Flora Leonard v. Golden Touch Transportation ( 2020 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 19-1075
_____________
FLORA LEONARD; KAREN VELAZQUEZ
v.
GOLDEN TOUCH TRANSPORTATION OF NEW YORK INC, a New York
Corporation; UNITED AIR LINES INCORPORATED, a Delaware Corporation;
THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK & NEW JERSEY, a joint venture;
GATEWAY SECURITY INC.
GOLDEN TOUCH TRANSPORTATION OF NEW YORK, INCORPORATED;
UNITED AIRLINES, INCORPORATED; THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK
AND NEW JERSEY; Third Party Plaintiffs
v.
KAREN VELAZQUEZ, Third Party Defendant
Flora Leonard,
Appellant
______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 2-15-cv-02084)
District Judge: Hon. William H. Walls
______________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a):
March 27, 2020
______________
Before: JORDAN, RESTREPO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: April 23, 2020)
_____________
OPINION *
______________
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal involving a personal injury claim arising from a slip and fall
accident at Newark Liberty International Airport. The U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey entered summary judgment for the appellees. We will affirm.
I
The following account is based on undisputed facts unless otherwise noted. Flora
Leonard is 79 years old and walks with a cane for support. She and her daughter, Karen
Velazquez, were traveling together on United Airlines from Norfolk, Virginia, to the
United Kingdom. Velazquez testified that she was accompanying her mother on this trip
“as an assistant person.” Aa-325. Leonard confirmed that she deferred to her daughter
for any necessary accommodations “because [Velazquez] knew” Leonard’s mobility
limitations. Aa-290. At the departing gate, Velazquez requested that her mother be
“flagged” for special assistance, Aa-325, believing that this would mean that a wheelchair
or “some way to get her from point A to point B” would be provided upon landing, Aa-
326. United complied.
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
2
The initial leg of their flight involved a transfer at Newark Airport, which is leased
to and operated by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Upon arriving at
Newark, Velazquez and Leonard boarded an electric cart requested by Velazquez to
make their connecting flight. The cart was operated by either United or Gateway
Security. The cart driver dropped the two passengers off at the top of a ramp where
United staff directed or hurried them to board a shuttle operated by Golden Touch
Transportation. Neither Velazquez nor Leonard requested a wheelchair or any other
mobility assistance during their transfer at Newark.
Velazquez boarded the shuttle first and did not return to assist Leonard or ask
anyone to help Leonard step onto the shuttle. When Leonard tried to board, she slipped
and fell on the shuttle’s step, which may have been between four and fourteen inches
high. Leonard suffered a large cut on her leg and started bleeding profusely. Velazquez
did not witness her mother’s fall but tried to help her after the accident. When Velazquez
tried to apply a tourniquet to her mother’s leg, she became covered in her blood. Leonard
underwent surgery and hospitalization in New Jersey as a result of this injury, and once
back in Norfolk, she developed injury-related infections resulting in two more
hospitalizations. Velazquez did not suffer physical injuries or seek medical or
psychological treatment in connection with this accident.
Leonard and Velazquez sued United, Gateway Security, Golden Touch, and the
Port Authority, seeking compensation for Leonard’s personal injury and Velazquez’s
related emotional distress. Following discovery, the defendants moved for summary
3
judgment, which the District Court granted. Only Leonard appealed, and did so only
with respect to United, Gateway Security, and Golden Touch. 1
II
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment,
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party to determine whether
any issue of material fact precludes entering judgment as a matter of law. Mylan Inc. v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 723 F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2013). We may affirm summary
judgment on any grounds supported by the record. United States ex rel. Spay v. CVS
Caremark Corp., 875 F.3d 746, 753 (3d Cir. 2017).
III
To sustain a negligence action under New Jersey law, a plaintiff must demonstrate,
among others, that (i) the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, (ii) the defendant
breached that duty, and (iii) the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.
Townsend v. Pierre, 110 A.3d 52, 61 (N.J. 2015). Accepting that the appellees are all
common carriers, “the duty imposed [on them] requires not only that the transportation
vehicle be kept safe, but that a safe means of ingress and egress be maintained for the use
of the passengers.” Buchner v. Erie R. Co., 111 A.2d 257, 258 (N.J. 1955). That
includes eliminating dangerous conditions on the common carriers’ property that
passengers use to enter and exit the transit vehicle. Id. at 288.
1
The District Court exercised diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1294.
4
The District Court held that United did not owe a duty of care to Leonard, because
she was not on United’s property when she fell. It further held that, regardless of who
operated the electric cart, there was no authority for holding that a common carrier
breaches its duty of care by hurrying a disabled passenger. The court also found no
authority for the proposition that a higher step is itself a dangerous condition. Leonard
contests each of these conclusions and argues that there are material issues of fact that
preclude summary judgment. While we regret Leonard’s unfortunate accident, we see no
reason to disturb the District Court’s thoughtful decision.
Leonard’s principal argument on appeal is that the result of the District Court’s
analysis would have been different if it had properly applied the heightened duty of care
owed by common carriers to passengers with noticeable mobility limitations, consistent
with Carter v. Pub. Serv. Coordinated Transp., 136 A.2d 15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1957). There, a pregnant woman traveling alone tripped and fell when attempting to
board a bus that may have stopped several inches from the curb. It was disputed whether
the bus operator realized that the woman was pregnant and that she would have trouble
boarding the bus. Carter, 136 A.2d at 17. Given that the woman was “obviously
pregnant”—“‘large’ in her ninth month of pregnancy”—the court held that it was proper
to ask a jury whether the operator knew or should have known that he needed to bring the
bus closer to the curb to allow her to board safely. Id. at 21. The court stated: “Where
the defendant through its employee has notice of the physical infirmity of one who is
about to board its vehicle, it owes her a duty and is chargeable with a greater degree of
attention than where a person is under no physical disability.” Id.
