independent of any injury from the
    immune state action or petitioning, and as we discuss above, it
    has not done so.
    Inasmuch as we hold that MSL has failed to demonstrate
    an injury for which antitrust liability may lie, we need go no
    further to affirm the district court's summary judgment order
    with respect to issues beyond those controlled by Parker and
    21.     Similarly, MSL's claims about getting only a listing
    in The Official Guide to U.S. Law Schools fail because there are
    many such publications, some of which do describe MSL.
    35
    Noerr.   Thus, we do not consider the district court's alternative
    free speech immunity theory.   Further, we make no comment on
    whether MSL produced sufficient evidence to show the existence of
    a conspiracy for two reasons.22   First, the alleged conspiracy
    with respect to the injuries from the bar examination
    requirements and the stigma from denial of accreditation involved
    immunized conduct.   See 
    Omni, 499 U.S. at 381-84
    , 111 S.Ct. at
    1354-56.   Second, MSL did not demonstrate that it suffered injury
    from the conduct not immunized.    15 U.S.C. § 15; see 
    Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585-86
    , 106 S.Ct. at 1355; Mathews v. Lancaster Gen.
    
    Hosp., 87 F.3d at 641
    ; see also Sciambra v. Graham News, 
    892 F.2d 411
    , 414-15 (5th Cir. 1996); United States Football League v.
    National Football League, 
    842 F.2d 1335
    , 1377-78 (2d Cir. 1988).
    Of course, we hasten to add that we do not hold that if MSL had
    been able to demonstrate injury from conduct beyond the scope of
    Parker and Noerr antitrust immunity there necessarily would be
    liability as we have no need to reach that point.
    D.   Dismissal of the Individual Appellees
    The district court dismissed claims against the 22
    individual appellees for lack of personal jurisdiction in the
    Eastern District of Pennsylvania in an order on March 11, 1994.
    MSL, 
    846 F. Supp. 374
    (E.D. Pa. 1994).    The court, upon
    reconsideration and after MSL had conducted some discovery, found
    on May 31, 1994, that MSL could not “suggest, much less show,
    22.     We do note, however, that there is no probative
    evidence that the AALS or LSAC was involved in any kind of
    conspiracy with the ABA.
    36
    substantial acts in Pennsylvania.”    MSL, 
    853 F. Supp. 843
    , 845
    (E.D. Pa. 1994).   MSL challenges the dismissal on the grounds
    that it was entered before MSL was allowed to undertake any
    discovery as to the appellees' contacts within the district.
    Our rule is generally that jurisdictional discovery
    should be allowed unless the plaintiff's claim is "clearly
    frivolous."    Nehemiah v. The Athletics Congress, 
    765 F.2d 42
    , 48
    (3d Cir. 1985), citing Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v.
    L’Union Atlantique S.A. D’Assurances, 
    723 F.2d 357
    , 362 (3d Cir.
    1983).   The district court found (at least by implication), and
    we agree, that MSL's jurisdictional claims were clearly
    frivolous.    Our result is in accord with other cases which hold
    that a mere unsupported allegation that the defendant “transacts
    business” in an area is “clearly frivolous.”   See Garshman v.
    Universal Resources Holding, Inc., 
    641 F. Supp. 1359
    , 1366
    (D.N.J. 1986), aff'd on other grounds, 
