Khalil Hammond v. Lancaster City Bureau of Polic ( 2020 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
Nos. 18-3552 and 19-1985
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KHALIL K. HAMMOND,
Appellant
v.
LANCASTER CITY BUREAU OF POLICE; CITY OF LANCASTER;
DETECTIVE SERGEANT JARRED P. BERKIHISER;
DETECTIVE MICHAEL GERACE;
ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER DAVID L. BLANCK;
ATTORNEY MARK F. WALMER;
LANCASTER COUNTY'S DISTRICT ATTORNEYS OFFICE
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 5-17-cv-01885)
District Judge: Honorable Timothy J. Savage
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 2, 2020
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 8, 2020)
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OPINION*
___________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM
Khalil Hammond appeals from a number of orders of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. We will vacate the District Court’s
judgment and remand for further proceedings.
I.
Hammond filed a civil rights complaint against the Lancaster City Bureau of
Police and employees of the Lancaster County District Attorney’s Office, claiming that
Defendants intentionally destroyed his property. On screening, Judge Thomas N.
O’Neill, Jr., dismissed Hammond’s Fourth Amendment claims as time-barred, dismissed
his Eighth Amendment claims for failure to state a claim, dismissed his Due Process
claims because Hammond had an adequate state law remedy, and stated that his state-law
claims might be viable, based on diversity jurisdiction, but that Hammond had not
indicated that the parties were diverse. Dkt. #5. The District Court dismissed the
complaint without prejudice to amendment (without explicitly barring Hammond from
raising any of the dismissed claims). Dkt. #6. Hammond filed a first amended complaint
(“FAC”), adding claims and attempting to cure the time bar. Dkt. #14. In the meantime,
the case was reassigned to Judge Timothy J. Savage, who, without any comment on the
adequacy of the amended complaint, ordered that it be served on defendants. Dkt. #15.
There was a settlement conference (apparently unsuccessful), some discovery, and
Defendants filed motions to dismiss. Hammond also filed a motion for leave to file a
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second amended complaint (“SAC”), which the District Court denied without prejudice
on August 1, 2018, because Hammond had failed to include the proposed complaint.
Dkt. #56. One group of defendants eventually filed a motion for sanctions because
Hammond had not replied to their discovery requests. Dkt. #59. In an order entered on
August 29, 2018, the District Court ordered Hammond to respond to the requests on or
before September 14, 2018, or the “action will be dismissed.” Dkt. #61.
On September 18, 2018, the District Court entered three orders granting the
various defendants’ motions to dismiss the FAC. Two of the orders stated in a footnote
that Hammond had failed to respond to the motion to dismiss by the deadline. Dkt. #64,
66. The third stated in a footnote that Hammond had not complied with the Court’s order
to respond to discovery requests. Dkt. #65. That is the extent of the reasoning in the
orders.
The Court then received Hammond’s motion (his second) to file a second
amended complaint—this time with a proposed complaint. The postmark on the
envelope is September 14, 2018, four days before the orders dismissing the FAC. The
District Court ordered the Defendants to respond. Dkt. #68. All filed responses in
opposition. On October 15, 2018, the District Court entered an order denying the motion
to file the SAC, stating in a footnote: “The proposed second amended complaint does not
cure the deficiencies in both plaintiff’s complaint and his amended complaint. His claims
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are barred by the statute of limitations and he fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.” Dkt. #72.
Hammond filed a motion for reconsideration of the September 18 orders, dated
October 19, 2018. Dkt. #73. The District Court denied the motion on December 6,
2018. Dkt. #80. In the meantime, Hammond filed a notice of appeal on November 5,
2018. Dkt. #77. Hammond also filed an untimely motion to reopen the appeal under
Rule 4(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in February 2019. Dkt. #83.
The District Court denied it on March 20. Dkt. #86.
Hammond then filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 20 order, which
the District Court also denied, in an order entered on April 5. Hammond filed a notice of
appeal (dated April 22) from the March 20 and April 5 orders. That appeal was docketed
at C.A. No. 19-1985 and was later consolidated with Hammond’s earlier appeal.
II.
We first consider our jurisdiction. Because Hammond’s motion to file the SAC
was “filed” before the District Court’s September 18 orders, see Pearson v. Sec’y Dep’t
Corr., 775 F.3d 598, 600 n.2 (3d Cir. 2015), and because the District Court denied the
motion on the merits in its October 15, 2018 order, we agree with the parties that the
October order was a final, appealable order. Hammond’s notice of appeal, filed on
November 5, 2018, was timely as to that order, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), and also
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“dr[ew] in question all prior non-final orders and rulings,” including the September 18
orders, see Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2010).
