Kevin Coit v. Mr. Garman ( 2020 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 19-2580
___________
KEVIN COIT,
Appellant
v.
Mr. GARMAN, (Facility Manager);
Mr. PASQUALE (Unit Manager);
HARSHBARGER; Lt. GATES;
LYTLE; CLEVELAND; CO CONDO; CO FLOREY;
CO CONKLIN; CO SEYMOUR;
CO Ward; CO EDWARDS;
HEARING EXAMINER PILOSI
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-01438)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 6, 2020
Before: SHWARTZ, RESTREPO and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 5, 2020)
_________
OPINION *
_________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM
Kevin Coit, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s order
granting summary judgment to the defendants. For the reasons detailed below, we will
affirm.
I.
Coit, who was previously housed at SCI-Rockview, brought this action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against 12 prison officials at that institution, asserting claims under the
First and Eighth Amendments for excessive force, sexual assault, failure to protect,
deliberate indifference, excessive cell searches, unconstitutional conditions of
confinement, retaliation, and denial of access to the courts. The District Court granted
summary judgment in the defendants’ favor on the merits. 1
Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows. On February 24, 2017, Coit was
handcuffed so he could be brought to participate in a mental health program. He refused
a pat down and was placed back in his cell, where he refused to let officers remove his
handcuffs. A struggle ensued, during which Coit claims the officers used excessive force
and inserted an object into his anus. The incident was recorded on video. After the
handcuffs were removed, Coit began cutting himself with a piece of glass from a broken
desk light. He was then escorted to the medical unit for treatment. After this incident,
Coit’s cell was searched six or seven times over the next two months.
1
We note that the defendants also argued that Coit had failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. The District Court disagreed, concluding that he had properly
exhausted. The defendants have not challenged that holding on appeal.
2
On March 22, 2017, Coit told a prison official that another inmate, Jones, had
threatened to stab him. Later that day, as Coit was being escorted, Jones pounced on him
and stabbed him several times in the back of the head with a piece of metal mesh.
Officers quickly moved to protect Coit, and he was immediately given medical attention.
The wound did not require bandages or stitches. The stabbing incident was recorded on
video.
On April 10, 2017, Coit was involuntarily escorted to the medical unit after he
refused 10 consecutive meals. He claimed a correctional officer punched him in the back
of the head en route, and that, upon arrival, corrections officers used excessive force in
removing his clothes and placing him in a suicide smock. He also claimed an officer
inserted a finger into his anus. During the incident, Coit resisted and ended up face first
on the floor, resulting in minor injuries to his nose and lip. This incident was also
recorded on video.
At a disciplinary hearing held on April 17, 2017, Coit pleaded guilty to charges of
threatening and assaulting an officer by throwing a cup of liquid at the officer. Coit said
it was water; the charges claimed it was urine. He was sentenced to 180 days of
disciplinary conduct (the maximum amount permissible). He was also found guilty of a
charge of unauthorized use of a telephone. He lost phone privileges for 180 days.
From May 16, 2017 through May 30, 2017, Coit was confined in his cell in the
secure residential treatment unit for 24 hours a day, with the lights on, no running water,
and “very little food.” The cell was cold and he was deprived of a blanket and sheets.
3
Coit smeared his own feces and blood on the wall; he cut himself with a staple to produce
the blood.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants. See
Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014).
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions” of the record
which demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving
party then must present specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c)(1), (e)(2); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
court should grant summary judgment where the non-movant’s evidence is merely
colorable or not significantly probative, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, because “[w]here
the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial,’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted).
III.
4
We begin by noting that Coit has waived his claim for denial of access to the
courts by failing to raise them in his brief. See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197,
222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[A]n appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening
brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”). The defendants assert that Coit has
waived his other claims by failing to raise them on appeal. However, we conclude that
Coit’s other claims were properly presented in his brief.
With regard to Coit’s Eighth Amendment claims for excessive force, sexual
assault, failure to protect, and deliberate indifference concerning the incidents of
February 24, March 22, and April 10, 2017, we conclude that summary judgment was
properly granted in favor of the defendants for the reasons explained by the District
Court. In short, our review of the video evidence confirmed that the defendants were
clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law regarding these claims. See Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one
of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe
it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for
summary judgment.”).
Defendants were also entitled to summary judgment as to Coit’s claim for
excessive cell searches. The Supreme Court has held that prisoners have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in their cells, but has noted that the Eighth Amendment protects
prisoners against corrections officers “rid[ing] roughshod over inmates’ property rights
with impunity,” in a “calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs.” Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984). As explained by the District Court, there is no
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genuine issue of material fact that the searches, which began after Coit’s February 24,
2017 self-mutilation, were for his safety, and not to harass him.
With regard to Coit’s retaliation claim, the defendants concede that filing
grievances is a constitutionally protected activity, and that excessive disciplinary time can
constitute an adverse action. 2 Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (“A
prisoner alleging retaliation must show (1) constitutionally protected conduct, (2) an
adverse action by prison officials sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from
exercising his constitutional rights, and (3) a causal link between the exercise of his
constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him.”) (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted). With regard to a causal link, the District Court concluded that
Coit had “presented no evidence to suggest that the sanction imposed by defendant Pilosi
was not reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.” (Dkt. No. 85 at 21).