5
Leonard asserts that the appellees were on notice of her mobility limitations,
because she was “flagged” as disabled, she required the assistance of an electric cart
intended for disabled passengers, and she is “an older . . . heavy set woman, with a cane.”
Appellant Br. 18. According to Leonard, the appellee’s failure to offer special assistance
affirmatively at every step of the way, such as by offering a wheelchair or other
assistance with stepping onto the shuttle, resulted in her fall and injury.
Assuming for the sake of argument that this is the level of care demanded from
each of the appellees, Leonard’s claim still fails because she cannot establish that any
alleged breach was the proximate cause of her fall and injury. “Proximate cause consists
of ‘any cause which in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient
intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which the result would
not have occurred.’” Townsend, 110 A.3d at 61 (quoting Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman,
678 A.2d 1060, 1071 (N.J. 1996)). If multiple acts or omissions could have caused an
event, there must be some evidence that an actor’s negligent conduct was a “substantial
factor” in causing the harm. Kulas v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 196 A.2d 769, 772
(N.J. 1964). An “actor’s negligent conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about
harm to another if it would have been sustained even if the actor had not been
negligent.’” Id. (citations omitted).
It is common ground between the parties that Leonard was relying on her daughter
to make any necessary accommodations for her mobility needs, a responsibility that
Velazquez willingly assumed. Velazquez and Leonard voluntarily rode the electric cart
that Velazquez requested, and neither of them specifically requested a wheelchair or any
6
other special assistance during their transfer at Newark. In fact, Velazquez testified that
her mother did not need assistance beyond what she was able to provide: “[S]he didn’t
need any help other than like me. . . . I was her companion for the flight. And that’s all
she needed besides her cane.” Aa325. Leonard has not offered any facts to contradict
that statement, i.e., a factual rebuttal that would allow a reasonable juror to find that
Velazquez or Leonard would have accepted additional assistance if offered. And there is
no indication that the appellees would have refused to assist her if asked. In those
circumstances, common carriers cannot be expected to override a passenger’s preferences
and insist on offering additional assistance at every turn or require that it be accepted by
an otherwise mobile passenger. A common carrier’s heightened duty of care cannot go
so far as to limit a passenger’s autonomy.
In short, Leonard’s intentional decision to request and accept certain assistance
while foregoing other options created the situation in which she found herself when she
slipped and fell. The appellee’s reasonable acquiescence in those choices cannot be
deemed a substantial factor in their consequences.
IV
For these reasons, we will affirm summary judgment for the appellees.
7
Leonard, et al. v. Golden Touch Transportation, et al., No. 19-1075
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment
I agree fully with the Majority’s recitation of the underlying facts in this case,
its framing of the standard of review and issues raised on appeal, and, most significantly,
its decision to affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims. I write
separately, however, because, unlike the Majority, I do not see this case as turning on the
question of proximate cause. Instead, in my view, it turns on whether any of the
defendants breached a duty of care to the plaintiffs. Even assuming that, as the plaintiffs
contend, the defendants owed a heightened duty of care to the elderly plaintiff, Ms.
Leonard, the plaintiffs nevertheless failed to carry their burden of presenting evidence
sufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any defendant breached
its duty.
For example, the plaintiffs cite no evidence that the entrance step on the bus –
the step on which Leonard fell and injured herself – was broken, slippery, obstructed, or
otherwise improperly maintained. While the plaintiffs speculate that the step may have
been higher than it ought to have been, the record is devoid of evidence, expert or
otherwise, that the height of the step was unsafe for someone in Leonard’s condition,
even if it were as high as the plaintiffs claimed it to be.
The plaintiffs similarly fail to cite evidence supporting a reasonable inference
that the defendants failed to provide Leonard with some additional assistance she was
entitled to. Although plaintiff Velazquez had Leonard “flagged” as needing extra help,
neither plaintiff requested a wheelchair for Leonard. Leonard left the arrangements to
1
Velazquez, and Velazquez did not believe that Leonard needed a wheelchair. According
to Velazquez, she “probably” explained to United that Leonard needed assistance because
“the walk[] in the airport is such a long walk[.]” Aa 336. But that concern was addressed
by the provision of an electronic cart to transport the plaintiffs from their arrival gate at
the Newark airport to the shuttle bus gate. The plaintiffs never expressed any concern
about Leonard’s ability to traverse the ramp to the shuttle bus or to board the bus, even
after specifically being told that is what they needed to do. As aptly stated by the
Majority, albeit in the proximate cause context, “common carriers cannot be expected to
override a passenger’s preferences and insist on offering additional assistance at every
turn or require that it be accepted by an otherwise mobile passenger.” Majority Op. at 7.
In short, I believe we are dealing with a question of whether any further duty to
the plaintiffs was owed, and I would say it was not. I would hold that the defendants
could not have breached a duty to the plaintiffs by failing to override the plaintiffs’
preference to continue their journey without seeking additional help, nor by failing to
offer help that there is no evidence was needed or would have been accepted. Because
the plaintiffs have not adduced evidence sufficient to raise a genuine dispute as to
whether the defendants breached a duty of care, I would affirm the District Court’s
dismissal on that basis and would not reach the issue of proximate cause.
2