And although Hammond’s notice of appeal did not name the October 15 order by
date, see Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B), we construe notices of appeal liberally. Sulima, 602
F.3d at 184. “[W]e can exercise jurisdiction over orders not specified in the Notice of
Appeal if: “(1) there is a connection between the specified and unspecified orders; (2) the
intention to appeal the unspecified order is apparent; and (3) the opposing party is not
prejudiced and has a full opportunity to brief the issues.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Here, there is a clear connection between the September 18 orders, dismissing
the action, in part, for Hammond’s failure to submit an amended complaint, and the
October 15 order ruling on the amended complaint that he submitted. Hammond’s
intention to appeal the October 15 order is clear from his informal brief. See Satterfield
v. Johnson, 434 F.3d 185, 191 (3d Cir. 2006) (determining that an order could be
reviewed where the intention to appeal was apparent in the opening brief). And the
Appellees are not prejudiced, because they had notice of Hammond’s intent to appeal the
order and had the opportunity to address the order in their briefs. See id.
As for the District Court’s December 6, 2018 order denying Hammond’s October
2018 motion for reconsideration, we lack jurisdiction, as Hammond did not file a timely
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notice of appeal or amended appeal following that order. See Fed. R. App.
4(a)(4)(B)(ii).1
We also have jurisdiction to consider the District Court’s March 20, 2019 order
denying Hammond’s motion to reopen the time to appeal, and the District Court’s April
5, 2019 order denying his motion for reconsideration of the March 20 order, as Hammond
timely filed an appeal on April 22, 2019. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), 4(a)(4).
III.
March and April 2019 orders
As noted, we have jurisdiction to consider the District Court’s March and April
2019 orders denying Hammond’s motion to reopen the time to appeal and his motion for
reconsideration. However, because those motions were directed only at establishing our
jurisdiction to consider the District Court’s earlier orders dismissing Hammond’s FAC
and SAC, and because we have jurisdiction to consider those orders through Hammond’s
timely November 5, 2018 notice of appeal, we need not consider whether the District
1
We considered whether Hammond’s jurisdictional response, filed in this Court and
dated December 10, 2018, should be construed as an amended notice of appeal of the
December 6 order. But because we are vacating the District Court’s September and
October 2018 orders (see below), we need not consider whether we might have
jurisdiction to review the December 6 order, as the District Court’s disposition of
Hammond’s motion for reconsideration is essentially moot. See Hamilton v. Bromley,
862 F.3d 329, 334 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that mootness is a jurisdictional question);
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 578, 584 (1999) (noting that “there is no
unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy” or mandatory “sequencing of jurisdictional issues”).
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Court abused its discretion in denying those motions. Cf. United States v. Rinaldi, 447
F.3d 192, 195 (3d Cir. 2006) (suggesting that district court orders denying motions to
reopen the time to appeal are reviewed for abuse of discretion).
The September and October 2018 orders
The District Court’s September 18, 2018 orders do not address the merits of
Hammond’s FAC and only can be construed as dismissing the FAC as a sanction. But
when a court dismisses a case as a sanction, it must first do an analysis of the six factors
set out in Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).2
See Knoll v. City of Allentown, 707 F.3d 406, 409 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that although
court has inherent authority to dismiss a case as a sanction for failure to follow
procedural rules or court orders, a court must consider Poulis factors before dismissing
such a case with prejudice). The orders here do not have any analysis or reasoning, and
they are not accompanied by an opinion.3
As to the October order denying the motion to file the SAC, we have determined
that the District Court abused its discretion. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec.
2
Those factors are: “(1) the extent of the party 's personal responsibility; (2) the
prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to
discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the
attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than
dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness
of the claim or defense.” Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868.
3
The District Court could have dismissed any or all counts for failure to state a claim,
without engaging in a Poulis analysis. Cf. Anchorage Assocs. v. V.I. Bd. of Tax Review,
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Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining standard of review). Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice
so requires.” “Among the grounds that could justify a denial of leave to amend are undue
delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, prejudice and futility.” In re Burlington Coat Factory
Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1434. The District Court, in two sentences, noted that the SAC
did not cure the deficiencies of the original complaint and the FAC, but the District Court
had never given any indication that the FAC was deficient in any manner. Indeed, the
District Court had allowed the matter to proceed to discovery and a settlement
conference. See also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (explaining that
although “the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the
District Court, . . . outright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason
appearing for the denial is not an exercise of that discretion; it is merely an abuse of that
discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules”).
For these reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s September 18, 2018 orders
and its October 15, 2018 order and will remand for further proceedings.
922 F.2d 168, 178 (3d Cir. 1990) (“We have never held . . . that consideration of Poulis
type factors is required before a court enters a summary judgment on an uncontested Rule
56 motion”). But the Court here did not indicate that it considered whether each count
stated a claim.
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