However, in his sworn complaint, Coit alleged that after defendant Pilosi, the hearing
officer, imposed his disciplinary time, she told him “this is what you get for filing
grievances and making p.r.e.a complaints.” 3 As acknowledged by the District Court, (id.
at 5 n.3), a sworn complaint can be treated as an affidavit on summary judgment. See,
e.g., Reese v. Sparks, 760 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1985).
The defendants argue that summary judgment was properly granted in light of
Coit’s response at his deposition to the question of why he believed that defendant Pilosi
was biased against him: “Because they had no evidence to support any of the allegations.
2
The defendants do not concede that Coit’s disciplinary time was excessive.
3
Presumably, “p.r.e.a” referred to the Prison Rape Elimination Act
6
She had told me personally that this is what I get for assaulting her officers.” (Dkt. No.
60-1 at 74). Given that one of the charges to which Coit pleaded guilty was for assault
(although he denied that there was urine in the cup he had thrown), Pelosi’s attributed
statement does not evince a motive to retaliate, but rather provides a logical explanation
for the sanction imposed. In other words, the statement appears to be little more than an
observation that prison rules provide for punishment for disciplinary infractions.
Furthermore, nowhere in Coit’s responsive filings to the summary judgment motion did
he assert that defendant Pilosi told him that he was being sanctioned for filing grievances
or complaints. In light of the glaring omission of Coit’s key complaint allegation from
both his deposition testimony and his filings in response to the summary judgment
motion, we will consider this allegation, in these circumstances, to effectively be a sham
affidavit, and conclude that no reasonable jury could afford it evidentiary weight. See
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”)
(citation omitted); cf. Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 691 F.3d 527, 547 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing the sham affidavit doctrine; i.e., a contradictory sworn statement or
omission); Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007).4
Accordingly, summary judgment was appropriately granted with respect to the retaliation
claim.
4
Although typically we have applied the sham affidavit doctrine when the affidavit in
question was filed in response to a summary judgment motion, given the circumstances
of this case, we find that it is applicable here.
7
The District Court also appropriately granted summary judgment on Coit’s
conditions-of-confinement claim. Although Coit claimed that from May 16 through May
29, 2017, he was confined in a cold cell with no sheets or blankets, he testified at his
deposition that he was given a suicide smock after a few hours. It is undisputed that he
was coming off of a suicide attempt, thus providing legitimate penological reason for
removing items from the cell (such as sheets, blankets, and pillows), which he could use
to either harm himself or block guards from observing his condition. Cf. Mammana v.
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 934 F.3d 368 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that the plaintiff had an
Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim where, inter alia, plaintiff was kept
in a cold cell with paper thin clothing for four days, and noting that “denying a prisoner
appropriate clothing with no legitimate penological reason may offend the Eighth
Amendment.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, Coit’s
allegations that his cell was cold were vague and conclusory and did not elaborate with
specificity regarding the severity of the cold or the harm he faced. See id. at 373 (noting
that the Eighth Amendment “does not mandate comfortable prisons,” and that for a
successful claim, an inmate must show that he is incarcerated “under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted);
Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2018) (explaining that conclusory
statements are insufficient to withstand summary judgment); Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934
F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that “vague statements” are insufficient to create a
material question of fact precluding summary judgment). Furthermore, although Coit
claimed he received “very little food” and that the water in his cell was shut off, it was
8
undisputed that he had a history of engaging in hunger strikes (including during the
month prior), he in no way elaborated on what “very little food” constituted, and by all
indications in the record he had access to drinking water (just not running water). See
Mammana, 934 F.3d at 373; Paladino, 885 F.3d at 208; Quiroga, 934 F.2d at 500. He
also did not allege or testify as to any issues that arose from his bare bones claim of not
having running water. Cf. Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 365 (3d Cir. 1992) (“When
viewed in their totality, the alleged actions of Lewisburg prison officials -- not allowing
Young to leave his cell more than once to defecate or urinate over a period of several
days, not providing Young with a plastic urinal for 29 hours, not allowing Young to
empty his urinal more than twice, not allowing Young to wash his hands before eating,
not allowing Young to bathe or shower, not providing Young with toilet paper despite his
diarrhea, not providing Young with water to drink, suggesting instead that he drink his
urine, and the mocking taunts by guards and their threats to chain Young to a steel slab if
he complained about his conditions -- would if proved demonstrate a violation of the
basic concepts of humanity and decency that are at the core of the protections afforded by
the Eighth Amendment.”). The totality of these alleged circumstances, combined with
Coit’s claim that he smeared his own feces and blood on the wall, are insufficient to
support an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim.
Lastly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Coit’s motion for
appointment of counsel. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1993). While
it seems apparent that Coit suffers from some mental health issues, he nonetheless seems
9
capable of adequately proceeding in a pro se capacity. Cf. Powell v. Symons, 680 F.3d
301 (3d Cir. 2012).
10