Robyn Jill Farrington v. ( 2020 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 19-1650
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In re: ROBYN JILL FARRINGTON, aka Robyn Jill Fleisher,
Debtor
ROBYN JILL FARRINGTON,
Appellant
v.
U.S. BANK TRUST N.A., as trustee for LSF9 Master Participation Trust;
LSF9 MASTER PARTICIPATION TRUST;
CALIBER HOME LOANS, INC.; JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 18-cv-08573)
District Judge: Honorable Jose L. Linares
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 3, 2020
Before: JORDAN, BIBAS and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 14, 2020)
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OPINION*
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*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM
Robyn Jill Farrington appeals the District Court’s order affirming the Bankruptcy
Court’s order granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss her adversary complaint. For the
reasons below, we will affirm the District Court’s order. The procedural history of this
case and the details of Farrington’s claims are well known to the parties, set forth in the
District Court’s opinion, and need not be discussed at length. Briefly, in May 2017, the
Superior Court of New Jersey entered a foreclosure judgment against Farrington. It
ordered that the mortgaged property be sold and Appellee U.S. Bank paid from the
proceeds, while Farrington was foreclosed from all equity in the property.
In August 2017, Farrington filed a counseled Chapter 13 petition in the
Bankruptcy Court. In an adversary complaint, she sought invalidation of U.S. Bank’s
liens against the property and a declaration that the property was part of the bankruptcy
estate. She repeated an argument rejected by the Superior Court: that the mortgage had
been sold before it was assigned to U.S. Bank and U.S. Bank lacked standing to collect.
Appellees filed a motion to dismiss which the Bankruptcy Court granted. The
Bankruptcy Court dismissed the complaint pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1 It
also concluded that res judicata and Farrington’s lack of standing to challenge the
assignment of the mortgage provided bases for the dismissal. It also determined that
1
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives a federal court of jurisdiction to review, directly
or indirectly, a state court adjudication. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
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Farrington could not object to Appellees’ proof of claim. Farrington, still represented by
counsel, appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s order to the District Court.
The District Court agreed that Farrington’s adversary complaint was barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In the alternative, the District Court concluded that her claims
were barred by res judicata. Farrington filed a pro se notice of appeal, and we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1).
We need not address whether Farrington’s claims are barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, because we agree with the District Court that her claims are barred by
res judicata. See Hoffman v. Nordic Nats., Inc., 837 F.3d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 2016) (court
may bypass jurisdictional issue to dismiss on non-merits ground of res judicata).
Res Judicata
This doctrine bars claims that have been or could have been litigated in a prior
case between the same parties and are based on the same set of facts. See Blunt v. Lower
Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 276-77 (3d Cir. 2014). Farrington first challenges this
conclusion by arguing that res judicata does not apply to the dischargeability of debts.
However, in dismissing the adversary complaint, the Bankruptcy Court did not determine
the dischargeability of the debt.
Farrington then challenges the application of res judicata to her adversary
complaint. Under both New Jersey and federal law, three criteria are needed for res
judicata to apply to an action: (1) a prior action with a final judgment on the merits; (2)
the same parties involved in each action; and (3) the same cause of action. In re
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Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008). Clearly, the same parties were involved in
each action.
Farrington argues that the state court’s judgment was not on the merits and was
not fairly litigated. She suggests that the foreclosure judgment was entered by state court
clerk’s office staff without any judge reviewing the evidence. She admits to contesting
the state court judgment but asserts that the state court refused to entertain her arguments.
However, the record does not support this contention.
Appellee U.S. Bank filed the foreclosure complaint in state court in January 2016.
After Farrington failed to respond, Appellee moved for a default judgment and then for
an entry of final judgment. In September 2016, Farrington filed a pro se motion in the
state court foreclosure proceedings opposing Appellee’s motion for final judgment and
seeking to have the default judgment vacated. She argued that she was never served a
complete copy of the complaint, was misled when she took out the original mortgage, and
was not served with a notice of intent to foreclose. She further contended that the
foreclosure was filed beyond the statute of limitations, the original note was lost, and that
there was an issue of who owned the loan.
Appellee filed a response. In April 2017, the state court held oral argument, which
it adjourned until May 2017 to allow Farrington to submit additional proof. Farrington
then filed a certification in opposition to the motion for final judgment, challenging
Appellee’s ownership of the mortgage. Appellee responded to her arguments.
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After another hearing on May 12, 2017, the Superior Court issued an order
denying Farrington’s objections, adjusting the amount due, and returning the matter to the
Foreclosure Unit for entry of final judgment. The court stated that the matter was before
it on an opposed motion for final judgment, that it had reviewed the parties’ papers, and
was entering the order for the reasons stated on the record.2 Farrington then filed a
motion for reconsideration and supplement which U.S. Bank opposed. After a hearing in
June 2017, the Superior Court denied the motion “having considered the submissions of
the parties and arguments.”
Farrington has not shown that the state court judgment was not on the merits or
that she did not have a fair opportunity to litigate those merits. She does not point to any
statement by the state court that it refused to consider her arguments. In a certification in
support of her motion for reconsideration, Farrington admitted that the state court asked
her questions at the hearing about the arguments she was raising. Suppl. App. at 369. As
noted above, the state court adjourned oral argument to give her time to submit additional
documentation. There would have been no reason for the court to do so if it were simply
refusing to consider her arguments. The state court’s rejection of her arguments does not
mean that the arguments were not fairly considered or that the judgment was not on the
merits.
2
The record does not contain a transcript of the state court hearings so we do not know
what reasons were stated on the record by the Superior Court.
5
Without much explanation, Farrington contends that the adversary complaint
involves a different cause of action than the state court proceeding. However, the state
court action determined that U.S. Bank had ownership of the mortgage and the right to
foreclose and collect. In her adversary complaint, Farrington sought a determination that
Appellees did not own the mortgage and lacked standing to enforce the debt.
We agree with the District Court that Farrington’s action was barred by res
judicata.
Proof of claim
Farrington argues that the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in dismissing
her objections to Appellee LSF9 Trust’s proof of claim. While she contends that there
are “critical deficiencies” in the proof of claim, she does not describe these deficiencies
or her objections to the proof of claim in her brief.
Conclusion
The District Court did not err in affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment.
Accordingly, for the above reasons as well as those set forth by the District Court, we
will affirm the District Court’s order.
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