Marie Arnez v. TJX Co Inc ( 2016 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 14-4828
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MARIE ARNEZ; ALEX ARNEZ, W/H,
Appellants
v.
THE TJX COMPANIES, INC.;
MARMAXX OPERATING CORP.
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 5-13-cv-02548)
District Judge: Honorable Edward G. Smith
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
November 3, 2015
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Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Filed March 15, 2016)
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OPINION*
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*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
Appellants Marie and Alex Arnez1 appeal from the District Court’s Order denying
their Motion for a New Trial on the issue of damages for alleged injuries sustained as a
result of a trip-and-fall incident. They present two issues for our consideration. First,
they contend that the jury’s verdict was inadequate and its failure to award pain and
suffering damages was against the weight of the evidence, requiring a new trial. Second,
they contend that the District Court erred in admitting the testimony of a defense
biomechanics expert. For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm and will tax costs
against Appellants.
I.
On January 8, 2011, while shopping in a Marshalls department store in Bethlehem,
Pennsylvania that was owned and operated by Appellees, The TJX Companies, Inc. and
Marmaxx Operating Corp., Marie Arnez tripped and fell over an empty flatbed cart. She
reported the injury to a store manager, but walked out of the store without assistance and
without requesting medical treatment. Although purporting to suffer a multitude of
injuries as a result of the fall, including injuries to her neck, both hands, wrists and
shoulders, her right knee and right ankle, and her low and mid back, Marie did not seek
any treatment until more than a week later, when she went to a chiropractor on January
19, 2011. Thereafter, Marie treated regularly with the chiropractor and had various other
instances of medical care that she asserted were due to the injuries sustained in her fall.
1
For clarity, we will refer to the Appellants by their first names.
2
For her back, she obtained medical imaging studies and ultimately had injections. For
carpal tunnel syndrome and other hand symptoms, she obtained electrodiagnostic studies
and eventually had a surgical release. She also claimed psychiatric injuries, for which
she underwent psychiatric evaluations and therapy.
Appellants filed suit against Appellees in the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania seeking all economic and non-economic damages
associated with Marie’s injuries from the trip-and-fall incident, including a loss of
consortium claim for Marie’s husband, Alex. Appellees removed the suit to federal court
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Prior to trial, Appellants filed a motion in limine to
exclude certain portions of the testimony and report of Appellees’ biomechanics expert,
Kirk L. Thibault, Ph.D., under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The District Court denied the motion after a lengthy
hearing.
During the trial, Appellees conceded that the flatbed cart was a trip hazard that
they should have removed prior to the incident, but contended that Marie was also
comparatively negligent in failing to see and avoid tripping on the cart. Appellees also
presented several experts, including a neuroradiologist,2 an orthopedic surgeon
2
The neuroradiologist, Dr. Michael L. Brooks, testified that after reviewing
imaging studies of Marie’s back from 2011 through 2013, he did not find any condition
that he attributed to the fall at Marshalls and only saw long-standing wear and tear
changes in her spine.
3
specializing in hand surgery,3 a neurologist,4 a forensic psychiatrist,5 and the
biomechanical engineer, Thibault, to testify as to Marie’s medical condition as a result of
the fall. The experts provided substantial testimony suggesting that Marie’s symptoms
were not caused by the accident and were likely embellished or a result of malingering.
Most at issue in this appeal was the testimony of the biomechanical expert, who testified
that the forces in Marie’s fall could not have caused a disc herniation in her neck and
back. The parties stipulated that if Marie’s doctors testified at trial, they would testify
that the amount of claimed past medical expenses is $45,000 and that the amount is fair
and reasonable.
During jury deliberations, the jury asked the District Court whether it had to award
Appellants the entire stipulated amount of medical expenses, to which the District Court
responded in the negative. Thereafter, the jury found that Appellees and Marie were both
50% at fault and awarded $5,000 in medical expenses. The jury declined to award Marie
any money for pain and suffering, embarrassment and humiliation, loss of enjoyment of
3
The orthopedic surgeon, Dr. William H. Kirkpatrick, testified that Marie’s carpal
tunnel syndrome and Raynaud’s syndrome were unrelated to the fall at Marshalls.
