Wyatt, Virgin Islands, Inc. v. Government of the Virgin IsLands Ex Rel. Virgin Islands Department of Labor , 385 F.3d 801 ( 2004 )

Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
10-12-2004
Wyatt VI Inc v. Govt of VI
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential
Docket No. 02-2695
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PRECEDENTIAL Appeal from the District Court of the
UNITED STATES COURT OF Virgin Islands
APPEALS (D.C. Civil Action No. 02-cv-00029)
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT District Judge: Honorable Raymond L.
____________ Finch
Nos: 02-2695/3762
_____________ Argued on April 30, 2003
WYATT, VIRGIN ISLANDS, INC.
Before: ROTH, MCKEE and COWEN
HOVENSA, LLC, Circuit Judges
Intervenor-Plaintiff in District Court (Opinion filed: October 12, 2004)
v.
Iver A. Stridiron
GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN Attorney General
ISLANDS BY AND THROUGH THE
VIRGIN ISLANDS DEPARTMENT OF Elliott M. Davis
LABOR; CECIL BENJAMIN, Solicitor General
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
COMM ISSIONER OF THE VIRGIN Douglas J. Juergens (Argued)
ISLANDS DEPARTMENT OF LABOR Maureen Phelan
Richard S. Davis
VIRGINIE GEORGE; MALCOLM Assistant Attorney General
MACCOW; EDGAR BARRIOS; Department of Justice
CLAUDE GAINE 48B-50C Kronprindsens Gade
GERS Building, 2 nd Floor
Intervenors-Defendants in District Court St. Thomas, VI 00802
K. Glenda Cameron (Argued)
Government of the Virgin Islands, Lee J. Rohn
Law Office Lee J. Rohn
Appellant in 02-2695 1101 King Street, Suite 2
Christiansted
St. Croix, USVI, 00820
Virginie George, Malcolm M accows,
Edgar Barrios and Claude Gaines, Counsel for Appellants
Appellants in 02-3762
Charles E. Engeman (Argued) DRA is enforceable and (2) an injunction
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & to prohibit the Commissioner of the
Stewart Department of Labor from interfering with
1336 Beltjen Road their use of the DRA. The District Court
Suite 202 granted declaratory relief in plaintiffs’
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, VI 00802 favor. Although the defendants raise many
grounds on appeal, the only issue we need
W. Carl Jordan address is whether the plaintiffs’ action for
Tara Porterfield (Argued) declaratory and injunctive relief is ripe for
Vinson & Elkins L.L.P. judicial review. For the reasons we state
2300 First City Tower below, we conclude that, under Public
1001 Fannin Street Service Commission v. Wycoff Co., Inc.,
Houston, TX 77002-6760 344 U.S. 237 (1952), there is no “case of
actual controversy” here as is required by
George H. T. Dudley 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Thus, plaintiffs’
Micol L. Morgan cause of action is not ripe for review.
Dudley, Topper and Feuerzeig, LLP I. BACKGROUND
Law House, 1A Frederiksberg Gade In 2001, HOVENSA awarded
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas Wyatt a contract to provide maintenance
U.S. Virgin Islands 00802 and other services at HOVENSA’s oil
refinery in St. Croix, Virgin Islands. In
November 2001, Wyatt began accepting
Counsel for Appellees employment applications in the Virgin
Islands. As a condition of employment,
Wyatt required all applicants to sign the
DRA. Under the DRA, each applicant
agreed to submit to binding arbitration all
OPINION
claims arising from the applicant’s
candidacy for employment or the terms
ROTH, Circuit Judge and co nd itio ns of an y offer of
emp loymen t.1 W yatt’s p a r e nt
Plaintiffs, Wyatt V.I., Inc., and
HOVENSA, L.L.C., brought an action for
declaratory and injunctive relief in the 1
The Dispute Resolution Agreement
District Court of the Virgin Islands. The provides in relevant part:
dispute arose from the requirement Wyatt
imposed on prospective employees that NOTICE TO ALL APPLICANTS
they sign a Dispute Resolution Agreement
(DRA) as a condition of employment. If you wish to be considered
Plaintiffs sought (1) a declaration that the for employment with Wyatt V.I.,
2
corporation, Wyatt Field Services Co.,
doe s not requ ire app licants f or
employment on the mainland United States
Inc. (“Wyatt”), you must read and
to sign a DRA.