    824 F.2d 223
    (3d Cir.
    1987);23 see also American Centennial Ins. Co. v. Handal, 901 F.
    Supp. 892, 899 (D.N.J. 1995).    MSL legitimately cannot allege a
    nationwide conspiracy and then say, without more evidence, that
    such a conspiracy must have effects in Pennsylvania.
    Further, jurisdictional discovery generally relates to
    corporate defendants and the question of whether they are “doing
    business” in the state.   See Compagnie Des 
    Bauxites, 723 F.2d at 362
    and cases cited therein.    Where the defendant is an
    23.     Garshman was decided on venue grounds, but the
    analysis is the same as for personal jurisdiction. 
    Garshman, 641 F. Supp. at 1366
    .
    37
    individual, the presumption in favor of discovery is reduced.
    See Shaw v. Boyd, 
    658 F. Supp. 89
    , 91 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1987).     Thus,
    the district court's order dismissing the individual appellees
    without ordering discovery first was correct.24
    E.   Recusal of Judge Ditter
    MSL made several attempts to have Judge Ditter recused.
    Judge Ditter denied MSL's recusal motion in an opinion dated
    December 16, 1994.   MSL, 
    872 F. Supp. 1346
    (E.D. Pa. 1994).
    MSL's attempts to seek his recusal in this court were also
    unavailing (one denied, one held moot in light of this appeal).
    Inasmuch as we are affirming the summary judgment, we need not
    consider arguments regarding reassignment on remand.   We review
    the denial of the recusal motion for abuse of discretion.
    MSL argues that Judge Ditter has both the appearance of
    bias and actual bias, and should be removed from the case under
    either 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) or this court's authority as recognized
    in Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 
    10 F.3d 155
    , 167 (3d
    Cir. 1993), and Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 
    975 F.2d 81
    , 98
    (3d Cir. 1992).   The standard for recusal is whether an objective
    observer reasonably might question the judge's impartiality.     MSL
    contends that both one past out-of-court experience, and the bias
    which it asserts is apparent from his rulings, justify Judge
    Ditter's recusal.
    24.     We note that in view of our merits disposition we
    can conceive of no way that the individual appellees could be
    liable in this case.
    38
    MSL argues that Judge Ditter's participation in 1974-75
    on an outside committee which tried to help the Delaware Law
    School, where his son was then a student, obtain ABA
    accreditation justifies recusal.     In over 200 pages of documents
    submitted by MSL relating to Delaware Law School (gleaned from
    depositions and testimony before several courts), Judge Ditter's
    name appears only six times.   This evidence suggests nothing more
    than that Judge Ditter had several meetings with the person who
    was the driving force behind the effort to make changes at
    Delaware Law School in order to qualify for accreditation.     There
    is one affidavit from the former dean of that school that
    suggests that Judge Ditter played a more active role, but Judge
    Ditter, in his careful consideration of the recusal motion,
    sufficiently points out the inconsistencies between this
    declaration and other more contemporaneous testimony.     See MSL,
    