4
The neurologist, Dr. Frederick Weinblatt, found that there was evidence that
Marie was embellishing her complaints and that “at most” she sustained a “self-limited
strain syndrome” from the fall that would resolve in “at most a year.” App. 1298.
5
The forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Barbara Ziv, testified after examining Marie that
Marie did not suffer any significant psychiatric injury because of her fall at Marshalls and
that she “makes up symptoms when it suits her.” App. 1137. Dr. Ziv provided several
specific examples of inconsistencies she found in Marie’s story regarding her symptoms
and noted that she diagnosed Marie with malingering and that “the hallmark of
malingering is inconsistency.” App. 1128.
4
life, and disfigurement. The jury also declined to award Alex Arnez any money for loss
of consortium. The District Court then entered judgment for Appellants in the amount of
$2,500.
Appellants filed a timely motion for a new trial on damages on the bases that: (1)
the jury verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and (2) Appellees’ biomechanical
expert was improperly permitted to testify as to his biomechanical analysis and areas of
medical opinion testimony beyond his qualifications, and that his testimony prejudiced
their case. On December 18, 2014, the District Court denied the motion for a new trial.
The District Court noted that the evidence submitted provides
a reasonable basis to believe that the jury simply did not
believe that [Marie] suffered any pain and suffering. And
even if the jury had believed that [Marie] suffered physical
injury, it still was free to conclude that the injury was “not
severe enough to warrant an award of damages.”
App. 0003 (citations omitted). The District Court also found that admitting Dr.
Thibault’s testimony was not error and that, even if it was, Appellants could not
demonstrate prejudice because of the other evidence admitted. Appellants appeal that
ruling.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This Court reviews a District Court’s denial of a
motion for a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 435 (1996). A new trial may be granted because the
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verdict is against the weight of the evidence if “the jury’s verdict resulted in a
miscarriage of justice or where the verdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned or
shocks our conscience.” Williamson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1353
(3d Cir. 1991). A new trial may also be granted within the court’s discretion if “the court
committed a significant error of law to the prejudice of the moving party.” Maylie v.
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 791 F. Supp. 477, 480 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (citations omitted).
III.
The two main issues in this appeal are whether the District Court abused its
discretion in denying Appellants’ request for a new trial on the issue of damages because:
(1) the jury’s verdict that awarded $5,000 for medical costs but nothing for pain and
suffering was against the weight of the evidence, and (2) the biomechanical engineer’s
testimony was improperly admitted and caused prejudice to Appellants’ case. We
address each contention in turn.
A.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has specifically declined to adopt a “per se rule”
requiring an award for pain and suffering when medical bills are awarded. Davis v.
Mullen, 773 A.2d 764, 769 (Pa. 2001). Instead, under Pennsylvania law, a jury’s award
of medical expenses without pain and suffering will not be disturbed when “the trial court
had a reasonable basis to believe that: (1) the jury did not believe the plaintiff suffered
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any pain and suffering, or (2) that a preexisting condition or injury was the sole cause of
the alleged pain and suffering.” Id. at 767.
“[T]he existence of compensable pain” is a credibility issue and “juries must
believe that plaintiffs suffered pain before they compensate for that pain.” Id. at 769; see
also, Majczyk v. Oesch, 789 A.2d 717, 726 (Pa. Super. 2001) (“[T]he determination of
what is a compensable injury is uniquely within the purview of the jury.”) (citations
omitted). There are some injuries a jury may not be free to disregard. See, e.g., Casselli
v. Powlen, 937 A.2d 1137 (Pa. Super. 2007) (finding that it was against the weight of the
evidence and warranted a new trial where the jury awarded medical expenses but nothing
for pain and suffering for a broken bone in the plaintiff’s foot); Womack v. Crowley, 877
A.2d 1279 (Pa. Super. 2005) (finding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to grant a new trial limited to damages when the jury awarded damages for medical
expenses but nothing for pain and suffering for a torn meniscus in the plaintiff’s left knee
that required surgery); Marsh v. Hanley, 856 A.2d 138 (Pa. Super. 2004) (finding that it
was against the weight of the evidence and warranted a new trial where a jury awarded
lost wages but nothing for pain and suffering for soft tissue injuries that required the
plaintiff to miss a substantial amount of time from work). Although there are such
injuries “to which human experience teaches there is accompanying pain,” a jury is “not
obliged to believe that every injury causes pain or the pain alleged.” Boggavarapu v.
