United States v. Carlos Maldonado ( 2021 )


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  •                                                                NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ______________
    No. 20-1300
    ______________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    CARLOS MALDONADO
    a/k/a BORI,
    Appellant
    ______________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Crim. No. 1-17-cr-00170-003)
    Honorable Christopher C. Conner, United States District Judge
    ______________
    Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    October 19, 2020
    BEFORE: GREENAWAY, JR., COWEN, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
    (Filed: January 8, 2021)
    ______________
    OPINION
    ______________
    COWEN, Circuit Judge.
    Carlos Maldonado appeals from the judgment of conviction entered by the United
    
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
    does not constitute binding precedent.
    States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. His defense counsel has
    filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Local Appellate Rule 109.2 and Anders v.
    California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967). We grant the motion to withdraw and will affirm the
    judgment.
    I.
    Pursuant to a plea agreement, Maldonado pled guilty to a felony information
    charging him with conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute one
    kilogram or more of heroin and five kilograms or more of cocaine hydrochloride in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
     and conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1956
    (h). The District Court sentenced him to 151 months in prison.
    II.
    Counsel for Maldonado has filed a motion to withdraw as well as a brief under
    Anders explaining that there are no nonfrivolous issues to appeal.1 An Anders brief and
    motion trigger a two-step inquiry. First, we consider whether defense counsel has
    established that he or she “has thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable
    issues” and “explain[ed] why the issues are frivolous.” United States v. Youla, 
    241 F.3d 296
    , 300 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Marvin, 
    211 F.3d 778
    , 780 (3d Cir.
    2000)). If we are satisfied with the attorney’s brief, we then undertake an independent
    1
    The District Court clearly had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3231
    . See also, e.g., 
    18 U.S.C. § 3237
    (a) (stating that offense may be prosecuted where it
    was begun, continued, or completed). We possess appellate jurisdiction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
     and 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . This Court exercises plenary review to determine whether
    there are any nonfrivolous issues. See, e.g., Simon v. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands, 
    679 F.3d 109
    , 114 (3d Cir. 2012).
    2
    review of the record to determine whether there are any nonfrivolous issues. 
    Id.
     A copy
    of the defense counsel’s brief was furnished to Maldonado, and he was given an
    opportunity to file a pro se brief. No such pro se brief was filed.
    We conclude that defense counsel has satisfied his Anders obligations and agree
    that this proceeding does not implicate any nonfrivolous issues. He thoroughly explains
    how the District Court complied with the guilty plea framework set forth in Federal Rule
    of Criminal Procedure 11, as well as the procedural and substantive requirements for
    sentencing.
    Maldonado’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. See, e.g., United States v.
    Lessner, 
    498 F.3d 185
    , 192-93 (3d Cir. 2007). The District Court placed Maldonado
    under oath (cautioning him he could be prosecuted for perjury if he provided false
    answers) and questioned him to ensure that he was competent to proceed with a guilty
    plea. The District Court further confirmed that Maldonado’s plea was voluntary, he was
    satisfied with counsel’s representation, and he understood the charges against him. It
    also made sure that the defendant understood his constitutional rights (including the
    rights he was giving up by entering the guilty plea) as well as the terms of the plea
    agreement. After the government had set forth the facts it would have presented at trial
    (to which Maldonado agreed subject to a clarification based on the plea agreement), the
    District Court accepted the guilty plea.
    3
    The sentence imposed did not exceed the maximum possible sentence for either of
    the offenses charged. The District Court properly calculated the Guidelines range,2
    appropriately ruled on the departure motion (granting a greater downward departure than
    the one requested by the government itself), and imposed a reasonable sentence (at the
    bottom of the Guidelines range) based on a meaningful consideration of the parties’
    arguments as well as the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors. See, e.g., United States v. Tomko,
    
    562 F.3d 558
    , 567-68 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc); United States v. Torres, 
    251 F.3d 138
    ,
    145-52 (3d Cir. 2001).
    III.
    We grant the motion to withdraw filed by Maldonado’s counsel and will affirm the
    judgment of conviction.
    2
    According to defense counsel, Maldonado has advised that he does not believe
    that he qualified as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines. However, the
    predicates on which the enhancement was based satisfy the applicable requirements. See
    U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.2(e), 4B1.1(a).
    4