sign the fo llowing Dispute
Prospective employees complained
Resolution Agreement. Your
to the Virgin Islands Department of Labor
application will not be considered
about the DRA. As a result of these
until you h ave s igned the
complaints, the Commissioner of the
Agreement. If you desire to do so,
Department of Labor sent two letters to
you may take this document with
Wyatt requesting that Wyatt “cease and
you to review. You must, however,
desist” its use of the DRA. In the first
return a signed copy of the
letter, dated December 20, 2001, the
Agreement with your application if
Commissioner wrote to Todd Reidlinger,
you wish to continue the
a manager at Wyatt in the Virgin Islands,
application process.
“[t]he agreement is improper and illegal; it
does not serve as a portrayal of reasonable
Dispute Resolution Agreement
and fair labor/management relations.” The
C o m m i s s i o n e r a l s o asse r te d th e
Department of Labor’s belief that the DRA
I recognize that differences
violated the Virgin Islands Wrongful
may arise between Wyatt and me in
Discharge Act (WDA), 24 V.I.C. § 76.
relation to my application for
Then in a February 1, 2002, letter, sent to
employment. Both Wyatt and I
Carmelo Rivera, a human resources
agree to resolve any and all claims,
disputes or controversies arising
out of or relating to my application
or candidacy for employment or the or harassment on the basis of age,
terms and conditions of any offer of race, religion, disability, national
employment exclusively by final origin or other basis prohibited by
and binding arbitration before a state, federal, or territorial law; or
neutral arbitrator pursuant to the c la im s f or breach of any
American Arbitration Association’s e m p l o ym e n t a g r e e m e n t o r
National Rules for the Resolution of promises; and any claims for
Employment Disputes, a copy of personal injury or property damage.
which is available at www.adr.org This agreement extends to disputes
or from Wyatt. By way of example with or claims against Wyatt V.I.,
only, some of the types of claims Inc., HOVENSA, L.L.C., and any
subject to final and binding of their related or affiliated
arbitration include claims for an companies, entities, employees or
alleged wrongful decision not to individuals (as intended third party
hire me; claims for discrimination beneficiaries to this agreement).
3
consultant for Wyatt, the Commissioner declaratory relief, and we
stated: shall proceed to seek such
We will do whatever is relief on behalf of the
necessary to ensure that the Department of Labor and
Virgin Islands’ workforce the prospective employees
receive every ‘employment of Wyatt. We expect to
protection’ guaranteed to gather affidavits to support
them under our labor laws. suc h an ac tion fro m
You are hereby advised that prospective employees who
a willful violation of 24 were told they had to sign
V.I.C. § 76 will be reported these agreements if they
to Office of the Attorney wanted to be considered for
General for prosecution. employment with Wyatt,
Please cease and desist from and felt coerced into signing
this p r a c tice. Your the agreements.
cooperation is expected.
***
Wyatt nevertheless continued to use The pre-employment dispute
the DRA as a condition of employment. 2 resolu tion agreement
The Department of Labor then requested required by Wyatt, Inc. for
an opinion from the Office of the Attorney prospective employees is in
General of the Virgin Islands regarding violation of 24 V.I.C. 76,
Wyatt’s use of the DRA. On March 1, and is unco nscionable ,
2002, the Attorney General issued an coercive, a n a dhesio n
opinion letter, stating: contract, and is contrary to
We find that this case is ripe an important public policy
f o r i n j u n c t iv e a n d / o r in the Virgin Islands which
recognizes the employment
r e a l i t y o f a n i s la n d
2 economy.
