Amro Elansari v. Pamela Ruest ( 2020 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 19-3021
___________
AMRO A. ELANSARI
Appellant
v.
PAMELA RUEST; UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2:19-cv-03609)
District Judge: Honorable Petrese B. Tucker
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on March 9, 2020
Before: JORDAN, BIBAS, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 10, 2020)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
Amro Elansari appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, which dismissed his complaint because the defendants were im-
mune from suit. We will affirm the District Court’s judgment.1
In his complaint, Elansari alleged that his constitutional rights were violated when the
U.S. Marine Corps did not allow him to enlist because he was on probation. Elansari stated
that he then applied for early termination of his probation in Pennsylvania’s Centre County
Court of Common Pleas for “good behavior.” D.C. Dkt. No. 2, ¶ 3. Elansari alleged that
Judge Pamela Ruest committed “fraud” when she denied his request. See id. ¶ 15.
The District Court properly dismissed Elansari’s claims against the Marine Corps, as
federal agencies are shielded by sovereign immunity absent an explicit waiver. See FDIC
v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). And the District Court’s dismissal of Elansari’s claims
against Judge Ruest on the basis of judicial immunity was also proper, as Elansari’s claims
challenged Judge Ruest’s decision to deny his application for early termination of proba-
tion; that decision was within her jurisdiction. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–
57 (1978) (“A judge . . . will be subject to liability only when [s]he has acted in the ‘clear
absence of all jurisdiction.’ ” (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
(1872))). Elansari’s conclusory allegation that Judge Ruest used “outside-of-the-courtroom
procedural tactics to deprive [him] of a fair opportunity to challenge” his conviction, Ap-
pellant’s Br. 12, does not defeat that immunity.2
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
2
Because the Defendants were immune from suit, the District Court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in dismissing the complaint without allowing Elansari to amend it. See Grayson v.
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002) (indicating that a district court
should give a plaintiff leave to amend unless amendment would be inequitable or futile).
3