Ponist, 542 A.2d 516, 518 (Pa. 1988) (citations omitted). A jury may determine that
some pain is a “transient rub of life for which compensation is not warranted,” Majczyk,
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789 A.2d at 726 (citations omitted), or that “not every injury [is] serious enough to
warrant compensation, although there may be some pain attached,” Van Kirk v. O’Toole,
857 A.2d 183, 186 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).
In the case at hand, it is undisputed that Marie did not receive medical treatment
until more than a week after the accident and, even then, only received treatment from a
chiropractor for a number of months. Although Appellees conceded that Marie had
contusions or sprains that would resolve in “at most” a year, Appellees submitted
evidence from multiple experts that called into question the existence and severity of
Marie’s symptoms as well as whether her medical conditions, such as her carpal tunnel
syndrome, were causally related to the accident. After reviewing the evidence, the jury
awarded only $5,000 in medical expenses, far less than the $45,000 claimed by the
Appellants. It is evident that the jury doubted Marie’s credibility as to the extent or
causation of her injuries, and the rejection of her testimony affords a reasonable basis for
denying any award for pain and suffering or for loss of consortium.
Based on the evidence submitted at trial, the jury was free to award Appellants
some or all of what they were asking for or nothing at all. An award of some medical
expenses and nothing for pain and suffering for the types of injuries that Marie purported
to suffer is consistent with a jury finding that any injuries resulting from the accident
were a “transient rub of life for which compensation is not warranted.” Majczyk, 789
A.2d at 726 (citations omitted). The District Court found that the jury’s award was not
against the weight of the evidence and failed to “shock[] [its] conscience” or “result[] in a
8
miscarriage of justice.” Williamson, 926 F.2d at 1353. The jury had a reasonable basis
for finding that Marie did not suffer any compensable pain, and the District Court did not
abuse its discretion in denying a new trial on the issue of damages.
B.
Regardless of whether or not Thibault’s testimony was properly admitted,6
Appellants failed to show that they were prejudiced by his testimony. Appellants argue
that Thibault’s testimony prejudiced their case because: (1) the jury “likely relied on
Thibault’s unreliable testimony to resolve the conflicting medical testimony regarding
whether [Marie] suffered spinal disc injuries” because of the forces at play in Marie’s
fall, and (2) Thibault’s “unqualified commentary on the medical evidence” likely “tipped
the scales in [Appellees’] favor, as the jury had to weigh conflicting medical testimony as
to whether [Marie] had suffered acute disc injuries.” Br. of Appellants at 43–45.
Nonetheless, Appellants themselves noted that “[t]here was no indication that
testimony of a biomechanics expert was necessary or helpful” in regard to the medical
evidence and that “Thibault even acknowledges that his testimony is somewhat redundant
given the available medical expert testimony.” Id. at 44. The jury watched a video of
Marie’s fall, directly showing them the forces at play in the fall, and heard the testimony
of several medical doctors relating to the cause and extent of Marie’s injuries. Based on
the volume of evidence the jury had to consider, the jury’s award showing that it credited
6
Although we need not reach the merits of this argument, we doubt that the
District Court abused its discretion in its application of Rule 702 and Daubert.
9
at least some of Marie’s medical expenses, and Appellants’ inability to point to anything
on the record suggesting that Thibault’s testimony prejudiced them, we find that the
District Court’s holding that Appellants failed to meet the burden of showing that
Thibault’s testimony prejudiced their case was not an abuse of discretion.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s Order of December
18, 2014.
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