In an apparent effort to reconcile
the dispute over the use of the DRA, the
After the Attorney General issued the
Commissioner and Wyatt’s attorney
opinion, the Commissioner notified Wyatt
conferred by telephone before the
of his intent to bring charges if Wyatt
Commissioner sent the first letter. Wyatt
continued to use the DRA.
agreed to remove objectionable language
The Government, however, never
from the DRA concerning employment at
filed suit against Wyatt. Instead, on March
will but continued to use essentially the
20, 2002, Wyatt instituted an action for
same DRA. The two also met after the
declaratory and injunctive relief against
Commissioner sent the first letter but did
the Government. In Count I, Wyatt sought
not resolve the dispute.
4
a declaration under the Federa l granted Wyatt. The motion was granted.
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § HOVENSA’s complaint in intervention
2201(a ), and the Virgin Islands alleged the same counts as Wyatt’s,
Declaratory Judgment Act, 5 V.I.C. §1261, excluding the request for injunctive relief.
that 1) by agreeing to arbitrate, an After the suit had commenced
applicant or employee does not forego Virginie George, Malcolm Maccow, Edgar
substantive rights, but instead agrees to Berrios, and Claud Gaines, prospective
resolution of all disputes in an arbitral employees whom Wyatt would not
forum; 2) the Federal Arbitration Act consider for employment because of their
(FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 - 16, governs the refusal to sign the DRA, moved to
enforceability of arbitration agreements intervene as defendants. That motion was
covering employment disputes; 3) the also granted.3
DRA is protected by and enforceable The District Court became
under the FAA; 4) the DRA does not concerned about its jurisdiction to hear the
violate the WDA; 5) the DRA is not case and ordered the parties to address that
unconscionable; 6) the DRA is not issue. In its Memorandum Opinion dated
contrary to the public policy of the Virgin June 5, 2002, the District Court concluded
Islands; 7) even if the DRA violates the that it did not have subject matter
WDA, the WDA is preempted by the jurisdiction based on the alleged violation
FAA; and 8) the Commissioner’s “cease of 42 U.S.C. §1983. The District Court
and desist” letters are unenforceable to the held, however, that it did have federal
extent they purport to require Wyatt to question jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
abandon its use of the DRA. In Count II, § 1331, based on Wyatt’s claim that the
Wyatt claimed a violation of the federal FAA provides a substantive right to enter
civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and into an arbitration agreement and that any
alleged that the Commissioner was local law in conflict with the FAA is
attempting to deprive Wyatt of its liberty preempted by virtue of the Supremacy
interest in entering into lawful contracts. In Clause of the United States Constitution.
Count III, Wyatt sought injunctive relief Wyatt, V.I., Inc. v. Government of the
against the Commissioner. Wyatt named,
as defendants, the Government of the
Virgin Islands by and through the Virgin 3
The prospective employees also
Islands Department of Labor and Cecil
moved to reopen the evidence to allow
Benjamin, in his Official Capacity as
presentation of evidence of “coercion,
Commissioner of the Virgin Islands
duress, lack of ability to apply for jobs
Department of Labor.
elsewhere, the illegality of the provision
HOVENSA moved to intervene as
and the public policy of the Virgin
a third party beneficiary to Wyatt’s DRA
Islands.” The District Court denied the
because the DRA granted HOVENSA the
prospective employees’ motion to reopen
same right to demand arbitration as it
the evidence.
5
Virgin Islands, 2002 WL 31599790, * 2 violative of public policy, 369 F.3d at 274,
(D.V.I. June 5, 2002). and we affirmed an order compelling
The District Court ruled that arbitration pursuant to the DRA. 369 F.3d
declaratory relief was an appropriate at 275.
remedy in the case because Wyatt was II. JURISDICTION AND
facing “a threat of liability if it continues STANDARD OF REVIEW
to use the Dispute Resolution Agreement The District Court purported to
without a determination of its legality.” In exercise jurisdiction pursuant to the
granting declaratory relief in Wyatt’s general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C.
favor, the court first noted that there was § 1331.
