United States v. Augustine DeCruz ( 2016 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 15-2351
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
AUGUSTINE DECRUZ,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 3-11-cr-00199-001
District Judge: The Honorable A. Richard Caputo
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
February 29, 2016
Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN, and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges
(Filed: March 16, 2016)
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OPINION*
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SMITH, Circuit Judge.
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.
A confidential informant (CI) advised a police officer in late January of
2011 that he could purchase cocaine from a man named Gus. After the CI
contacted Gus by telephone, the police officer verified the CI was clean, provided
him money for a controlled buy, drove to Gus’s house, and watched as the CI
entered the rear of the house and then emerged four minutes later with a substance
that field tested positive for cocaine. In early February, the CI made a second
controlled buy from Gus while the same police officer again watched from his
vehicle. The purchased substance again field tested positive for cocaine.
Thereafter, the police officer swore out an affidavit and obtained a search
warrant for Gus’s house. Execution of the search warrant found Augustine DeCruz
on the second floor in the hall, together with crack cocaine and two firearms, a
Rossi .38 caliber handgun and a Ruger P95 9 mm handgun. DeCruz was arrested
and detained. While DeCruz was incarcerated, his cellmate contacted the police to
advise that DeCruz had bragged that the search had failed to discover a firearm in
the basement and crack cocaine in folded laundry. Execution of a second search
warrant produced a Remington rifle and an additional 151.7 grams of crack
cocaine.
In June of 2011, a grand jury returned a three-count indictment charging
DeCruz with possession with the intent to distribute 28 grams of a controlled
substance containing crack cocaine; possession of the Rossi, the Ruger and the
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Remington rifle in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime; and possession of a
firearm by an alien who was unlawfully in the United States. DeCruz filed a
pretrial motion seeking, inter alia, to suppress evidence seized during execution of
the two search warrants for lack of probable cause and to disclose the CI’s identity.
Alternatively, DeCruz sought a Franks hearing.1 The District Court denied
DeCruz’s motion in its entirety. Thereafter, pursuant to a written plea agreement,
DeCruz waived his right to prosecution by indictment and entered a guilty plea to a
two-count information charging him with possession with intent to distribute a
substance containing an unspecified quantity of cocaine base and possession of
only the Rossi and the Ruger handguns in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense.
Thereafter, DeCruz, represented by new counsel, moved to withdraw his
guilty plea to the firearm offense. He asserted that his inability to read and write
English prevented him from fully understanding the consequences of his guilty
plea and that he was innocent of the “charge related to the gun.” A148. During a
hearing, DeCruz’s counsel admitted the crack cocaine was DeCruz’s, but asserted
that DeCruz wanted to proceed to trial on the firearm offense because it was owned
by someone else. The District Court denied DeCruz’s motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. Thereafter, the Court sentenced DeCruz to 46 months for the drug
1
See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978).
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trafficking offense and the 60 month mandatory minimum on the firearms offense
to be served consecutively.2
On appeal, DeCruz contends the District Court erred in denying his pretrial
motion to suppress evidence, to disclose the CI’s identity, and to conduct a Franks
hearing. DeCruz also asserts that the District Court erred by denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.3
Given the police officer’s recitation in the affidavit of the circumstances
leading up to and immediately following each of the two controlled buys, we agree
with the District Court that the affidavit adequately established probable cause.
See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (reaffirming that the probable cause
determination requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances to
2
DeCruz’s counsel failed to file an appeal as requested. DeCruz filed a timely
§ 2255 petition, asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Consistent
with a stipulation of the parties, the District Court ordered the reinstatement of
DeCruz’s direct appeal rights. This timely appeal followed. The District Court
had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253(a) and 2255. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).
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In reviewing the District Court’s denial of the motion to suppress, we conduct
clear error review of factual findings and plenary review of legal conclusions.
United States v. Riddick, 156 F.3d 505, 509 (3d Cir. 1998). The denial of a motion
to disclose the identity of a confidential informant is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. United States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 149 (3d Cir. 2002). We have
yet to determine the standard of review for the denial of a Franks hearing, but need
not resolve that standard here for reasons explained in the text. United States v.
Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651, 665-66 (3d Cir. 2012). The abuse of discretion standard
governs our review of the denial of DeCruz’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003).
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determine if “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found in a particular place”). Because the probable cause determination for the
first search warrant depended upon the police officer’s observations and not the
CI’s report of what transpired in the house, the omission of the CI’s reliability and
criminal history were not material to the finding of probable cause. For that
reason, the District Court did not err in denying either the motion to conduct a
Franks hearing or to suppress the evidence. In light of the criminal offenses
charged in the indictment, there was no need to reveal the identity of the CI, whose
earlier involvement in the controlled buys would not refute DeCruz’s possession
on the day of the initial search and seizure of the crack and the handguns.
Nor are we persuaded that the District Court abused its discretion in denying
DeCruz’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In ruling on a motion to withdraw a
plea, the court “must consider” three factors: “(1) whether the defendant asserts his
innocence; (2) the strength of the defendant’s reasons for withdrawing the plea;
and (3) whether the government would be prejudiced by the withdrawal.” United
States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003). The District Court appropriately
considered these factors. It noted that DeCruz did not assert his innocence as to
the drug charge and that his alleged innocence on the firearms offense was based
on his own uncorroborated statement that someone else owned the firearm
(singular). See A148, 161. Notwithstanding DeCruz’s illiteracy, the District Court
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reasoned that DeCruz’s active participation in the plea proceeding and solemn
admission of guilt to the elements of each offense made DeCruz’s subsequent
reason for withdrawing his plea “appear[]” to be “a change of heart,” which did not
warrant granting the motion. A174.
DeCruz’s contention that he did not understand the plea proceeding and that
his plea was involuntary is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy. The
transcript showed that DeCruz was fully engaged in the proceeding, asking
questions and raising his concerns. Moreover, his responses showed that he
understood the significance of the information that had “dropped” not only a count
from the indictment, but also the averment that the Remington rifle was used in
furtherance of drug trafficking. DeCruz made clear that he was pleading guilty
solely to possession of what was seized in the first search and affirmed he
understood the plea agreement. When DeCruz raised concerns about sentencing
and was ready to change his mind about pleading guilty, the hearing was continued
only after DeCruz agreed that he decided to go forward with pleading guilty. The
Court then ensured that DeCruz understood his sentencing exposure, the
mandatory minimum and the fact that the law required one sentence to get “tacked
on to the other.” DeCruz said he understood these sentencing considerations and
had no hesitation when he pleaded guilty to each count. These circumstances
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support the District Court’s finding that DeCruz had a “change of heart,” which did
not justify granting the motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
For the above stated reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
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