Jason Wright v. Attorney General United States ( 2020 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 19-1166
______
JASON ANTHONY WRIGHT,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A206-473-310)
Immigration Judge: Mirlande Tadal
____________
Argued March 11, 2020
Before: McKEE, AMBRO, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 16, 2020)
Ingrid D. Johnson [ARGUED]
Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath
105 College Road East
P.O. Box 627, Suite 300
Princeton, NJ 08542
Counsel for Petitioner
Imran R. Zaidi [ARGUED]
United States Department of Justice
Office of Immigration Litigation
P.O. Box 878
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044
Counsel for Respondent
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OPINION*
____________
PHIPPS, Circuit Judge.
Jason Anthony Wright, a native and citizen of Jamaica, petitions for review of the
denial of his request for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Wright
was admitted to the United States in 2007 on a nonimmigrant visa, and he overstayed. In
2014, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him,
and Wright conceded removability. In 2016 and 2017, Wright was convicted in New
Jersey state court of three drug crimes involving the manufacture and distribution of or
intent to manufacture heroin.
At the removal proceedings, Wright sought asylum, withholding of removal, and
CAT protection on the grounds that he would suffer violence as a bisexual man upon his
return to Jamaica. Finding that Wright had been convicted of at least one particularly
serious crime, the Immigration Judge (IJ) determined that by statute Wright was
ineligible for all forms of relief except CAT deferral of removal. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(B); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2). For that request, the IJ concluded
that Wright did not demonstrate that he would be personally at risk of torture or that the
government would consent or acquiesce to his torture. Wright administratively appealed
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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only the denial of the CAT deferral, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) issued
a final order of removal that adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision.
In petitioning for review of the BIA’s order, Wright presents only legal challenges,
which receive de novo review. See Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 153-54 (3d Cir.
2007). In exercising jurisdiction over Wright’s petition, the scope of review consists of
the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), but it may include portions of
the IJ’s opinion “only where the BIA has substantially relied on that opinion.” Camara v.
Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 2009); see also S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d
535, 543 (3d Cir. 2018); cf. Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 303, 310 (3d Cir.
2011) (“When the BIA issues its own decision on the merits, rather than a summary
affirmance, we review its decision, not that of the IJ.”). For the reasons below, we will
deny Wright’s petition for review.
I.
Wright argues that the BIA and the IJ ignored certain evidence and overvalued
other evidence. According to Wright, those constitute legal errors for failing to consider
“all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture,” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3), and
for violating his due process rights to a full factfinding and an individualized
determination.
Wright contends that the BIA and the IJ ignored country reports and other
evidence supporting a likelihood that he would be tortured as a bisexual male upon return
to Jamaica. But neither the BIA nor the IJ ignored that evidence. Wright premises much
of his argument on the BIA’s citation to “just one out-of-context phrase from a larger
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report” about the lack of state persecution. But the BIA did consider more completely the
country reports he presented, as evidenced by the BIA’s acknowledgment of the
“harassment and violence directed at the LGBT community in Jamaica” described in
those reports. Decision of the BIA at 2 (AR 4). Similarly, the IJ stated that “[a]ll
admitted evidence has been considered in its entirety,” and noted that “the country
conditions reports highlight various societal abuses against the LGBT community.”
Decision and Order of Immigration Judge at 2, 13 (AR 32, 43). Thus, Wright fails to
establish that the IJ and BIA ignored evidence or otherwise violated due process. See
Pieschacon-Villegas, 671 F.3d at 310 (explaining that while the BIA cannot ignore
evidence, it “has [the] discretion to hold that . . . evidence is insufficient to meet
[petitioner’s] burden”); Zhu v. Att’y Gen., 744 F.3d 268, 272 (3d Cir. 2014) (explaining
that the BIA does not need to “expressly parse each point or discuss each piece of
evidence presented”).
Wright further submits that in rejecting his assertion of a likelihood of future
torture, the BIA erred by adopting the IJ’s decision, which considered an abuse-free time
during Wright’s childhood in Jamaica. The likelihood-of-future-torture analysis involves
“all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture,” including evidence of “past
torture inflicted upon the applicant.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). The IJ dutifully
accounted for past violence against Wright:
[Wright] testified that he was bullied and beaten in primary school on one
occasion. He was also molested by his cousin between the ages of nine and
11, but has not been subjected to any other form of harm in Jamaica since.
3
Decision and Order of Immigration Judge at 13 (AR 43). The completeness of the IJ’s
review – noting both instances of violence and abuse-free periods – does not constitute
legal error because the nature and frequency of past abuse is relevant to the possibility of
future torture.
II.
Wright next asserts that the BIA incorrectly imposed a heightened legal standard
for proving torture. Wright correctly contends that he must show a more-likely-than-not
risk of torture upon removal. See Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 515 (3d Cir. 2017)
(explaining standard); 8 C.F.R. 1208.16(c)(2). But from there he misconstrues the record
to suggest that the BIA required him to show that “individuals will be looking for him,”
AR 3. The BIA analyzed whether people would be looking for him because Wright
argued that he would be sought out and tortured because of his bisexuality. Thus it was
Wright, not the BIA, who attempted to make that potentially heightened showing. The
BIA for its part applied the correct ‘more likely than not’ standard.
***
In rejecting Wright’s petition for CAT deferral, the BIA did not – independently or
through adoption of the IJ’s decision – commit an error of law in evaluating whether
Wright would experience a likelihood of future torture.1 The BIA did not perform a
1
Because Wright fails in challenging the likelihood of torture, it is unnecessary to evaluate
his challenge to governmental acquiescence. See Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 507-
08 (3d Cir. 2012) (requiring for CAT deferral that an alien demonstrate a likelihood of
future harm and either governmental involvement or governmental acquiescence); see also
Quinteros v. Att’y Gen., 945 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 2019); Myrie, 855 F.3d at 515.
4
“selective rather than plenary review” of the evidence. Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d
372, 388 (3d Cir. 2010). Nor did the BIA misapply governing legal standards or deny
him due process. Thus, we will deny his petition.
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