no preemption issue because there is no We have jurisdiction over this
Virgin Islands law or policy directly in appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
conflict with enforcement of the DRA which gives the courts of appeals
under the FAA. The District Court next jurisdiction over appeals from all final
concluded that the DRA is enforceable decisions of the district courts. We
under the FAA because it is not exercise plenary review over whether a
unconscionable, coercive, or contrary to cause of action is ripe. See Doe v. County
public policy. Finally, the District Court of Centre, PA, 242 F.3d 437, 452 (3d Cir.
denied Wyatt’s request for injunctive 2001).
relief. The court reasoned that any further III. DISCUSSION
Government action would be unlikely as a As one ground of appeal, the
result of the declaratory judgment entered prospective employee defendants have
in Wyatt’s favor. challenged the District Court’s decision to
The Go vern men t and th e exercise judicial review of the case on the
prospective employees filed their appeals ground that the case is not yet ripe.5 First,
on June 7, 2002, and September 27, 2002, they submit that the Commissioner’s cease
respectively. 4 Wyatt does not appeal the and desist letters were not orders within
District Court’s denial of injunctive relief. the meaning of 24 V.I.C. § 68(c). They
further urge that, even if the cease and
During the pendency of this appeal, desist letters are considered orders, the
we have held in Lloyd v. HOVENSA, Commissioner never petitioned the
L.L.C., 369 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2004), that Territorial Court for enforcement of the
Wyatt’s DRA was not unenforceable as orders. They argue that, because the
Territorial Court never entered a decree
4
The prospective employees filed a
5
motion to reconsider in the District Court The prospective employees relied
on June 19, 2002, but they withdrew that on a ripeness argument in their brief and
motion on September 27, 2002 and filed at oral argument, but the Government did
a notice of appeal the same day. not rely on this ground for appeal.
6
enforcing the orders, there was no final Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth.,
administrative or state action; therefore, 297 U.S. 288, 325 (1936). The Act is
the case was not ripe for judicial constitutional “so far as it authorizes relief
intervention. which is consonant with the exercise of the
Wyatt and HOVENSA contend that judicial function in the determination of
the case is ripe for judicial review because controversies to which under the
the Commissioner’s “cease and desist” Constitution the judicial power extends.”
orders constitute concrete action in the Aetna, 300 U.S. at 240.
sense that the orders affect Wyatt’s In order for there to be a “case of
primary conduct, namely what contracts actual controversy” in the constitutional
Wyatt can utilize in its hiring process. sense, the controversy must be
Additionally, Wyatt asserts that it had no one that is appropriate for
choice but to bring its action for judicial determination. A
declaratory and injunctive relief because it justiciable controversy is
thought it would be subject to fines or thus distinguished from a
imprisonment under 24 V.I.C. § 75 if it difference or dispute of a
continued to ignore the orders of the hypothetical or abstract
Commissioner. character; from one that is
We agree with the prospective academic or moot. The
employee defendants that this case is not controversy must be definite
ripe under the “case of actual controversy” and concrete, touching the
requirement of the Declaratory Judgment legal relations of parties
Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201. Because h a v i n g a d v e r s e le g a l
we decide the appeal on this basis, we will interests. It must be a real
not go on to discuss the other grounds for and substantial controversy
appeal. admitting of specific relief
The Declaratory Judgment Act through a decree of a
creates a remedy by which federal courts conclusive character, as
“may declare the rights and other legal distinguished from an
relations of any interested party seeking opinion advising what the
such declaration” when there is a “case of law would be upon a
actual controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). hypothetical state of facts.
The Supreme Court, in upholding the
constitutionality of the Act, has interpreted Aetna, 300 U.S. at 240-41 (citations
the remedy as limited to cases and omitted). The conflict between the parties
controversies in the constitutional sense. must be ripe for judicial intervention; it
See Aetna Life Insurance Co. of Hartford, cannot be “nebulous or contingent” but
Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 “must have taken on fixed and final shape
(1937). A “case of actual controversy” so that a court can see what legal issues it
means one of a justiciable nature. is deciding, what effect its decision will
7
have on the adversaries, and some useful of actual controversy” in an action seeking
purpose to be achieved in deciding them.” declaratory and injunctive relief, under the
Wycoff, 344 U.S. at 244. Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, to
Interrelated to our discussion of establish that certain film products were
what constitutes a “case of actual being transported in interstate commerce.
