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 2020-01

Dale Sattar v. Cameron Parker ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                  NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 19-2576
________________
DALE SATTAR,
Appellant
v.
DET. CAMERON PARKER; OFC. SHAWN CLIFFORD;
OFC. CORWIN WASSON; OFC. BRENDAN O’CONNOR;
JOHN DOE OFFICERS 1–10
________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-18-cv-05650)
District Judge: Hon. Gerald J. Pappert
________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on January 17, 2020
Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion filed: January 21, 2020)
________________
OPINION*
________________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.
Dale Sattar appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his various
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    claims. We will affirm.
Discussion1
A. False Arrest, False Imprisonment, and Malicious Prosecution Claims
Sattar contends the District Court erred in dismissing his complaint for failure to
adequately plead his false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims.
Specifically, the District Court determined Sattar failed to allege facts showing that the
officers who arrested him lacked probable cause. See Zimmerman v. Corbett,
    873 F.3d 414
    , 418 (3d Cir. 2017) (stating that lack of probable cause is an element of malicious
prosecution claims); Sands v. McCormick,
    502 F.3d 263
    , 270 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming
dismissal of false arrest and false imprisonment claims because arresting officer had
probable cause). “Probable cause exists if there is a fair probability that the person
committed the crime at issue.” Wilson v. Russo,
    212 F.3d 781
    , 789 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
We see no error in the District Court’s determination. Sattar alleges that he was
holding his rifle when he talked to someone who was heading to visit Sattar’s neighbor;
that the neighbor’s wife then “called the police and said that [Sattar] made threats against
[the neighbor and the visitor],” App. 3 ¶ 22; that Sattar picked up his gun after the police
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The District Court had jurisdiction under
    28 U.S.C. § 1331
    . We have jurisdiction
under
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review the District Court’s order granting dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. SEC v. Gentile,
    939 F.3d 549
    , 552 n.1 (3d Cir. 2019).
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arrived; and that the police officers “were pointing their guns at [Sattar] and yelling at him
to drop his rifle,” App. 3 ¶ 28. These allegations taken together would lead a reasonable
officer to believe there was “a fair probability” Sattar was violating the law, so in the face
of this probable cause showing, a lack of probable cause was not pleaded.
B. Equal Protection Claim
Sattar’s equal protection claim—based on a “class of one” theory—fares no better.
That claim was dismissed by the District Court because Sattar failed to allege that “the
defendant[s] treated him differently from others similarly situated,” Hill v. Borough of
Kutztown,
    455 F.3d 225
    , 239 (3d Cir. 2006). While Sattar alleged that his neighbor had
committed various crimes without being arrested and that therefore the two were
similarly situated, he did not allege that the police had ever found Sattar’s neighbor with
a rifle outside his home after receiving a call that the neighbor threatened someone.
Sattar and the neighbor were therefore not “alike in all relevant aspects,” Startzell v. City
of Philadelphia,
    533 F.3d 183
    , 203 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted), and the District Court thus properly dismissed this claim as well.
C. Unlawful Seizure Claim
Finally, Sattar asks us to remand his claim of unlawful seizure to the District Court
because the District Court’s order and memorandum dismissed Sattar’s complaint in its
entirety but did not discuss his seizure claim. But defendants explicitly moved before the
District Court to dismiss Sattar’s entire complaint, including the seizure claim, and Sattar
did not contest that dismissal in his responsive briefing. Thus, Sattar has waived this claim
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and, in the absence of any “compelling reasons” to address it, Srein v. Frankford Tr. Co.,
    323 F.3d 214
    , 224 n.8 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted), we decline to do so.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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