Kathleen Acavino v. John Wilson ( 2020 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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Nos. 18-3684
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KATHLEEN ACAVINO,
Appellant
v.
JOHN W. WILSON; DENNIS L. O’CONNELL, Esquire, Divorce Master
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-18-cv-2312)
District Judge: Honorable Mark A. Kearney
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Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 12, 2019
Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges
(Filed: January 7, 2020)
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OPINION*
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*
This disposition is not an Opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not
constitute binding precedent.
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge
Kathleen Acavino appeals the District Court’s Order granting the motion of
Divorce Master Dennis L. O’Connell, Esq. to dismiss Acavino’s Second Amended
Complaint (“SAC”). The District Court dismissed Acavino’s SAC with prejudice based
on Divorce Master O’Connell’s quasi-judicial immunity.1 For the reasons which follow,
we affirm.
We have jurisdiction over the Order granting the motion to dismiss pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal order.
See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). We “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Divorce proceedings between Acavino and her husband were initiated in the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, Family Court Division, and the record was
transferred to Philadelphia Family Court Divorce Master O’Connell for a hearing.
Master O’Connell held a hearing on June 4, 2018, and on that same day Acavino brought
1
Having dismissed the action against Master O’Connell, the District Court also declined
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims against the remaining defendant,
Acavino’s former husband.
2
this action in the U.S. District Court against her former husband, and the District Court
dismissed that Complaint without prejudice as she failed to sue a state actor. In an
Amended Complaint, Acavino then sued the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, which had
immunity, and thus the District Court again dismissed the action without prejudice.
In her Second Amended Complaint, Acavino sued her former husband and Master
O’Connell in his individual capacity, and she now appeals the District Court’s dismissal
of her claims against Master O’Connell. Specifically, she challenges the June 4th hearing
and alleges a violation of her constitutional rights. Among other things, she complains
about what assets should be considered for purposes of determining marital property
subject to distribution, and she questions the neutrality of the Divorce Master.
Absolute quasi-judicial immunity has been extended to protect a range of judicial
actors, including: “(1) those who make discretionary judgments ‘functional[ly]
comparab[le]’ to judges, . . . (2) those who ‘perform a somewhat different function in the
trial process but whose participation . . . is equally indispensable,’ . . . and (3) those who
serve as ‘arms of the court,’ . . . fulfill[ing] a quasi-judicial role at the court’s request.”
Russell v. Richardson, 905 F.3d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 2018) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). Thus, the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity provides absolute
immunity for those “who perform functions closely associated with the judicial process.”
Id. (quoting Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200 (1985)).
Here, as the District Court pointed out, Master O’Connell is entitled to quasi-
judicial immunity because his “judgments are ‘functional[ly] comparab[le]’ to those of
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judges – that is, because [he], too, ‘exercise[s] a discretionary judgment’ as part of [his]
function.” Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436 (1993) (citations
omitted); see Nystedt v. Nigro, 700 F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 2012) (discovery master was
entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity); cf. Capogrosso v. Supreme Court of N.J.,
588 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2009) (state officials sued in their individual capacities were
entitled to quasi-judicial immunity and thus not subject to suit for injunctive relief or
declaratory relief). Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s Order granting Master
O’Connell’s motion to dismiss.2
2
We further note that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that “‘injunctive relief shall not be
granted’ in an action brought against ‘a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in
such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory
relief was unavailable.’” Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 304 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting §
1983). Here, Acavino’s pleading does not allege that a declaratory decree was violated or
that declaratory relief was unavailable, and because the injunctive relief sought by
Acavino does not address the actions of Master O’Connell other than in his judicial
capacity, her claim for injunctive relief is barred. See id.
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