Guy Patterson v. Commissioner Social Security ( 2021 )


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  •                                                                    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ______________
    No. 20-2102
    ______________
    GUY C. PATTERSON,
    Appellant
    v.
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
    ______________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-18-cv-00193)
    District Court Judge: Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose
    ______________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    January 28, 2021
    ______________
    Before: MATEY and JORDAN, Circuit Judges, BOLTON *, Senior District Judge.
    (Filed: February 5, 2021)
    ______________
    OPINION **
    ______________
    *
    The Honorable Susan Bolton, Senior United States District Judge for the District
    of Arizona, sitting by designation.
    **
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
    does not constitute binding precedent.
    BOLTON, Senior District Judge.
    We consider the claims of Guy C. Patterson, a 55-year-old white male, against the
    Social Security Administration (“Agency”) alleging that, by failing to select him for three
    job openings, the Agency: (1) discriminated against him on the basis of his sex, race, and
    age, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the federal-sector
    provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”); and (2) took
    retaliatory action against him in violation of Title VII and the ADEA. Patterson filed his
    lawsuit in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The District Court
    granted the Agency’s motion for summary judgment and denied Patterson’s cross-motion
    for summary judgment on all claims. It also denied Patterson’s subsequent motion to
    alter or amend this judgment. Patterson timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant
    to 
    29 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    I.     DISCUSSION
    Patterson’s claims fail as a matter of law. “We exercise plenary review over a
    district court’s [order entered on motions for] summary judgment, and we apply the same
    standard as the district court.” Bletz v. Corrie, 
    974 F.3d 306
    , 308 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation
    omitted). “Summary judgment is appropriate where, construing all evidence in the light
    most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
    and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 
    Id.
     (citations and internal
    quotation marks omitted). Applying those standards, we conclude that the record
    supports the District Court’s judgment that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law
    to prove any of Patterson’s claims. Patterson argues that a recent Supreme Court case,
    2
    Babb v. Wilkie, 
    140 S. Ct. 1168
    , 1177 (2020), changes this result, but fails to offer
    evidence that meets even Babb’s lower causation standard. Babb, 140 S. Ct. at 1177-78
    (but-for causation not required to establish liability for violation of ADEA’s federal-
    sector provision). 1
    Patterson cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of Title
    VII or the ADEA because he has insufficient evidence of discriminatory intent. See
    McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
    411 U.S. 792
    , 802 (1973) (burden-shifting
    framework requires plaintiff to establish prima facie case); Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
    
    352 F.3d 789
    , 797 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that a prima facie case of employment
    discrimination “requires a showing that: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a protected class; (2)
    he/she was qualified for the position; (3) he/she was subject to an adverse employment
    action despite being qualified; and (4) under circumstances that raise an inference of
    discriminatory action, the employer continued to seek out individuals with qualifications
    similar to the plaintiff's to fill the position”). Even if he could make such a showing, the
    Agency has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not selecting Patterson
    for each position, including lower interview scores. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 
    411 U.S. at 802
     (burden-shifting framework requires employer to articulate legitimate,
    nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action). Patterson’s evidence is
    1
    Patterson also raises the following issues: The District Court erred in failing to
    consider the applicability of Ricci v. DeStefano, 
    557 U.S. 557
     (2009) to his claims, and
    the Agency failed to comply with an Office of Personnel Management regulation, which
    Patterson argues is material to his employment discrimination claims. We find none of
    these arguments have merit.
    3
    insufficient to show that any of these reasons were pretextual. See id. at 804 (burden-
    shifting framework permits plaintiff opportunity to show pretext).
    Patterson also fails to produce evidence sufficient to establish a causal connection
    between his non-selection and retaliatory animus. See Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 
    461 F.3d 331
    , 340–41 (3d Cir. 2006) (“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation . . . a
    plaintiff must tender evidence that: (1) [he] engaged in protected activity . . . ; (2) “the
    employer took an adverse employment action against [him]; and (3) there was a causal
    connection between [his] participation in the protected activity and the adverse
    employment action.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
    The District Court correctly granted summary judgment on all claims.
    II.    CONCLUSION
    Because Patterson’s evidence cannot prove his claims, we will affirm.
    4