Myron Moton v. John Wetzel ( 2020 )

DLD-120 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 19-2773
___________
MYRON MOTON,
Appellant
v.
JOHN WETZEL; STEVEN GLUNT; KATHLENE KANE; SUPERINTENDANT
HARRY; DEPUTY MEINTEL; DEPUTY ZWILRZYNA; UNIT MANAGER DISBY;
L.T. LEEDOM; TRACY WILLIAMS; L.T. BOOHER; L.T. DAVY; OFFICER
HUBER; OFFICER GARDER; OFFICER MCBETH; JOHN/JANE DOES FBI
AGENTS; JOHN/JANE DOE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AGENTS; SGT. SWIFT;
JOHN DOE CELL EXTRACTION TEAM UNIT; LIEUTENANT SUPERVISED
CELL EXTRACTION TEAM UNIT; JOHN DOE MAIL CARRIERS; JOHN/JANE
DOE MAIL CARRIERS; JOHN/JANE DOE MAIL SUPERVISER; DEB ALVORE;
OFFICER JOHNSON; CHIEF GRIEVANCE COORDINATORS; ACTING
GRIEVANCE COORDINATORS; DORINE VARNER; KERI MOORE; MICHAEL
BEAL; SUPERINTENDANT WINGARD; DEPUTY HAINSWORTH; DEPUTY
MAZUKIEWIEZ; MAJOR WADSWORTH; MAJOR PRICE; DARR; JOSEPH
DUPONT; JOSEPH ALLEN; OFFICER SANNER; OFFICER WYATT; OFFICER
STANTON; SGT. LEDAMUK; LT. CINKO; LT. SHAFFER; OFFICER
MCDANNELL; HEIDI SROKA; OFFICER KLINE; OFFICER BLY; CAPTAIN
BAKOS; LT. SMITH; JOHN DOE CELL EXTRACTION UNITED TEAM;
JOHN DOE LIEUTENANT SUPERIVSED CELL EXTRACTION UNIT TEAM;
OFFICER TRESILER; OFFICER HUGO; SGT. WASHBURN; MUTCHER;
RILKESKY; UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE; JOHN DOE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE AGENT; JOHN/JANE DOE DEPARTMENT OF FBI AGENT
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-19-cv-00008)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
February 20, 2020
Before: RESTREPO, PORTER and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 4, 2020)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Myron Moton, a Pennsylvania state prisoner proceeding in forma
pauperis, appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his second amended complaint
after screening it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For the reasons discussed
below, we will summarily affirm.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we will recite only the facts necessary
for our discussion. In June 2018, Moton filed a civil rights complaint in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The complaint, which was over
100 pages long, raised a vast array of claims against dozens of state and federal officials.
The District Court dismissed the complaint, without prejudice, for failure to comply with
Rule 8 and Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally Garrett v.
Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining the requirement, under Rule
8, that a complaint provide a short and plain statement of the claims). The District Court
explained that Moton should plead specific facts for each of his claims against each
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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defendant. Moton then filed a similar, nearly 100-page amended complaint, which the
District Court again dismissed without prejudice.
Moton then filed his second amended complaint, which the U.S. District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, where many of Moton’s claims arose. Moton alleged that
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections personnel, local prosecutors, judges, the FBI,
and the Department of Justice are engaged in a vast criminal conspiracy involving
bribery, obstruction of justice, retaliation, and harassment. Among other things, Moton
alleged that corrections officers are trying to have him killed and that he has been
repeatedly placed in disciplinary confinement. Moton also alleged that the Philadelphia
District Attorney’s Office has failed to investigate evidence of his innocence.
In June 2019, the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation and dismissed the complaint, pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and with
prejudice, for failure to state a claim. This appeal, which is timely, see Fed. R. App. P.
4(c)(1); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988), ensued.
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District
Court’s dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is plenary. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). Where a complaint has not alleged sufficient facts to state a
claim for relief that is “plausible on its face[,]” dismissal is appropriate. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“Factual allegations must be enough to
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raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”). We may summarily affirm “on any
basis supported by the record” if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. See
Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Third Circuit LAR
27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
III.
The District Court properly dismissed Moton’s complaint for failure to state a
claim. Moton brought a vast array of claims against dozens of defendants based on vague
allegations of a conspiracy. Even after receiving multiple opportunities to replead and
instructions from the District Court about the type of information to provide, Moton
failed to plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
[any] defendant is liable for the misconduct,” and he failed to allege “more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.1
Moreover, we note that, to the extent that Moton’s claims were based on alleged
violations of criminal statutes, those statutes do not confer a private right of action. See
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 279–86 (2002); see also Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,
410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the
prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”). To the extent that he attempted to raise a
1
We note that Moton’s appellate filings — and his filings in the District Court after the
Magistrate Judge issued his Report and Recommendation — have continued to raise new
claims, including Eighth Amendment claims, stemming from allegations of recent
misconduct by the defendants. Moton may wish to pursue those claims through separate
litigation and after proper administrative exhaustion, but we will not consider them in this
appeal. See In re Reliant Energy Channelview LP, 594 F.3d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 2010) (the
Court will “not consider new claims for the first time on appeal”) (citation omitted).
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retaliation claim, Moton failed to plausibly allege that any constitutionally protected
conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in any of the defendants’ alleged
retaliation. Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001). To the extent that
Moton’s allegations regarding his placement in disciplinary confinement raise a due
process claim, he failed to allege that he was deprived of a protected liberty interest. See
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); cf. Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654
(3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that disciplinary confinement for seven months “does not, on
its own, violate a protected liberty interest as defined in Sandin”). And, to the extent that
Moton’s claims against the Philadelphia District Attorney are not barred by favorable
termination requirement of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994), Moton
failed to plead a plausible due process violation, cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 523
(2011). Thus, the District Court properly dismissed the second amended complaint with
prejudice.2
Although Moton has raised various challenges to the District Court proceedings,
we conclude that they are meritless. In particular, even assuming that there was any error
regarding the consideration of Moton’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
2
Because Moton was granted leave to amend his complaint on multiple occasions and
was provided with guidance as to the information that an amended complaint should
contain, the District Court properly dismissed the second amended complaint with
prejudice. See generally Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir.
2002). We note that, with respect to any claims that would be barred by Heck’s favorable
termination requirement, the District Court properly indicated that its dismissal was
without prejudice to Moton’s seeking habeas relief. See Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373,
379 (3d Cir. 2016).
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Recommendation, such error was harmless because the District Court properly dismissed
the complaint for failure to state a claim. See Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d
Cir. 2011). The District Judges and the Magistrate Judge who presided in this case did
not err in declining to recuse themselves, as Moton has not shown that “a reasonable
person, with knowledge of all the facts, would conclude that the judge’s impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.” In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 301 (3d Cir.
2004) (quotation marks and citations omitted). We discern no abuse of discretion in the
decision to transfer the second amended complaint to the Western District. See generally
Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 880 (3d Cir. 1995). And the District Court
properly denied Moton’s requests for appointment of counsel after weighing the
appropriate considerations. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 158 (3d Cir. 1993).
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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