controversy” in the constitutional sense is The Utah Public Service Commission had
the ripeness doctrine. The purpose of the denied the plaintiff’s application for
ripeness doctrine is to “prevent the courts, authorization to carry film commodities
t h r o u g h avoidance of prema ture within the state. The plaintiff commenced
adjudication, from entangling themselves an action in federal court, seeking both a
i n a b s t ra c t d is a g r e e m e n t s o v er declaratory judgment that its carriage of
administrative policies, and also to protect motion picture film and newsreels between
the agencies from judicial interference points in Utah constituted interstate
until an administrative decision has been commerce and an injunction from
formalized and its effects felt in a concrete interfering with this transportation.
way by the challenging parties.” Abbott Wycoff, 344 U.S. at 239.
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, The Court decided that the case was
148-49 (1967), overruled on other not ripe for judicial review. First, the
grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, Court noted that the dispute had not
105 (1977). In determining whether a matured to a point where the Court could
dispute has matured to a point to require see what controversy w as going to
judicial adjudication, courts must consider develop. Id. at 245. It was not enough
“the fitness of the issues for judicial tha t the pl a i n ti f f f e a r e d f u tu re
decision and the hardship to the parties of administrative or judicial action by the
withholding court consideration.” Id. at commission. Id.
149. A dispute is not ripe for judicial Second, the Court noted that the
determination “‘if it rests upon contingent declaratory proceeding, as it was invoked
future events that may not occur as by the plaintiffs, not only “foreclos[ed] an
anticipated, or indeed may not occur at a d m i n i s tr a t i v e b o d y , ” b u t w a s
all.’” Doe v. County of Centre, PA, 242 “incompatible with a proper federal-state
F.3d 437, 453 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting relationship.” Id. at 247. The Court
Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 stated:
(1998)). “Claims based merely upon Declaratory proceedings in
‘assumed potential invasions’ of rights are the federal courts against
n o t enou gh to wa rrant jud icia l state officials must be
intervention.” Ashwander, 297 U.S. at decided with regard for the
325 (quoting Arizona v. California, 283 implications of our federal
U.S. 423, 462 (1931)). system. State administrative
In Wycoff, the Supreme Court bodies have the initial right
faced the issue whether there was a “case to reduce the general
8
policies of state regulatory $500 or imprisoned
statutes into concrete orders not more than 3
and the primary right to take months, or both.
evidence and make findings
of fact. It is the state courts (emphasis added). We note first
which have the first and the that Wyatt does not mention
last word as to the meaning potential prosecution under § 75 in
of state statutes and whether its complaint requesting declaratory
a particular order is within relief. Nor is § 75 mentioned at the
the legislative terms of District Court hearing on April 4,
reference so as to make it 2002, or in the District Court’s
the action of the State. Memorandum Opinion of June 5,
2002, granting declaratory relief to
Id.; Cf. Topp-Cola Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., Wyatt. In fact, at the April 5
314 F.2d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding hearing, the Assistant Attorney
that, under Wycoff, District Court erred in G e n e r a l , r e p r e se n t i n g t h e
exercising jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s Government, stated:
action for declaratory relief because, just With respect
as federal “interference” with state to enforcement of a
administrative agencies and interpretation cease and desist
of state law is “condemned,” plaintiff’s order, I believe that
federal action seeking relief from there is no single
territorial administration of Puerto Rican way in which cease
trademark law is similarly condemned). and desist orders are
The dispute presented in the case to be enforced.
before us is Wyatt’s claim that it was
facing prosecution under 24 V.I.C. § 75 T h e
and the possibility of the imposition of government has at its
fines. Section 75 provides: arsenal more than
Whoever wilfully one technique,
resists, prev ents , including the seeking
impedes or interferes of declaratory
w i t h t h e judgment, which was
Commissioner or his the intention in this
d u l y a u t h o r iz e d matter and which, to
representative, in the some extent, appears
performance of his to be the direction in
duties pursuant to which it’s going.