    872 F. Supp. 1346
    , 1358-65 (E.D. Pa. 1994).     We thus affirm Judge
    Ditter's holding that nothing related to Delaware Law School
    creates an appearance of bias in this case.     This is true both
    because of Judge Ditter's limited role at the time and the amount
    of time which has passed.   This view is in accord with the
    prevailing case law.   See, e.g., In re Allied Signal, Inc., 
    891 F.2d 974
    , 976 (1st Cir. 1989) (upholding denial of recusal motion
    based on social and business relationship eight years earlier
    between judge and one of plaintiff's attorneys); Alexander v.
    Chicago Park Dist., 
    773 F.2d 850
    , 857 (7th Cir. 1985) (denying
    recusal motion based on judge's representation of witness 25
    years earlier).
    39
    Furthermore, we do not understand why Judge Ditter's
    participation in the Delaware Law School accreditation process,
    no matter how intensive, would cause an objective observer to
    believe that he would not be impartial here.   The Delaware Law
    School and MSL situations, though somewhat similar in nature, are
    unrelated.   Indeed, it is difficult even to articulate a
    reasonable basis on which to argue that by reason of Judge
    Ditter's experiences regarding the Delaware Law School he would
    have a bias here.   As far as we can see, there is no more basis
    to think that Judge Ditter was not impartial here because of his
    experiences 20 years ago with Delaware Law School, than to
    believe that a judge who had been in an automobile accident would
    not be impartial in a case involving a different accident.
    MSL also argues that Judge Ditter's rulings, both in
    substance (allegedly always against MSL) and in form (allegedly
    repeatedly vilifying and condemning MSL and its dean),
    demonstrate actual bias.   Since we have affirmed several of the
    rulings MSL contends demonstrate bias, and a review of the record
    shows that there was no pattern of consistently ruling against
    MSL, there is no actual bias.
    We also point out that a judge's consistent pattern of
    ruling against a party could be entirely justified for that party
    might consistently be taking positions that cannot be supported.
    Even-handed justice does not require a judge to balance
    numerically the rulings in favor of and against each party.
    After all, each ruling stands on its own.   Furthermore, the
    Supreme Court has said that “judicial rulings alone almost never
    40
    constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”
    Liteky v. United States, 
    510 U.S. 540
    , 555, 
    114 S. Ct. 1147
    , 1157
    (1994).25   We do not believe that a reasonable person who looked
    at Judge Ditter's rulings objectively would find the appearance
    of bias.    See United States v. Bertoli, 
    40 F.3d 1384
    , 1413 (3d
    Cir. 1994).    It should be apparent to anyone that he worked
    diligently in this hard-fought case and, as far as we are
    concerned, reached the correct outcome.
    We also do not find that any of Judge Ditter's comments
    cited by MSL, see MSL br. at 23-25, suggest the appearance of
    partiality.    The Liteky Court held that “judicial remarks during
    the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or
    even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily
    do not support a bias or partiality 
    challenge.” 510 U.S. at 555
    ,
    114 S.Ct. at 1157; see also In re Skobinsky, 
    167 B.R. 45
    , 52
    (E.D. Pa. 1994).    MSL's desire to impute hostile intent to Judge
    Ditter does not mean he had that intent, and does not create an
    appearance of bias.    MSL's attitude appears to be that anyone who
    disagrees with it is both wrong and biased, but the evidence does
    not show this.    The cases cited by MSL are inapplicable because
    they dealt with unique extrajudicial contact with a party, In re
    Sch. Asbestos Litig., 
    977 F.2d 764
    (3d Cir. 1992), an implicit
    admission of bias by the judge, In re Antar, 
    71 F.3d 97
    , 101 (3d
    Cir. 1995), or reassignment on remand, Haines and Alexander.
    Since this case will not be remanded, we need not consider
    25.     The holding in Liteky required bias to stem from an
    “extrajudicial source” to support a recusal under section 455(a).
    41
    reassignment and, as we discussed, Judge Ditter's denial of the
    recusal motion was not an abuse of discretion.
    F.     Disqualification of Inside Counsel
    MSL also appeals the district court's disqualification
    of five members of MSL’s administration and faculty from serving
    as trial counsel, giving oral argument, and taking depositions.26
    Since MSL does not allege that it received incompetent counsel,
    and we are affirming the summary judgment order, the issue
    probably is moot.    In any event, the court did not err in
    requiring the disqualification.
    III. CONCLUSION
    The order of the district court entered August 29,
    1996, granting the appellees summary judgment and the other
    orders on appeal will be affirmed.
    26.     By agreement among the parties, this order later was
    modified to allow two of the MSL professors to act as trial
    counsel. MSL br. at 29 n.12.
    42
    43
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 96-1792

Citation Numbers: 107 F.3d 1026, 1997 WL 83661

Judges: Becker, Mansmann, Greenberg

Filed Date: 2/28/1997

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

Authorities (65)

united-states-football-league-arizona-outlaws-baltimore-stars-football , 842 F.2d 1335 ( 1988 )

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Appeal of Murphy , 482 Pa. 43 ( 1978 )

Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. American ... , 872 F. Supp. 1346 ( 1994 )

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Application of Hansen , 1978 Minn. LEXIS 1195 ( 1978 )

Ronald A. Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthalmology, ... , 870 F.2d 397 ( 1989 )

Liteky v. United States , 114 S. Ct. 1147 ( 1994 )

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