Wesley Massey v. Todd Pfeifer ( 2020 )

BLD-104 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 19-2784
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WESLEY A. MASSEY,
Appellant
v.
TODD PFEIFER; KEVIN FORCIER; CRAIG HOWE;
ANDREW NATALE; RITA MARWOOD
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-17-cv-00173)
District Judge: Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
January 30, 2020
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, Jr., and BIBAS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 26, 2020)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Wesley Massey appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania, which dismissed his civil rights complaint. Because no
substantial question is raised by the appeal, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s
judgment.
Massey filed his complaint as a pretrial detainee against five defendants, claiming
violations of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution. He alleged “malicious abuse of process,” “malicious use
of process,” “willful misconduct,” “false imprisonment,” and “false arrest” relating to the
state prosecution for his misuse of an employer-issued credit card. He requested millions
of dollars in damages. He separately filed a motion for an injunction or a temporary
restraining order barring his prosecution and a preliminary monetary award of $300,000
to compensate for lost wages and lost business.
The District Court, screening the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), dismissed
the claims against two Crawford County Assistant District Attorneys and the Magistrate
District Judge who was presiding over Massey’s criminal case, determining that they
were immune from suit. The District Court also separately denied Massey’s motion for
preliminary injunctive relief. At that time, the District Court sua sponte stayed and
administratively closed the action pending the resolution of Massey’s criminal
proceedings. The District Court ruled that Massey could move to reopen the action “if
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and when [his] criminal charges are dismissed or resolved in his favor,” Memorandum
Order of Oct. 21, 2017, Dkt. #22, at 3.
About a year later, the Defendants moved to reopen the proceedings, explaining
that Massey’s criminal proceedings had concluded—Massey had pleaded no contest to a
charge of Access Device Fraud under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4106(a)(1)(iv) —and that
they wished to file a motion to dismiss his complaint. After the District Court granted the
motion to reopen, the Defendants moved to dismiss. The assigned Magistrate Judge
issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending that the claims raised in the
complaint be dismissed with prejudice, but that Massey be allowed an opportunity to
amend to clarify an “ambiguously-asserted Fourteenth Amendment claim of selective
prosecution.” Report and Recommendation, Dkt. #59, at 21. Massey objected to the
dismissal of his complaint and also clarified that he did not desire to pursue a selective
prosecution claim. The District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation, except
for the recommendation that Massey be allowed to amend his complaint. The District
Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, and Massey timely appealed.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of a dismissal for
failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), like that of a dismissal
on a party’s motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), is de novo. See
generally Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). “To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
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claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
We agree with the District Court that Massey’s complaint fails to state a plausible
constitutional claim. First, we agree with the District Court’s decision to dismiss the
Assistant District Attorneys and Magistrate District Judge as defendants, because none of
the allegations of Massey’s complaint revealed that they took any actions unrelated to
initiating or conducting judicial proceedings. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424
(1976); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978).
Next, the District Court properly dismissed Massey’s unspecified claims under the
Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as his complaint failed to set forth
any plausible claim for relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
As for his specific Fourth Amendment claims, Massey’s claim for malicious
prosecution is precluded by the “favorable termination” rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477, 484 (1994) (“One element that must be alleged and proved in a malicious
prosecution action is termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the
accused.). Massey’s nolo contendere plea under Pennsylvania law is treated the same as
a conviction for purposes of Heck, see Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 378 (3d Cir.
2016), and his conviction has not been overturned. See also Junod v. Bader, 458 A.2d
251, 253 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (“A resolution clearly adverse to the accused . . . such as a
conviction or guilty plea, denies his status of being wrongly accused and so diminishes
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the likelihood of his proving lack of probable cause or malice that our courts will
promptly dismiss the malicious prosecution action.”).
We also agree that Massey’s false arrest claim is barred. To establish a false arrest
claim, the claimant must show that the arrest was made without probable cause. See
generally District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 584-86 (2018). But “the
presumption of probable cause arising from a conviction can be rebutted only by showing
that the conviction had been obtained by some type of fraud,” see Heck, 512 U.S. at 486
n.4 (citing Crescent City Live Stock Co. v. Butchers’ Union Slaughter–House Co., 120
U.S. 141, 151 (1887)), and Massey’s complaint contains no allegations that suggest his
arrest was fraudulent. See also Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 584 n.2 (“Because probable cause is
an objective standard, an arrest is lawful if the officer had probable cause to arrest for any
offense, not just the offense cited at the time of arrest or booking.”). Similarly, Massey
failed to plead any plausible claim for malicious abuse of process, as he did not allege
that there was a “perversion” of the criminal prosecution process to accomplish a purpose
other than that for which the criminal process was intended. See Jennings v. Shuman,
567 F.2d 1213, 1218 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1977).
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment, although
we will modify the order of dismissal as to the malicious prosecution claim to be without
prejudice, so that if Massey ever succeeds in overturning his conviction, he may refile his
claim. See Curry, 835 F.3d at 379.
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