this chapter, shall be
fined not more than We believe
9
that by getting a follow up the initial letters and the opinion
court to adjudicate letter of the Attorney General is
the dispute we would demonstrated by the statement, which we
be resolving the quote above, of the Assistant Attorney
issues raised by the General at the April 5 District Court
cease and d esist hearing.
order, and that’s it. As in Wycoff, the plaintiffs merely
feared potential future administrative or
The government, however, judicial action and brought this action for
has never taken any steps to obtain declaratory relief “to hold in readiness for
a declaratory judgment or to invoke use should the Commission[er] at any
any other remedy as set out in future time attempt to” use his powers to
Chapter 3 of Title 24 of the Virgin issue an order and enforce that order
Islands Code. Such remedies through the Territorial Court. See Wycoff,
would include a petition for judicial 344 U.S. at 245. In essence, the dispute
enforcement of an order, pursuant between the parties is contingent upon
to § 69, a petition for judicial events that may not occur at all or may
review of an order, pursuant to § occur differently than anticipated. See
70, or an order for reinstatement of Doe v. County of Centre, PA, 242 F.3d at
a wrongfully discharged employee, 453. Because Wyatt did not give the
pursuant to § 77(c). Because the Commissioner the chance to proceed on its
penalties of § 75 are limited to own grounds, the Department of Labor
resisting, preventing, impeding or never had the opportunity “to reduce the
interfering with the Commissioner general policies of [its] state [statute] into
in the performance of his duties, as [a] concrete order,” and the Virgin Islands
set out in Chapter 3, it would never had the opportunity to give the “last
appear that the Commissioner word” as to the meaning of the WDA and
would have to seek further remedial whether the Commissioner’s order was
action under Chapter 3, than he has “within the legislative terms of reference
done here, before he could invoke so as to make it the action of” the Virgin
the penalties of § 75. Wyatt’s fears Islands. Wycoff, 344 U.S. at 247. Wyatt
appear then to be premature. has not yet felt the effects of final
The only action that Commissioner administrative or state action in a concrete
did take was to write two letters in which way. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at
he requested that Wyatt “cease and desist” 148-49. For the above reasons, we
its use of the DRA. Such a letter is not an conclude that this cause of action is not yet
“order,” nor was there any evidentiary ripe for review.
hearing held prior to the transmittal of The Go vern men t and the
either letter. The inconclusiveness of the prospective employees also argue that the
Commissioner’s decision on how he would District Court did not have federal
10
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § IV. Conclusion
1331. They contend that W yatt’s request For the foregoing reasons, we will
for a declaration that “even if the reverse the District Court’s grant of
Agreement violates the WDA, the WDA is declaratory relief and remand this case to
preempted by the FAA” is in reality an the District Court with directions to
anticipated federal defense of preemption dismiss it.
which, under the well-pleaded complaint
rule, does not by itself give the District
Court subject matter jurisdiction over
Wyatt’s cause of action. In response,
Wyatt submits that the District Court did
have jurisdiction, notwithstanding the
well-pleaded complaint rule, under Shaw
v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 86 (1983).
Wyatt argues that they presented a federal
question over which the District Court had
jurisdiction because they sought to enjoin
the Commissioner from interfering with
their federal right to enter into arbitration
agreements on the ground that the WDA is
preempted by the FAA. See id. at 96, n.14(“A plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief
from state regulation, on the ground that
such regulation is pre-empted by a federal
statute, which by virtue of the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution must prevail,
thus presents a federal question which the
federal courts have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve.”).
Because we will dismiss this case
on ripeness grounds, we do not need to
decide the federal question jurisdiction
issue at this time. See Wycoff, 344 U.S. at
248-49 (“Since this case should be
dismissed in any event, it is not necessary
to determine whether, on this record, the
alleged controversy over an action that
may be begun in state court would be
maintainable under the head of federal-
question jurisdiction.”).
11